Antia Long Ying Kwan

The young person pleaded guilty to eight counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of accessory after the fact.

The offences involved a crime spree where the young person and co-accused shot at multiple businesses and a school, and later destroyed evidence related to a homicide.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a maximum three-year youth sentence but disagreed on credit for presentence custody.

The court imposed the maximum three-year sentence of custody and supervision with no credit for presentence custody, finding that the full term was necessary to hold the young person accountable given his central role in the offences.

The young person pleaded guilty to 10 counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of accessory after the fact to reckless discharge of a firearm.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a maximum three-year youth sentence, but disagreed on whether the young person should receive credit for presentence custody.

The court considered the young person's personal circumstances, including diagnoses of PTSD and ADHD, and his commendable progress in custody.

The court accepted the joint submission and exercised its discretion to award six months' credit for the 24 months spent in presentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 20 months' custody and 10 months of community supervision.

The offender was convicted after trial of 24 weapons-related offences including possession of two loaded unlawful handguns, a loaded unlawful rifle, nine prohibited devices, and approximately 1,000 rounds of ammunition for the purpose of transfer, as well as eight breaches of s. 109 prohibition orders.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender with prior penitentiary terms including an equivalent 11-year sentence in 2018 for firearm trafficking, resisted the search warrant execution by initiating a lengthy armed standoff requiring deployment of the Emergency Task Force.

The court identified the new sentencing range for a repeat s. 95 offender under the post-2023 regime as 10–14 years.

A global notional sentence of 12 years was imposed, reduced by one year of Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, and a further 2.8 years of Summers credit (1.5:1 for 685 days), yielding 8.2 years (2,993 days) remaining to serve.

A lifetime s. 109 prohibition order and a DNA order were also imposed.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The Crown sought an 18-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence and probation.

The court considered the offender's lack of a criminal record, gainful employment, family support, and experiences with anti-Black racism as mitigating factors.

Balancing these against the gravity of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with house arrest and curfew conditions, along with ancillary orders.

The accused faced 25 firearm-related possession charges arising from the execution of a search warrant at his condominium after a lengthy police standoff.

He challenged the warrant under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter, arguing that the affiant was misleading and that the information to obtain was insufficient, but the court held that the vehicle-description errors were innocent, excised them, and found the unredacted ITO still established reasonable grounds.

At trial, the accused admitted possession of the firearms, prohibited devices, and ammunition, but asserted duress based on threats from an armed creditor who allegedly used his apartment for storage.

The court held the defence lacked an air of reality because safe avenues of escape existed, including paying the debt or going to police, and alternatively found the Crown disproved duress beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on all counts.

The accused, Shahabeldin Mohamed, was found guilty of dangerous operation of a conveyance, accessory after the fact to robbery, and failure to stop when pursued by police.

Prior to sentencing, the Crown and defence reached a resolution: the Crown would stay the accessory and failure to stop charges, and a joint submission for a conditional sentence would be made for the dangerous operation count.

The court addressed four issues: the Crown's power to stay charges post-conviction but pre-sentence, whether to accede to the joint submission, and the appropriateness of a DNA order and a firearms prohibition.

The court affirmed the Crown's power to stay charges, accepted the joint submission for a 16-month conditional sentence, but declined to impose a DNA order or a firearms prohibition, finding that the dangerous driving offence in this case did not involve violence against a person.

The accused was convicted of multiple offences, including robbery and reckless discharge of a firearm, after firing a handgun into a ceiling to distract police while co-conspirators robbed a jewelry store.

The accused absconded prior to sentencing.

The court found the accused had absconded within the meaning of s. 475 of the Criminal Code but proceeded with sentencing in absentia as a presentence report provided sufficient information.

The court imposed a total sentence of 77.5 months imprisonment, less 7.5 months credit for presentence custody, resulting in 70 months left to serve.

The Crown applied to have the court endorse a certificate of default pursuant to s. 770(1) of the Criminal Code, alleging the respondent breached his bail conditions by failing to reside at his specified address, breaching a curfew, and committing offences in the United States.

The respondent had failed to attend the last day of his trial because he was in custody in New York.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent failed to reside at his address, breached his curfew without an applicable exception, or committed the alleged offences in the US.

The accused was arrested for armed robbery following a high-speed police chase and foot pursuit.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 7, s. 10(a), and s. 10(b) rights due to the arresting officer's use of force and a delay of over seven hours in facilitating access to counsel.

The court dismissed the s. 7 and s. 10(a) claims, finding the force used was reasonable and the short delay in advising him of the reasons for arrest was justified.

However, the court found a serious breach of the implementational component of s. 10(b), as the police failed to take proactive steps to facilitate access to counsel while the accused was at the hospital and unjustifiably delayed access at the police station.

The determination of the appropriate remedy was deferred to sentencing.

Four co-accused were tried for their alleged roles in a coordinated jewellery store robbery and a preceding distraction shooting.

