John Patton

The appellant, Xiu Jin Teng, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder and her sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was the trial judge's dismissal of her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, which the trial judge found was not bona fide but an attempt to delay the trial.

Other grounds included Charter breaches (s. 11(b) right to trial within reasonable time, s. 10(a) and (b) detention rights), jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Rowbotham application was an abuse of process and that the trial was fair.

It also found no Charter breaches, no error in jury instructions, and that the conviction was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was allowed on a narrow point, varying a communication prohibition order to allow for family law-related communications.

The appellant, Margaret Lee Cole, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of Richard Humble, who died in a house fire.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive (forged documents and will), the presence of a sedative (Alprazolam) in the victim's system (prescribed to the appellant), a false alibi, and other suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting extrinsic misconduct evidence (the "Chapman letters") and in the jury's instruction on its use, as well as in the jury's instruction on the fabricated alibi.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown's case was overwhelmingly strong and that the errors did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on sexual assault charges.

The trial judge had found both the complainant and the respondent credible but had a reasonable doubt, partly due to the complainant's inability to explain her entry into an abandoned trailer and her communication with her father after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by applying stereotypical views about sexual assault victims' behavior, specifically by inferring consent from the complainant's entry into the trailer and by judging her credibility based on her communication with her father.

The court also found an error in the exclusion of the complainant's prior consistent statement and demeanour evidence to her friend.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought interim judicial release pending her appeal, citing concerns about contracting COVID-19 in custody.

The court assessed the application under the public interest criterion of s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the grounds of appeal were not strong, the offence was exceptionally serious, the release plan was inadequate, and the COVID-19 risk in her institution was low, the court concluded that the applicant's detention remained necessary in the public interest.

The application for release was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the death of his girlfriend.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed her in a dispute about his drug abuse and theft of money to acquire drugs.

The appellant claimed he witnessed a drug dealer kill the victim.

The appeal addressed three grounds: (1) admissibility of a police statement taken in hospital; (2) jury direction regarding prior inconsistent statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt; and (3) rulings on third-party suspect evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for killing his uncle.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the Crown had misrepresented the mens rea required for murder by suggesting the jury could convict if the appellant "ought to have known" his actions would cause death.

Although the trial judge provided correct instructions on the law, his inadequate response to the jury's question about "ought to know" and his erroneous definition of recklessness created a real danger that the jury did not properly understand that subjective foresight of death was required.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed on March 21, 2012.

The appellant, who suffered from brain damage from meningitis, borderline personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and dysthymia, was self-represented during a complex dangerous offender hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that the proceeding was procedurally unfair due to multiple cumulative deficiencies: the failure to inquire whether the appellant wished to retain counsel despite facing severe jeopardy; the failure to conduct a fitness inquiry despite clear indicia that the appellant may not have been mentally present; the failure of amicus curiae to adequately protect the appellant's interests, including by conceding admissibility of psychiatric records and ultimately advocating in favour of the dangerous offender finding; and the failure to explore meaningful alternatives such as video linking to keep the appellant informed when she was absent from court.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

A violin teacher was acquitted at trial of 44 counts of sexual offences, including sexual assault, indecent assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation, arising from his conduct of requiring young female students to remove their bras and measuring their breasts under the guise of fitting shoulder rests for violins.

The trial judge found the touching was not for a sexual purpose and acquitted on all counts.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in law by conflating the requirement of sexual purpose (applicable only to sexual interference and sexual exploitation) with the requirement that conduct occur in circumstances of a sexual nature (applicable to sexual assault and indecent assault).

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the acquittals on sexual assault and indecent assault charges and entering convictions, while upholding the acquittals on sexual interference and sexual exploitation charges.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his wife following a trial by jury.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant attempted a planned murder-suicide.

The defence argued an unknown assailant was responsible.

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mental state required for murder, the treatment of the appellant's post-offence conduct and suicide attempt, and alleged imbalance in the instructions.

