Leslie Maunder

The Law Society of Ontario investigated the appellant lawyer for failing to promptly and completely produce documents related to his firm's structure and referral fee practices, breaching Rule 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division found professional misconduct, which was upheld by the Appeal Division and the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that the lower courts erred by applying a purely objective test to "good faith" in the duty to cooperate, effectively creating an absolute liability offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the test for failure to cooperate is a mixed subjective and objective one, considering all circumstances and good faith efforts, but clarified that ignorance of record-keeping obligations cannot serve as a "good faith explanation" for delay.

The applicant brought an application under section 35(9) of the Mental Health Act to permit the disclosure of the respondent's psychiatric records for a capacity hearing before the Law Society Tribunal.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the records were not essential to the hearing.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the records were highly relevant and important to determining the respondent's capacity to practice law, and that the respondent's privacy interests were diminished due to his membership in a regulated profession.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Tribunal for failing to cooperate with an investigation and produce requested documents.

The appellant argued that the Law Society was required to seek his response to the complaint before authorizing the use of investigative powers under s. 49.3(2) of the Law Society Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Law Society has no obligation to seek a response before authorizing an investigation, and that the appellant was obligated to cooperate.

The court also rejected arguments that the Law Society improperly delegated authority, fettered its discretion, or engaged in a fishing expedition.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division upholding a finding that he failed to co-operate with a Law Society investigation into his firm's referral practices.

The appellant argued that his delay in providing financial records was due to confusion and misunderstanding, and that the Appeal Division interpreted the concept of 'good faith' too narrowly.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Division reasonably concluded that good faith requires more than an absence of bad faith, and that ignorance of professional obligations or negligence in fulfilling them does not constitute good faith.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which upheld a Hearing Panel's decision regarding the use of a prior civil judgment in disciplinary proceedings against him.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the merits and a correctness standard to the issue of abuse of process.

Finding no error in the Hearing Panel's reasons, the court dismissed the appeal and awarded agreed costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The applicant, a disbarred lawyer, applied to the Law Society for a new licence.

After an investigation raised good character concerns, the matter was referred to a hearing.

The applicant brought a motion to quash the referral, which ultimately resulted in a consent dismissal of his licence application.

He then applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review and an order of mandamus compelling the Law Society to issue him a licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that mandamus was unavailable because the applicant had an alternative remedy: he could simply re-apply for a licence and establish his good character at a hearing.

The court also rejected his arguments regarding procedural unfairness.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld the Hearing Division's finding that she knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in six real estate transactions and revoked her licence.

The appellant argued the Hearing Division lacked jurisdiction to render a decision with only two members, improperly relied on an expert report, and unreasonably found she had the requisite intent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act permitted the two remaining members to complete the hearing, the expert report was properly used to understand red flags of fraud, and the finding of knowing participation in fraud was reasonable.

The applicant lawyer sought judicial review of a decision by the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which had overturned a Hearing Division decision and ordered her interlocutory suspension pending a conduct application.

The Law Society alleged the applicant was involved in the misuse of trust funds and had facilitated the practice of law by her suspended former partner, with whom she had resumed a romantic relationship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeal Division reasonably concluded the Hearing Division had misapprehended evidence amounting to an error of law, and that the interlocutory suspension was necessary to protect the public interest.

The appellant, a paralegal, sought an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory costs order and an appeal panel decision of the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The appellant had been charged with exceeding his authority by representing clients on super summary offences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the interlocutory costs order.

The court also declined to extend the time to appeal the appeal panel decision, concluding there was no merit to the proposed appeal and that the interests of justice required the appellant to raise his factual and constitutional arguments at a new disciplinary hearing.

The appellant lawyer was disciplined by the Law Society for failing to co-operate with an investigation into a mortgage transaction.

He refused to provide documents until the Law Society disclosed an electronic copy of a complaint letter he believed was backdated.