The Crown relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including covert video surveillance, intercepted communications, and DNA.

The court acquitted Hadi of all charges due to reasonable doubt regarding his identification from video evidence.

Mitsakis and Bangura were convicted of conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offences related to the distraction shooting, as DNA and circumstantial evidence proved their involvement.

Mohamed was acquitted of robbery but convicted of being an accessory after the fact, dangerous driving, and fleeing from police after he attempted to escape the arrest scene in a vehicle containing evidence.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery of jewelry stores and one count of fraud over $5,000 relating to a staged accident.

The court found the robberies were well-planned, sophisticated, and involved serious violence and risk to the public.

After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the offender's relative youth and prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a global sentence of 7 years' imprisonment before credit.

The court granted enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic and credit for time spent on strict bail, resulting in a net sentence of 44.5 months to serve.

The accused, charged with second degree murder and aggravated assault, applied for the production of medical and counselling records of the Crown's key witness.

The applicant argued the records were necessary to make full answer and defence, as they related to the witness's credibility, reliability, and inconsistent statements.

The court applied the O'Connor and McNeil frameworks and found the records were likely relevant.

After reviewing the records, the court ordered partial production subject to redactions and strict conditions to balance the accused's right to make full answer and defence with the witness's privacy interests.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a shootout with police in a nightclub parking lot.

The driver was killed, and the accused fled by crawling under a nearby pickup truck.

A prohibited firearm was later found under the truck.

The accused denied crawling under the truck or possessing the firearm.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding it not credible and contradicted by video evidence and officer testimony.

Applying the test for circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that the only rational inference was that the accused possessed the firearm and discarded it while hiding.

The accused was found guilty of both firearms offences.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and aggravated assault, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The defence argued that sitting in the dock carried a stigma and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication.

The Crown opposed, citing security concerns and the lack of exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the customary position is in the dock, the accused failed to show exceptional circumstances, and there were valid security concerns given his criminal record and outstanding charges for violent offences in custody.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Terrence Barrett, who is charged with second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought to admit various utterances and two videotaped statements made to police.

The defence argued that the statements were involuntary due to Barrett's medical and mental state and oppressive conditions, and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary and that Barrett's Charter rights were not infringed.

Consequently, the Crown's application to admit the statements was granted, and the defence application to exclude them was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking and killing a 71-year-old pedestrian.

Following the collision, the offender fled, attempted to conceal his involvement by further damaging the vehicle to fake vandalism, and lied to his family and a mechanic.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors, including the calculated deception and lack of genuine remorse, against mitigating factors such as his lack of a prior record and compliance with bail conditions.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day, reduced by pre-sentence and strict bail credits to a net sentence of 447 days, along with a DNA order and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, Daniel Kenneth Porter, charged with failing to stop at the scene of a fatal accident, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by the Crown, alleging a breach of solicitor-client privilege by his former lawyer, Ms. Elme Schmid, under sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued that Ms. Schmid breached privilege by providing information to the police without explicit waiver, and that the waiver was not voluntary.

The Crown contended that Ms. Schmid's advice was competent, Porter fabricated his account, and any remedy would not apply to a non-state actor.

The court found Porter's evidence unreliable and incredible, preferring Ms. Schmid's testimony, and concluded there was no breach of solicitor-client privilege, finding an implied waiver.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on first degree murder for the stabbing death of Milan Segota, with the defence conceding second degree murder.

The Crown also sought committal on aggravated assault for injuries to Aimee Novak, with the defence conceding assault with a weapon.

The court examined whether circumstantial evidence supported inferences of planning and deliberation necessary for first degree murder.

The court found insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, distinguishing the case from situations involving armed ambush or premeditated knife acquisition.

The defendant was committed to stand trial on second degree murder and aggravated assault.

In a pretrial voir dire on a first degree murder prosecution arising from a fatal house fire, the Crown sought to admit a statement allegedly made by the accused to a friend about learning how to burn down a house and collect insurance money.

The court held the statement met the threshold requirements of relevance, materiality, and discreditable conduct, but found the evidence weak on timing, detail, and witness reliability.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis for extrinsic misconduct evidence, the court concluded the proposed evidence invited impermissible propensity reasoning.

The Crown failed to show that probative value outweighed moral prejudice, and the statement was excluded.

On a Crown pretrial motion in a first degree murder prosecution, the court considered whether two earlier forged solicitor letters were admissible as extrinsic misconduct or similar fact evidence.

The Crown alleged the accused used a similar cut-and-paste method to attach genuine signatures to fabricated documents, and argued the prior letters were probative of authorship, modus operandi, and the alleged falsity of a will and related estate documents said to support motive, planning, and deliberation.

Applying the threshold analysis for extrinsic misconduct and the similar fact balancing framework, the court found the evidence relevant, material, discreditable, and strongly probative.

The court held the probative value outweighed moral and reasoning prejudice and admitted the letters.