Colin Sheppard

Jahmel Burke pleaded guilty to multiple counts of trafficking in fentanyl, cocaine, and other controlled substances, as well as possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, the range of sentences for similar offences, and imposed a global sentence of 11 years' imprisonment, with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts, and credit for pre-sentence custody.

The decision discusses the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The decision concerns the prosecution of Brandon Caleb for trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, expert testimony, and physical evidence, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Caleb trafficked in cocaine and possessed a loaded firearm at his residence.

The court rejected alternative explanations and found the evidence did not support reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The decision addresses a section 11(b) Charter application by Jordan Masters-George to stay proceedings due to delay in a complex, multi-accused drug prosecution.

The court found that while the net delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the case, the Crown’s reasonable prosecution plan, and the absence of COVID-19-related delay.

The application was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping after playing a minimal role in the confinement of an international student for ransom.

The Crown sought 10 to 12 years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's minimal participation, her status as a first offender, her history of trauma, and her diagnoses including Borderline Personality Disorder.

Emphasizing proportionality and rehabilitation, the court imposed a 22-month conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

Kristopher Matthews pleaded guilty to kidnapping and administering a stupefying drug.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 23-28 years and a s. 743.6 order for delayed parole eligibility.

Defence sought 10-13 years global and opposed the s. 743.6 order.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years (13 years for kidnapping, 2 years consecutive for administering the drug), giving credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court denied the s. 743.6 order, finding that the danger presented by the offender did not warrant such an exceptional measure.

Jevaughn Myers pleaded guilty to kidnapping and administering a stupefying drug.

The victim, an international student, was kidnapped for ransom and held for 13 days.

The Crown sought 16 years, while the defence proposed 8 years.

The court considered aggravating factors (victim impact, Myers' central role) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, first offender, mental health, family support, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions).

Applying sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, comprising 9 years for kidnapping and 1 year consecutive for administering a substance, after accounting for pre-sentence custody.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order were also imposed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and overcoming resistance after orchestrating a sophisticated plot to abduct a foreign university student for ransom.

The victim was taken from his home, drugged, bound, and held captive for 13 days before being rescued by police.

The court sentenced the offender, who acted as the mastermind, to 20 years imprisonment for kidnapping and a concurrent 3 years for overcoming resistance, noting the extreme gravity of the offence and the paramount need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court declined to impose consecutive sentences based on the totality principle and declined to restrict parole eligibility.

The accused, Isiaha Gordon-Brown, pleaded guilty to five counts including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl, possession of a prohibited firearm device, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He proceeded to a judge-alone trial on one count of drug trafficking in association with a criminal organization (the "Jungle Gang").

The court found him guilty on the criminal organization count based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating his association with the gang and his senior role in drug trafficking within their territory.

The court then proceeded to sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the dangerous nature of the drugs and firearms, the commercial scale of trafficking, and the accused's senior position, balanced against strong mitigating factors including his lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and significant rehabilitative efforts in custody.

A total sentence of 15 years was imposed, reduced to 11 years by the totality principle, and further reduced by 31 months for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 8 years and 5 months.

The defendants brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay of up to 44 months from arrest to the anticipated completion of their five-week trial.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the delay, while exceeding the presumptive 30-month Jordan ceiling, was justified by exceptional circumstances.

These circumstances included the particular complexity of the multi-accused kidnapping case, which involved extensive investigation, disclosure, and coordination of multiple counsel, and the systemic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which profoundly impacted court operations and created significant backlogs.

The court concluded that the Crown and the justice system took all reasonable steps to mitigate delay, and the time taken would not violate the applicants' constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident outside a bar.

The accused raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, arguing he experienced a dissociative episode triggered by post-traumatic stress disorder after hearing a threat to shoot.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the accused's evidence of dissociation and lack of memory lacked credibility, particularly given his organized post-offence conduct.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the specific intent required for murder and attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the suddenness of the attack, the single stab wounds, and the accused's intoxication and PTSD.

The accused was found not guilty of the charged offences but guilty of the included offences of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

During a trial for murder and attempted murder, the Crown and defence brought evidentiary applications.

The Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the surviving victim to first responders shortly after being stabbed.

The court admitted the statements under the spontaneous utterance exception.

The defence sought to admit evidence of the deceased victim's disposition to instigate confrontations when intoxicated, pursuant to Scopelliti.

