Roger Anthony Sydney Pinnock

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting police investigative narrative evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his alibi, infringing his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal held that the investigative narrative evidence was properly admitted in reply because the defence had attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The Court also found that while some of the Crown's cross-examination and jury address regarding the appellant's right to silence and false alibi were problematic, the trial judge's instructions adequately protected the appellant's fair trial rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a minor.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of the assaults, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, ignored evidence about his apparel, and misapprehended video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.(D.) test were sufficient and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The applicant brought motions to re-open two appeals that had been dismissed as abandoned due to non-attendance and non-compliance.

The first motion related to a summary conviction appeal, which the court dismissed because it did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The second motion related to a conviction appeal for failing to comply with a court order.

The court dismissed the second motion, finding that the explanation offered for the non-attendance and non-compliance was cast into serious doubt by information before the court, and it would not be in the interests of justice to re-open the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest and sexual assault, as well as his four-year concurrent sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, shifted the burden of proof, and misapplied the W.D. test for credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidence, properly applied the burden of proof, and accurately reflected the W.D. framework.

The sentence was also upheld as the finding of a pattern of assaults was reasonable.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's refusal to make a mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The respondent conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the trial judge offered no explanation for refusing the mandatory order, and issued a 20-year SOIRA order.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after stabbing the deceased.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in ruling that adducing evidence of the deceased's attempt to recruit young boys for armed robberies would put the appellant's own propensity for violence in issue.

He also argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the adoption of prior inconsistent statements by witnesses who had no present recollection of the events.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidentiary ruling was correct and that while the jury instruction on prior statements was erroneous, it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a no-probative value instruction regarding his attempted suicide, by conducting a lengthy review of evidence, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a strong case of planning and deliberation based on handwritten notes and the appellant's actions prior to the murder.

The court noted defence counsel had used the attempted suicide evidence as part of the defence theory and found no error in the trial judge's review of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a special instruction on the reliability of his confession and that Crown counsel's conduct caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were sufficient as the appellant had testified and explained why he falsely confessed.

The court also found that while some of the Crown's conduct was unfortunate, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice, noting that defence counsel raised no concerns at trial.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had excluded observations made by the police officer as the respondent exited his vehicle, treating them as compelled direct participation in roadside sobriety tests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that observations made as a driver exits a vehicle, even in response to an officer's direction, do not constitute compelled direct participation under the Milne and Orbanski framework.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements and evidence of his prior discreditable conduct, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of this evidence.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the sentence was fit given the history of domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud over $5,000.

He argued the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process because they were allegedly used solely to collect a civil debt owed to the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no improper purpose behind the prosecution despite some ill-advised emails from Crown counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month imprisonment and $22,500 restitution order were within the appropriate range and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of offences relating to a home invasion.

While in custody, he had an incriminating conversation with a co-accused in a police cell, which was overheard by police.

The appellant appealed, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was infringed because police delayed his access to a lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 10(b) breach due to the unjustified delay, though it held the police did not actively elicit the conversation.

Applying s. 24(2), the Court excluded the conversation, finding the breach was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The convictions related to the home invasion were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to exclude breathalyser results under s. 24(2) of the Charter and overturn the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that any breach was minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the accused suffered no prejudice as he spoke with duty counsel and was satisfied with the advice.

The Court concluded that excluding the reliable breathalyser evidence would do more harm than good to the administration of justice, and restored the conviction.

The appellant appealed from an order upholding a committal order made by a preliminary hearing judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the reviewing judge, while endorsing the reviewing judge's remark that the extent of the preliminary hearing judge's questioning of witnesses was difficult to understand or condone.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the distinction between murder and manslaughter, after-the-fact evidence, and the defence theory of natural causes.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge, noting the lack of objections from trial counsel.

The fresh evidence application was denied as it did not meet the Palmer test and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict given the powerful circumstantial evidence of culpable homicide.

The appellant appealed his convictions for prostitution-related offences, assault, and sexual assault, as well as his designation as a long-term offender and the ten-year supervision order.

He raised evidentiary issues regarding a prior consistent statement and collateral evidence of the complainant's subsequent conduct, and argued the jury charge was inadequate and lacked a Vetrovec warning.

He also challenged the validity of the Attorney General's consent for the long-term offender application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the long-term offender proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after causing the victim's death through severe internal injuries inflicted during a sexual assault.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement made to police at the scene, in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, in failing to limit the use of post-offence conduct, and in instructing on sexual arousal and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement was voluntary as the appellant was not detained or a suspect.

While the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that post-offence conduct could not be used to determine the level of culpability between murder and manslaughter, the court applied the curative proviso as the error caused no substantial wrong.