Catriona Verner

In a blended Charter voir dire and criminal trial, the accused challenged the admissibility of fentanyl evidence and evidence that he provided a false name following arrest.

The court found the arrest unlawful, concluding there were no lawful grounds to arrest for either drug possession or trespassing, and held that ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated, with an additional s. 10(a) breach identified in the analysis.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court found the police conduct serious and the impact on Charter-protected interests significant, such that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The fentanyl and false-name evidence were excluded, leaving no evidence to prove either count.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The defendant, Anthony Doiron-Francis, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault following a severe attack on a female stranger.

He admitted guilt to aggravated assault.

The court found him not guilty of attempted murder, concluding that the Crown failed to prove specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault, determining that the assault was objectively sexual in nature due to the circumstances, including the complainant's pants being pulled down during the struggle.

For sentencing purposes, the court found the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was sexually motivated.

The accused, Craig Willoughby, charged with impaired and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, brought a Charter application to exclude a blood sample.

The court found violations of Willoughby's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter rights, as the police officer lacked subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the subsequent blood demand.

While the s. 10(b) right to counsel was not violated, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the profound impact on the accused's bodily integrity outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, the blood sample was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Tristan Armstrong, faced charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm and cocaine for trafficking.

In a blended Charter application and trial, the court considered the admissibility of evidence.

The defence argued violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police search of the vehicle and person was unreasonable under s. 8, influenced by racial profiling, and that the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights to be informed of reasons for arrest and to counsel were violated.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2), the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the racial profiling and disregard for Charter rights, outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, despite the seriousness of the alleged offences.

Consequently, the gun, ammunition, and cocaine were excluded from evidence.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual interference against the defendant, D.C., involving his stepson, J.R., who was 10 years old at the time of the alleged assault.

J.R. was the sole witness, testifying via Zoom and through prior video statements to police.

The court assessed J.R.'s testimony, finding him believable and consistent on the core allegation.

However, the court noted a significant lack of specific details, several inconsistencies regarding minor facts, and a complete absence of corroborating evidence.

Applying the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, the court concluded that despite J.R.'s apparent truthfulness, the evidence was insufficient to be sure that the assault occurred as alleged.

Consequently, D.C. was found not guilty.

H.M. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation for having sexual relations with the complainant between 1995 and 1998, when she was 14-17 years old and he was in a position of trust.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the 18-year age difference, the prolonged nature of the abuse, the frequency and degrading nature of the sexual acts (including BDSM, anal intercourse, and video recording), and the severe, long-lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, sincere remorse, and a guilty plea.

Applying principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized deterrence and denunciation, rejecting the defence's argument against retroactive application of increased sentencing ranges for child sexual abuse.

The court balanced the severity of the offence with the offender's moral blameworthiness at the time, noting the then-lower maximum sentence and societal understanding.

H.M. was sentenced to 30 months in a federal institution.

The appellant appealed his convictions for child luring and possession of child pornography.

He argued that the search of his home computers violated his section 8 Charter rights, that his section 11(b) rights were breached due to delay, and that the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable steps test and assessing the mens rea for the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the search, no unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework, and that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and possessed the requisite mens rea.

The defendant, C.M., was charged with 24 sexual assault-related offences involving five complainants, all young female servers at his breakfast restaurant.

After some charges were stayed or dismissed, the court proceeded with 17 remaining counts.

The judgment meticulously analyzes the credibility and reliability of each complainant's testimony, considering factors such as "motive not to fabricate" and the potential for "tainted memory" from discussions among complainants.

The court found C.M. not guilty on most counts due to reasonable doubt, often influenced by contradictory defense evidence or concerns about the reliability of the complainants' memories.

However, C.M. was found guilty on four counts of sexual assault related to three complainants (V.F., E.R., and R.R.), where contemporaneous disclosure of the assaults provided sufficient reliability.

Sexual exploitation charges were dismissed due to insufficient proof of mens rea regarding the complainants' ages.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary reclassification from minimum to medium security and subsequent transfer.

The court addressed four issues: jurisdiction, mootness, compliance with procedural protections under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) ss. 27 and 87, and the reasonableness of the transfer decision.

The court found it had jurisdiction, the application was not moot, CSC complied with procedural requirements, and the decision to transfer was reasonable.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The accused, charged with domestic and sexual assault offences, brought a Stage Two application under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to adduce five private records belonging to the complainant.

The records included greeting cards, letters, and a social media message.

The defence argued the records contained prior inconsistent statements relevant to the complainant's credibility.

The court found that the records met the admissibility threshold, as they had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The application to adduce the records at trial was granted.

In a criminal trial for historical sexual assault, the court assessed the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

While the complainant was found credible, concerns regarding the reliability of her memory, including admitted weaknesses, haziness, and susceptibility to suggestion during initial disclosure, raised a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's mid-trial abscondment did not alter the assessment.

The Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

J.M. was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of threatening his former wife.

The complainant and the defendant provided diametrically opposed testimonies.

The court assessed the credibility of both witnesses, noting some implausibilities in the complainant's account and a possible motive to fabricate related to ongoing family law proceedings.

While the complainant was generally believable, the implausibilities and motive to fabricate raised a reasonable doubt.

For the threatening count, the court found insufficient evidence to prove the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt, given the lack of surrounding circumstances.

J.M. was acquitted on all three counts.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.