The Hearing Panel found he failed to co-operate, imposing a one-month suspension and costs, which the Appeal Panel upheld.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court upheld the finding of professional misconduct but set aside the penalty and costs.

The court found the Hearing Panel made procedurally unfair findings on issues it had deemed irrelevant, and erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor justifying specific deterrence.

The applicant, a paralegal, sought judicial review of a Law Society appeal panel decision that set aside findings of professional misconduct against him but directed a new hearing rather than staying the proceedings.

The applicant argued the appeal panel breached procedural fairness and provided insufficient reasons for refusing the stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the appeal panel reasonably concluded that the stay request should be addressed by a new hearing panel with the benefit of a full evidentiary record.

The appellant brought a motion seeking disclosure of an electronic version of a letter to adduce as fresh evidence on his upcoming appeal of a Law Society disciplinary decision.

The appellant had previously brought similar motions before the Hearing Panel and Appeal Panel, which were dismissed on the basis that the letter was irrelevant to the allegation of failure to cooperate.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence sought was not 'fresh evidence' but rather evidence previously ruled irrelevant, and the proper route to challenge that ruling was through the appeal itself.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that reinstated a particular of professional misconduct in a Notice of Application, which had been struck by the Hearing Panel.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, finding the Appeal Panel's decision defensible as the Notice provided sufficient information for the appellant to know the case to meet.

The court also upheld the Appeal Panel's order requiring the appellant to repay costs he had received from the Law Society, as the foundation for that costs award fell away when the Hearing Panel's decision was overturned.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Appeal Panel decision dismissing his appeal from a Hearing Panel that denied his application for a paralegal licence.

The Hearing Panel found he did not meet the good character requirement because he had breached a previous undertaking not to provide unauthorized legal services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's motion to introduce fresh evidence and dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Law Society moved to strike a portion of the appellant's notice of appeal on the basis that it was filed outside the 30-day time limit prescribed by Rule 61.04.

The appellant had appealed a decision on the merits and a subsequent costs decision, believing the time to appeal the merits ran from the date of the costs decision.

The court found the appeal of the merits decision was out of time, but exercised its discretion under Rule 3.02 to extend the time for filing, noting the lack of prejudice to the Law Society and the inextricable link between the merits and costs decisions.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society's Appeal Panel upholding the revocation of his license to practice law following criminal convictions for sexual exploitation of two minors.

The appellant argued the penalty was too harsh given his prior good character and cooperation, and that the panels erred in assessing remorse and character evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the panels' decisions reasonable and that revocation was an appropriate penalty for sexual misconduct involving a breach of trust with young persons.

The Crown appealed an order requiring it to pay $18,000 in costs to nine respondents who were arrested during a major gang takedown.

The respondents had been detained for more than 24 hours without a bail hearing and were remanded for periods exceeding the statutory limit, prompting them to bring habeas corpus applications.

The application judge found systemic failures by the Crown to prepare for the mass arrests, resulting in breaches of the respondents' Charter rights, and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's failure to ensure adequate court resources for the predictable influx of detainees constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, justifying the exceptional remedy of costs.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and leaving the scene of an accident.

The accused had run over the victim with her car following an altercation, and the main issue at trial was whether she acted intentionally or accidentally out of panic.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to consider the accused's crack cocaine consumption in relation to her state of mind.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the instruction was a proper 'rolled-up charge' rather than a stand-alone intoxication defence, and concluded that even if there was an error, it would not have had a material bearing on the acquittals.

The applicant appealed a committal for extradition on the basis that he was not linguistically present during the proceedings, as they were not interpreted for him.

The respondent conceded this point.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the committal order, and ordered a new committal hearing, noting that under section 70(1) of the Extradition Act, the required presence of the person sought includes linguistic presence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter with intent to commit theft, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly consider frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence and effectively reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the frailties, including issues with the photo line-up and discrepancies in the description, and made no error warranting appellate intervention.