Leslie Maunder

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence.

She abandoned her conviction appeal, which was consequently dismissed.

Despite commending the appellant's sincere efforts at rehabilitation and addressing her drug addiction, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence to be fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in a Corbett application by admitting his 28-year-old manslaughter conviction after finding defence counsel attacked the arresting officer's character.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Corbett test.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded the 10-year sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal and reduced the sentence to 5 years' imprisonment.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded prohibited handgun during a traffic stop.

At trial, he was acquitted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge found he lacked the requisite mens rea, specifically knowledge that the barrel length was under 105 mm.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mens rea for s. 95(1) only requires knowledge that the accused is in possession of a loaded firearm, not knowledge of the specific characteristics that make it prohibited or restricted.

The Court also declined to stay the proceedings despite a three-year delay by the Crown in perfecting the appeal, finding no abuse of process.

A conviction was entered.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police and was found carrying a loaded prohibited handgun.

He was acquitted at trial of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm on the basis that he lacked the requisite mens rea, as he did not know the barrel was shorter than 105 millimetres.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mens rea under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code only requires the offender to know they are in possession of a loaded firearm, regardless of whether it is prohibited or restricted.

The Court also declined to stay the proceedings despite a nearly three-year delay by the Crown in perfecting the appeal, finding no actual prejudice.

The appellants pleaded guilty to manslaughter following a home invasion robbery and were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to their guilty pleas and remorse, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the usual 8 to 12 year range for brutal manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and was justified in departing from the range due to serious aggravating factors, including the appellants' lengthy records for violent crimes, the fact they were on parole, and the gratuitous violence inflicted on a vulnerable victim.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The appellant was serving a conditional sentence when he was arrested for new offences.

A warrant for his arrest for breaching the conditional sentence was issued and later executed.

The breach hearing commenced 33 days after the warrant was executed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the breach, arguing the hearing was not held within the 30-day period required by s. 742.6(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 30-day period is triggered by the execution of the warrant for the breach, not its issuance or the arrest for the new offences, and that the 33-day delay was as soon as practicable in the circumstances.

The appellants appealed convictions and penitentiary sentences arising from prolonged physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of a vulnerable complainant in a domestic setting.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge conflated credibility and reliability, misapprehended medical and nursing evidence, rendered unreasonable verdicts, or misapplied the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

Reading the reasons as a whole, the court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire evidentiary record, the defence fabrication theory, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeals were dismissed as the global sentences, including consecutive terms for one appellant, were fit.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari and setting aside his discharge at a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by dealing with the evidence on a piecemeal basis and choosing among competing inferences rather than considering the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for causing unnecessary suffering to a dog by choking it.

He argued that he was merely defending himself from unnecessary force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was an evidentiary basis for the trial judge to reject the self-defence claim and conclude the appellant caused unnecessary suffering.

The Crown appealed a youth sentence but conceded the appeal was moot as it was no longer seeking a custodial disposition.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding it was largely fact-driven and not an exceptional case.

The appeal was dismissed for mootness.

The Crown appealed the sentence of four years' imprisonment (less 32 months' credit for pre-sentence custody) imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of probation.

The respondent had pled guilty to these offences.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the sentencing judge carefully analyzed the evidence, applied appropriate principles, and considered mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, youth, difficult upbringing, and rehabilitative potential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari to quash a decision made at the conclusion of a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by considering the evidence in isolated segments rather than as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 11(b) Charter analysis by not giving adequate weight to the harm to his health caused by the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to diminish the force of the prejudice claim because the appellant failed to raise health concerns before the motion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in rejecting a conditional sentence after considering the appellant's health problems.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of undisclosed evidence.

At trial, evidence suggested a witness had been charged but the charges were dropped due to a 'glitch', when in fact the witness was never charged.

The Court of Appeal applied the principles from R. v. Dixon and found that the failure to disclose this information impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, as counsel could not adequately explore whether the witness's testimony was a quid pro quo for not being charged.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of offences relating to a home invasion.

While in custody, he had an incriminating conversation with a co-accused in a police cell, which was overheard by police.

The appellant appealed, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was infringed because police delayed his access to a lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 10(b) breach due to the unjustified delay, though it held the police did not actively elicit the conversation.

Applying s. 24(2), the Court excluded the conversation, finding the breach was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The convictions related to the home invasion were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a long-term offender, was convicted of breaching a condition of his long-term supervision order that required him to report any relationships entered into with females.

He had engaged in a 90-minute conversation with a woman at a laundromat and gave her his phone number, which he did not report to his supervisor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was meant to capture relationships with some mutual level of involvement, not casual encounters or unsuccessful attempts to initiate a relationship.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether the triers in the jury selection process understood their role or were biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no obligation for such an inquiry and that a 'Yes' response during a challenge for cause does not automatically disqualify a potential juror.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a shooting in a high school gymnasium, as well as his 18-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing expert evidence on eyewitness identification, admitting in-dock identification, and in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-year sentence was manifestly fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's record and the danger posed to bystanders.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences for acting as the getaway driver in an armed jewellery store robbery.

At trial, the Crown introduced hearsay evidence from the deceased store owner, who had previously testified at a co-accused's sentencing hearing and identified the appellant as having visited the store the day before the robbery.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting this hearsay evidence and failing to properly instruct the jury on its frailties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence met the principled exception tests of necessity and reliability, and the jury instructions were adequate.