Catriona Verner

Following the quashing of the appellant's conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to address the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had improperly grounded the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence on convictions for failure to comply with an undertaking, which are not serious personal injury offences.

The Court set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, substituting concurrent 30-day sentences for the failure to comply convictions.

The appellant, Stewart Pascal, appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appeal centered on the Crown's failure to disclose the criminal record and outstanding charges of a key Crown witness, Deidre Jarvis.

The Court found that the police knew about Jarvis's outstanding charges and had a disclosure obligation to provide this information to the Crown, who then had to disclose it to the defence.

The non-disclosure deprived the defence of crucial impeachment material, as Jarvis's second statement, given after charges were laid, was significantly more incriminating than her first.

The Court concluded that the non-disclosure impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, affecting both the reliability of the verdict and the overall fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, Jermaine Gager and Corey Leonard Smelie, appealed their murder convictions, with Mr. Smelie also seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

They raised several grounds, including errors in qualifying an expert witness on street gangs, inadequate jury instructions, erroneous dismissal of disclosure applications, inconsistent verdicts, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or conduct, and affirmed the fitness of the sentence imposed on Mr. Smelie.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for weapon and drug trafficking offences, arguing that the conditional sentence for possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking was illegal, the overall sentence was demonstrably unfit, and the sentencing judge overemphasized the respondent's rehabilitative prospects.

The Court of Appeal found that the conditional sentence for cocaine trafficking was an error of law but determined it did not impact the overall sentence.

The court upheld the original sentence length, deferring to the sentencing judge's discretion and her findings regarding the respondent's significant rehabilitative efforts.

The appeal was granted only to correct the illegality by reallocating presentence custody to specific counts, without altering the global sentence length.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual interference and incest.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by allowing improper cross-examination regarding the complainant's motive to fabricate and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal found both errors to be significant and prejudicial, particularly the improper cross-examination which risked shifting the burden of proof, and the lack of instruction on the prior inconsistent statement which could have led the jury to use it for the truth of its contents.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso, concluding that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same without these errors.

A new trial was ordered.

Two appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the death of Jagtar Gill, who was beaten with a metal bar, stabbed multiple times, and had her throat slashed.

The Crown's theory was that Bhupinderpal Gill (the victim's husband) and Gurpreet Ronald (with whom Gill was having an affair) conspired to commit the murder, with Ronald as the perpetrator.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of second degree murder for Ronald, leaving only verdicts of guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.

The appellants appealed on the basis that this instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to both their defences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to leave second degree murder as a possible verdict for Ronald, and that this error tainted the verdict against Gill as well, as it undermined his defence that Ronald acted alone without planning and deliberation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching but acquitted of sexual assault, all charges arising from the same facts and evidence.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Crown cross-appealed the acquittal, arguing that confusing jury instructions explained the inconsistency.

A five-judge panel was convened to resolve conflicting authorities regarding the role of jury instructions in inconsistent verdict analysis.

The majority held that the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. F. (J.) provides authoritative direction: if the Crown wishes to respond to an inconsistent verdict argument by asserting that an acquittal resulted from legal error in instructions, it must appeal the acquittal.

The majority found the instructions legally correct and declined to order a retrial, instead entering acquittals on the conviction counts.

The dissent would have allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding the charge confusing when viewed as a whole.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun, ammunition and cocaine when stopped by police while walking along a street late at night.

The trial judge found that several of the accused's constitutional rights were infringed by police but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, convicting the accused of various firearms offences and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed reversible error in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police conduct, excluded the evidence and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal, while leaving open the question of whether remedies other than exclusion of evidence may be available under s. 24(1) of the Charter when dealing with s. 24(2).

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a landlord.

The victim was stabbed 29 times and, while dying, made pointing gestures toward the appellant Nurse before expiring.

The appellants appealed on two grounds: (1) the admissibility of the victim's gestures as hearsay evidence, and (2) the lawfulness of a second forensic analysis of deleted BlackBerry Messenger chats conducted with updated software one year after the initial analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the gestures admissible under the dying declaration and spontaneous utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that the second analysis of previously extracted data did not constitute a fresh search requiring new authorization.

Appeal from conviction on two counts of rape and two counts of incest against the appellant's two sisters.

The appellant was convicted at trial and sentenced as a youth to two years in custody.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in limiting a section 276 application regarding cross-examination on allegations against other alleged assailants; (2) the trial judge misapprehended evidence on memory transference; (3) the trial judge improperly relied on similar fact evidence; and (4) the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing outside an Ottawa nightclub.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the conviction was unreasonable, focusing on whether the evidence supported the finding of planning and deliberation required for first degree murder.

The court found that while the appellant's guilt of murder was established, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding that the attack appeared impulsive rather than the product of a calculated scheme.

Two members of the YBK (Young Buck Killers) criminal organization appealed their convictions for gang-related offences including trafficking in firearms and drugs.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on trafficking charges, territorial jurisdiction, and hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no misdirection on the trafficking charges, no jurisdictional error as the offences had meaningful connections to Ontario, and no error in the admission of hearsay evidence.

The applicant's leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was upheld as proportionate to the serious offences committed in furtherance of a violent criminal organization.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing and killing an 18-year-old victim following a brief altercation.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 13 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: failure to leave the defence of provocation with the jury, failure to provide a rolled-up charge incorporating self-defence, provocation, and intoxication, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

The appellant also challenged the sentence on three grounds: erroneous finding that the appellant armed himself after being attacked, failure to treat provocation and self-defence as mitigating, and improper focus on lack of remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defence of provocation to the jury; (2) whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of evidence that the appellant did not apply the brakes immediately after striking the victim; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse Crown counsel for failing to disclose certain information communicated by a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of cocaine for trafficking after police officers detained him on a street in Windsor, Ontario without reasonable suspicion, violating his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found the detention arbitrary and the searches unlawful but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter breach by relying solely on the officers' subjective belief that they were not detaining the appellant.

The court found the police should have known they were exceeding their powers following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant, and excluded the evidence, entering acquittals on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts each of robbery, aggravated assault, and discharge of a firearm with intent to wound, arising from a bank robbery in Toronto.

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of his initial arrest on unrelated drug charges, arguing that evidence linking him to the bank robbery should have been excluded as the product of constitutional infringement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arrest was based on objectively reasonable grounds and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 26 months imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The trial judge found that the complainant, a 17-year-old first-year university student, was incapable of consenting to sexual activity due to her level of intoxication and unconsciousness during portions of the assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in understanding the distinction between "blacking out" and unconsciousness, in equating pain with lack of consent, and in drawing inferences about the complainant's intoxication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jonathan Chambers on March 7, 2007, north of Barrie.

The Crown's case relied heavily on evidence from three accomplices who had entered into plea agreements: Tafari Williams, Terrence Walker, and Gregory Millar.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence from Walker and Millar to confirm Williams' testimony despite potential tainting, and that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles and that any errors in misapprehension were not material to the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, requiring the appellant to explain bruises on the complainant when he had no such obligation.

The court also found that fresh evidence in the form of a CFS report on a penile swab, which showed no female DNA present, was of sufficient cogency to affect the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a bar security head, had smashed the complainant's head against glass doors and punched him in the face, causing lacerations including one that severed the complainant's tear duct.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding causation.

The Crown appealed the sentence of suspended passing and three-year probation.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made critical errors regarding the essential link between the appellant's assault and the wounding injury, but determined the appellant was properly found guilty of the included offence of assault simpliciter.

The court substituted the verdict accordingly and affirmed the sentence.