M.T. Devlin

A youth pleaded guilty to theft of a motor vehicle, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and failing to stop for police.

The Crown sought six months secure custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence with probation and community service.

The court determined that the flight from police constituted a violent offence under section 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, making custody an available option.

However, the court found this was not an exceptional case under section 39(1)(d).

Considering the youth's first-time offender status, guilty pleas, pre-trial custody served, positive pre-sentence report, remorse, and return to stable home environment, the court imposed an 18-month probation with 100 hours of community service instead of custody.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a controlled substance following the discovery of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the front console of a vehicle he was driving on November 14, 2013.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence.

The court found that while the accused had control over the drugs, the Crown failed to establish knowledge of the hidden drugs beyond a reasonable inference.

The court discharged the accused on both counts, finding that knowledge could not be the only reasonable inference from the facts presented.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding on the grounds that his language rights under s. 16(1) of the Charter and his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter were infringed.

The trial court failed to provide a French trial on the scheduled date, resulting in an 8-month delay before trial commenced.

The court found breaches of both language rights and the right to trial within a reasonable time due to administrative failures and an inflexible pre-scheduled French trial system.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with 10 criminal offences including 8 counts of fraud over $5,000, 1 count of possession over $5,000, and 1 count of mail theft, arising from allegations that he fraudulently cashed corporate cheques between October 31, 2011 and December 28, 2011.

During trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of evidence regarding ATM machine locations and ATM surveillance video photographs.

The court admitted Ms. Jaramy's testimony regarding ATM locations as an exception to the hearsay rule, finding the banks' central listing of ATM locations satisfied reliability and necessity requirements.

The court also admitted ATM surveillance video photographs as admissible under section 29 of the Canada Evidence Act.

A young person challenged a guilty plea entered for robbery with a handgun, alleging that late disclosure of investigating officer's notes constituted a breach of Charter rights under section 7.

The Crown conceded that the notes should have been disclosed with initial disclosure despite an ongoing Special Investigations Unit investigation.

The court found a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards and awarded costs of $13,000 plus HST against the Crown as a remedy for the constitutional breach.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit forcible confinement.

Over an 18-month period, the accused made multiple entries to an abandoned home where he constructed a prison cell in the basement, complete with reinforced doors, sealed windows, and restraint apparatus.

The accused's plan was to kidnap and confine a specific individual, Gwen Armstrong, and demand ransom from her husband.

The court sentenced the accused to two years less a day, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including counselling and no contact orders.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the paramount sentencing principles.

A young person was charged with robbery and assault causing bodily harm in relation to a deceased complainant.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved the identity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

The complainant, a 10-year-old boy with muscular dystrophy, was robbed of his father's iPhone by two youths.

The complainant identified the accused as the shorter of the two assailants, first at a chance encounter at school and subsequently in class photos.

The court found the identification spontaneous and immediate but concluded that eyewitness identification evidence alone, even when honest and certain, does not prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt due to the inherent frailties of human perception and memory.

The accused was acquitted.

A ruling on a voir dire regarding the admissibility of hearsay statements made by a deceased complainant in a youth criminal justice case.

The accused, a young person, was charged with robbery and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to admit four statements made by the deceased complainant describing the robbery and identifying the accused.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding that all four statements met the threshold test for reliability based on factors including spontaneity, contemporaneity, specificity, and the declarant's intelligence and motive.

The court rejected arguments that the statements should be excluded based on prejudicial effect or concerns about eyewitness identification reliability, finding that probative value outweighed prejudice and that identification concerns affected weight rather than admissibility.