The court admitted the disposition evidence, finding it relevant to the issue of who instigated the confrontation, but also permitted the Crown to adduce evidence of the accused's prior robbery conviction in response.

The accused, on trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder during the COVID-19 pandemic, brought a motion requesting that civilian witnesses testify without masks so their demeanour could be assessed.

The trial judge applied the framework from R. v. S. (N.) to balance the accused's fair trial rights against the public health interest in limiting virus transmission.

The court held that requiring witnesses to remain masked did not create a serious risk to trial fairness, as demeanour is not determinative of credibility.

The court further noted that testimony by videoconference was a reasonable alternative that accommodated both interests.

The motion was dismissed, and witnesses were directed to remain masked.

Kenneth Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the circumstances of the assault on his roommate, Richard Skupien, which resulted in Skupien's death from a ruptured spleen and rib fractures.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the attack on a vulnerable individual in his home, and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, reduced to two years and four months after applying credit for pre-trial custody and the onerous conditions.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to file their expert pathologist's report as a numbered exhibit, which the Crown opposed.

The report detailed the pathologist's critique of the Crown's expert and offered opinions on the timing of injuries, which could support the defence's theory.

The court denied the request, citing the convention against filing expert reports as exhibits, concerns about them acting as prior consistent statements, and the risk of overemphasizing expert evidence without the full context of cross-examination.

The judge also noted the imprecision of the scientific methods for aging injuries and the potential for misuse if the report was admitted without express caveats.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit preliminary hearing testimony of a witness, Mr. Nassirnia, as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (KGB application).

Mr. Nassirnia could no longer recall incidents he testified about at the preliminary hearing.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing evidence lacked sufficient reliability due to the witness's apparent lack of genuine recollection, having repeatedly refreshed his memory from a police statement.

The court found that the necessity requirement was met and that sufficient indicia of reliability were present, particularly the oath and opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, with a direction that Crown counsel should first attempt to refresh the witness's memory with his police statement at trial.

The Crown brought a blended application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act and the principled exception to hearsay (KGB application) to cross-examine its own witness, Michelle Paul, on prior inconsistent statements and to admit those statements as substantive evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had testified at trial but claimed inability to recall details from her prior police statement and preliminary hearing testimony.

The defence opposed, citing reliability concerns due to the witness's apparent intoxication during the police statement and arguing that some evidence constituted inadmissible propensity evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that certain details of the "Birthday Incident" were inadmissible propensity evidence, the "Phone Call" evidence did not materially differ from trial testimony, and the "Misinterpretation" evidence lacked legal relevance.

The court was not satisfied that the ends of justice warranted cross-examination or the substantive admission of the prior statements.

This ruling addresses a Crown application to admit two statements made by the accused, Kenneth Johnson, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a murder trial.

The statements, one to police and one to his landlord, were alleged to be false and fabricated.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court found a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude the statements were false and fabricated, and capable of supporting an inference of guilt, despite some reservations about the compelling nature of the inference for the landlord statement.

The court also considered and rejected the defence's request to exclude the evidence based on residual discretion, finding the probative value, though modest, was not outweighed by prejudice.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior disreputable conduct and ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased in a murder trial where the accused allegedly beat his roommate to death.

The court ruled that statements by the deceased expressing a desire to move out and fear of the accused were admissible under the present state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

However, a statement attributing a 'hard punch' to the accused was excluded for lacking threshold reliability.

The court also admitted most of the circumstantial evidence of the accused's prior physical abuse of the deceased to show context and animus, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, but excluded observations of bruising that could not be directly linked to the accused.

During a jury trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police after he called 911 regarding his roommate's medical emergency.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of the accused's s. 10 Charter rights, alleging he was psychologically detained without being cautioned.

The court found that a reasonable person in the accused's position would not have felt detained, as the police were responding to a medical emergency and had no reason to suspect foul play at the time.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The defendant, Michael Campbell, challenged the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the 'misconduct exception' which limits pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio when an offender is denied bail under section 524(4) or (8).

The court found this provision to be overbroad and in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, declaring it of no force and effect.

Consequently, the defendant was granted enhanced pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with additional credit for harsh institutional conditions and successful house arrest.

The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant for exercising control over a prostitute and possessing a prohibited firearm, imposing a total sentence of 45 months imprisonment, reduced by the enhanced pre-trial credit, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.