John Patton

Two appellants, Jemaine Phillips and Drai O'Hara-Salmon, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Said Hadbai in a parking lot across from Jack's Bar in London, Ontario on December 27, 2011.

Phillips, who fired the fatal shot, was convicted as the principal offender.

O'Hara-Salmon was convicted as a party to the offence under sections 21(1)(b), 21(1)(c), and 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

Phillips raised multiple grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's instructions on self-defence, the exclusion of expert psychiatric evidence, the failure to leave provocation with the jury, and various other charging issues.

O'Hara-Salmon raised grounds concerning the adequacy of instructions on party liability, the failure to give a W.(D.) instruction, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's conduct or instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempted murder, unlawful confinement, uttering death threats, and assaulting a police officer.

Although he pleaded guilty, he advanced a mental disorder defence seeking a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The trial judge rejected the NCR defence and imposed a sentence of 20 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, contending it was manifestly unfit and that insufficient weight was given to his mental illness as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction as abandoned and dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding the 20-year sentence was not manifestly unfit and that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's mental condition.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 years imprisonment following his guilty plea to counselling to commit murder and criminal harassment of his estranged wife.

The appellant also challenged a non-communication order imposed under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code that prevented him from communicating with his minor son while incarcerated.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the sentence and the non-communication order, finding the 12-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the aggravating circumstances and that the trial judge was entitled to impose the communication restriction for safety protection reasons.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder by a jury, based primarily on the recognition evidence of the victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and the victim's lack of credibility.

They also argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning, providing an insufficient jury charge on eyewitness identification, and admitting cellular telephone records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury instructions adequate, and the cellphone records properly admitted as voluntary statements.

The appellant was observed street racing and subsequently abandoned his vehicle in a stranger's driveway.

Police detained the appellant, conducted a pat-down search for officer safety, and discovered the vehicle's keys.

The appellant was arrested for careless driving and outstanding warrants.

Police impounded the vehicle as apparently abandoned under s. 221(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and conducted an inventory search, discovering a loaded handgun.

The trial judge found Charter breaches under s. 10 but admitted the handgun under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the sentence of seven years' imprisonment, finding the searches lawful and the sentence fit.

The appellant was observed acting suspiciously at a gas station and fled on foot when approached by police, leaving his unlocked vehicle behind.

Police searched the vehicle without a warrant, finding a Taser and a handgun.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the search was authorized as an inventory search of an abandoned vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the vehicle was not 'apparently abandoned' and the search violated section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that he continue to be detained at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, arguing he should be transferred to a less secure facility closer to his family.

The Board found that a transfer was premature given the appellant's ongoing threatening and sexually inappropriate behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and owed deference.

The appellants, a doctor and a nurse, were charged with fraud and forgery related to Health Canada's Medical Marijuana Licensing Scheme.

At the preliminary inquiry, they were committed for trial on fraud but discharged on forgery.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to the Superior Court, which quashed the discharge and remitted the matter, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of forgery.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly define the essential elements of forgery, failing to consider the whole of the evidence, and improperly weighing inferences.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his 81-year-old neighbour and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding bad character evidence and post-offence conduct, including the appellant's failure to call the police and his use of the victim's credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed competing inferences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the parole ineligibility period appropriate given the brutality of the murder.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined the appellant extensively about his knowledge of four other shootings in his neighbourhood to test his memory of when he heard about the shooting in this case.

The appellant appealed, arguing the cross-examination was unfair and amounted to trial by innuendo.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the cross-examination had very low probative value but high prejudicial effect, as it insinuated the appellant was involved in a violent subculture.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, with the court declining to apply the curative proviso because the unfair cross-examination resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of two bank robberies and sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The primary issue at trial was identity, with the Crown relying on DNA evidence found on a tissue in a discarded sweatshirt, video surveillance, and similar fact evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize weaknesses in the Crown's case regarding the continuity of the tissue, rendering the verdict unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 9-year sentence was fit for a repeat offender with a lengthy record of robbery convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury, arguing that the Crown made an inappropriate comment during closing submissions and that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that there is a presumption in law that a witness comes to court to tell their honest recollections.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown's comment was inappropriate, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court also held that the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice the appellant, as both the appellant and the complainant testified, and the jury was properly instructed on the factors for assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of administering a stupefying thing to enable sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two complainants.

They appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on evidence of the complainants' out-of-character conduct, misapprehended toxicological evidence, and improperly used post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting and using similar fact evidence by relying too heavily on generic similarities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly relied on specific similarities and correctly applied the law regarding the admissibility and use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The trial judge's discretionary determination was entitled to deference.

The 18-year-old appellant, a first-time offender, was convicted of multiple offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault following a violent home invasion.

The trial judge sentenced him to a total of nine years' imprisonment, holding that general deterrence and denunciation were the paramount sentencing considerations.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while general deterrence and denunciation are weighed heavily for serious violent crimes, individual deterrence and rehabilitation remain the primary objectives for a youthful first offender.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence to seven years by making the two-year sentence for unauthorized possession of a firearm concurrent rather than consecutive.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder after stabbing two strangers.

At trial, he did not contest the stabbings but claimed he intended to commit suicide.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence indicating he suffered from catatonic schizophrenia at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria.

Based on the unanimous and uncontradicted opinions of three forensic psychiatrists, the Court found the appellant established the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and verdicts of not criminally responsible were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a jury inquiry or declare a mistrial after the jury reported feeling uncomfortable because the appellant parked in the same area as them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the presumption of juror impartiality was not displaced and that an inquiry or mistrial was unnecessary.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that conditionally discharged him rather than granting an absolute discharge.

The appellant, who had been found NCRMD for assault offences, had recently been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder and his recovery remained unclear.

The Court of Appeal held that the board applied the proper test for significant risk of harm and that its decision was reasonable given the appellant's partial insight and the short time since his new diagnosis and treatment regime.

The appeal was dismissed.