The appellant also made unsupported claims that evidence and exhibits were tampered with.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting outside an after-hours bar.

The Crown's case relied on surveillance video evidence, detective testimony identifying the appellant through multiple physical characteristics, and DNA evidence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge's exclusion of expert evidence from a physicist regarding whether a white spot on the surveillance video was a chain and medallion, and (2) the trial judge's failure to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence but allowed the appeal on the provocation issue, finding that the evidence satisfied the air of reality threshold for the defence.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 2, 2018, which maintained the same order as the previous year.

The Board concluded that despite the appellant's positive steps, events in spring 2017 and the appellant's lack of insight demonstrated that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion was open to it on the evidence and that there was no material misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal of a Criminal Code section 672.54(c) detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in concluding that he poses a significant risk to the public and that the Board committed a Carrick error by failing to make this determination independently of his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while a Board must make its own determination of dangerousness, it is entitled to rely on counsel's credible acknowledgement that the significant threat standard has been met, provided the Board does not abdicate its responsibility to assess the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and related offences arising from a home invasion and attack on his former intimate partner.

The Crown's case relied on direct identification evidence from the victim, circumstantial evidence including the victim's blood on the appellant's shoe and a warm vehicle at his residence, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

The appellant claimed he was at home at the time of the attack.

The trial judge failed to provide express instructions to the jury regarding the proper use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while such instructions would have been preferable, their absence did not render the trial unfair given the strength of the Crown's case on identity, the peripheral role of post-offence conduct evidence, and the absence of any request for such instructions by defence counsel.

The appellant also appealed his 13-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to consider his compliance with strict bail conditions as a mitigating factor and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 14 months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

The conviction arose from a second trial following a mistrial on a charge of aggravated assault of Tim Runge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in leaving assault causing bodily harm as an included offence to the jury, contending that the uncontested expert evidence of a serious and permanent brain injury established the elements of aggravated assault as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly left the included offence with the jury as there was an air of reality to it, and that defence counsel had requested the instruction.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings regarding aggravating factors.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their first-degree murder convictions and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a recantation by key Crown witness Ronnie Khananisho.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit the fresh evidence and confirmed the prior panel's dismissal of the appellants' appeals from conviction.

The court found that while the recantation was admissible and the due diligence requirement was satisfied, the evidence failed the cogency test.

The recantation suffered from serious credibility issues, including implausible origins involving contact with the incarcerated appellant's former girlfriend, and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial verdict given that the central witnesses were Jorge Restrepo and Jorge Acosta, whose testimony was corroborated by powerful independent evidence including cellphone records and medical evidence.

The Ontario Provincial Police and the Crown appealed an order by Nordheimer J. determining that certain materials seized under a search warrant were subject to litigation privilege and therefore not potentially evidence in any criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the order affected the enforcement or implementation of the search warrant, which is a judicial order made in a criminal investigation.

The court determined that judicial orders directed at the enforcement or implementation of a criminal order are themselves criminal in nature.

Consequently, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal in a criminal proceeding under the Courts of Justice Act, and the appeal was quashed.

A motion for directions regarding the proper route of appeal in a matter involving solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege over documents and audio files seized by the Ontario Provincial Police.

The moving parties sought clarification on whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The single judge in chambers declined to hear the motion and adjourned it to be heard by a three-judge panel, holding that questions of the court's jurisdiction must be decided by a panel, not a single judge.

The appellant appealed a disposition issued by the Ontario Review Board that imposed additional restrictions on his community access, reducing his indirectly supervised community access to a maximum of four hours with an approved itinerary and reducing day passes from seven days indirectly supervised to three days directly supervised.

The appellant challenged the disposition on multiple grounds, including that it was not the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, that the Board failed to carry out its inquisitorial mandate, that the Board focused exclusively on public safety, that a treatment impasse existed requiring Board intervention, and that the Board failed to consult the complete risk assessment report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the Board's disposition.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.