T. MacDonald

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter arising from a spontaneous altercation outside a Toronto pub in which an unarmed victim died from a single stab wound to the neck.

The parties jointly proposed a five-year penitentiary sentence but disputed whether additional credit should be granted for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns, triple-bunking, and inadequate medical treatment.

The court accepted that the detention conditions were deplorable and that the accused was denied adequate care for a wrist injury, but held that a further sentence reduction beyond standard Summers credit would render the sentence unfit and underweight denunciation and deterrence.

A five-year sentence was imposed with 566 days of pre-sentence credit, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The defendant brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 788 days (25 months and 25 days).

The court deducted 219 days attributable to defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 569 days (18.7 months), which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials under R. v. Jordan.

The Crown did not justify the delay.

The court found the defendant's s. 11(b) right was breached and stayed the charges.

The accused, Craig Willoughby, charged with impaired and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, brought a Charter application to exclude a blood sample.

The court found violations of Willoughby's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter rights, as the police officer lacked subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the subsequent blood demand.

While the s. 10(b) right to counsel was not violated, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the profound impact on the accused's bodily integrity outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, the blood sample was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in a child pornography case.

The applicant was arrested on May 14, 2015, with trial scheduled to conclude on April 13, 2017—approximately 23 months later, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application for procedural non-compliance.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion and granted the applicant's section 11(b) application, finding that the delay was presumptively unreasonable and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption.

The court found that the Crown's failure to disclose critical forensic evidence until the eve of the preliminary inquiry constituted a breach of disclosure obligations that could not be excused as an exceptional circumstance.

A stay of proceedings was ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial decision that excluded computer evidence obtained under a search warrant in a child pornography investigation and resulted in an acquittal.

The trial judge had found multiple breaches of s. 8 of the Charter, including reliance on unverified NCMEC CyberTipline reports, failure to include disclaimers in the Information to Obtain, uncertainty regarding PhotoDNA use, and staleness of evidence due to delay.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring verification for accuracy rather than assessing whether the information provided a credibly based probability sufficient for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court found that NCMEC reports and Microsoft-generated data could constitute reliable hearsay supporting reasonable and probable grounds and that the time delay and investigative uncertainties did not negate the probability that computer artifacts or account evidence would remain.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was convicted of two counts of assault and one count of uttering threats to cause death against his common-law partner.

The Crown sought 14 months incarceration with consecutive sentences.

The defence sought 6 months, already served in pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 3 years probation, taking into account the accused's prior domestic violence convictions, mitigating factors including consistent employment and compliance with previous probation, and the principle of totality.

The court emphasized that domestic violence requires denunciation and deterrence while considering rehabilitation for a youthful offender.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a controlled substance following the discovery of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the front console of a vehicle he was driving on November 14, 2013.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence.

The court found that while the accused had control over the drugs, the Crown failed to establish knowledge of the hidden drugs beyond a reasonable inference.

The court discharged the accused on both counts, finding that knowledge could not be the only reasonable inference from the facts presented.

A 12-year-old youth was arrested at school following the discovery of a firearm and ammunition in his backpack.

At the police station, he was subjected to a strip search conducted by Toronto Police Service officers.

The court found that the manner in which the strip search was conducted violated the youth's Charter rights under section 8 (protection against unreasonable search).

Specifically, the officers failed to follow mandated procedures requiring that a detainee not be left completely naked during the search process, as established in R. v. Golden.

The court found that the decision to order the strip search itself was not unconstitutional, but the manner of execution was.

Given a pattern of similar breaches by Toronto Police Service officers over the preceding decade and the lack of effective remedial response, the court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter.

The offender was sentenced following conviction for sexual offences involving a minor complainant.

Counsel presented a joint submission seeking the maximum reformatory sentence of two years less a day followed by three years of probation, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the need for treatment and supervision.

The court accepted the joint submission, noting mitigating circumstances and the complainant’s approval of the proposed disposition.

The sentence included incarceration, probation with counselling conditions, and multiple ancillary orders including a DNA order, SOIRA registration, firearms prohibition, and restrictions on contact with persons under 16.

The court confirmed acceptance of the complainant’s testimony and victim impact statement.

The accused sought Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) and a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) based on alleged police failure to preserve text messages.

The defence filed its materials late and failed to comply with multiple requirements of the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including notice, timing, and proper content of application materials.

The court found that the late and deficient filings prevented the Crown from adequately preparing to respond to the Charter applications before the scheduled trial.

Emphasizing the importance of procedural rules to ensure fairness and prevent trial ambush, the court vacated the scheduled trial date.

The resulting delay was attributed to the defence.