Peter Westgate

The defendant, Zakariye Yousuf, pleaded guilty to extortion with a restricted firearm and intentional discharge of a restricted firearm at a law office.

These offences were directed by Yousuf to intimidate a civil litigation lawyer, Lisa Carr, and her associate, Alycia Rose, due to Carr's legal work against tow truck companies.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the targeted nature of the crimes, the use of firearms, and the impact on the justice system, alongside mitigating factors such as Yousuf's guilty plea, difficult background, and rehabilitative potential.

The judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years for each count, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a total remaining sentence of five years and three months.

Three defendants, Levi Alexander, Vejay Alexander, and Lamar Cyrus, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a planned robbery of a modified starter's pistol resulted in the unintentional shooting death of Alex Perlmutter.

Lamar Cyrus also pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm.

The court accepted joint sentencing recommendations, emphasizing the egregious nature of the offence, the defendants' disregard for court orders (firearms prohibitions, probation conditions), and their serious criminal records.

Mitigating factors included the guilty pleas (though late) and the harshness of pre-sentencing custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The victim's family provided impact statements detailing their profound loss.

The defendants, Jamal and Jamis Yusuf, sought to reopen their trial after conviction for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement, and subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was based on a new affidavit from co-accused Aziz Pauls, who did not testify at trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence failed to meet the credibility and impact requirements of the test for reopening a trial after conviction, particularly given the strong video evidence and prior judicial findings.

The applicant, charged with numerous firearms and drug trafficking offences following an undercover operation, sought a bail review and a s. 525 hearing.

He argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and delay constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found no material change, noting COVID-19 was considered at the original hearing and the delay was not unreasonable.

The court upheld the detention on the tertiary ground, concluding that releasing the applicant, given the formidable case and serious firearms charges, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Robert Lepp sought to vary his judicial release order, challenging a broad prohibition on mentioning complainants online (Term 6) and restrictions on internet use (Term 7).

The court, applying R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, found Term 6 to be opaque, overbroad, and not necessary for public protection, striking it entirely.

Term 7 was varied to allow unsupervised internet use for employment and legal purposes, and supervised use for other purposes, recognizing Lepp's rights as a self-represented litigant, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Non-contact terms (Terms 4 and 5) were also adjusted to remove one complainant's name while re-introducing another's due to new charges.

Barrington Grant applied for a bail review to vacate a detention order and grant judicial interim release under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He was charged with firearms and ammunition offences.

The Justice of the Peace had detained him primarily on tertiary grounds.

The Superior Court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, relevant to both secondary and tertiary grounds.

Considering Grant's pre-existing health conditions and the proposed robust release plan including electronic monitoring and a surety, the court was satisfied that the fear of reincarceration would motivate compliance and that public confidence would not be undermined by release under strict conditions.

The application for judicial interim release was granted.

The applicant sought release from custody pending trial under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, citing the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances impacting his incarceration at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court considered the applicant's extensive criminal record, including prior convictions for violence and non-compliance with court orders, and the serious nature of the current firearm-related charges.

Despite acknowledging the elevated risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities, the court found that the applicant's history and the strength of the Crown's case meant that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for judicial release was denied.

The accused, Prasath Thanigasalam, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds due to multiple breaches of prior recognizances.

The reviewing judge found no error in the Justice of the Peace's initial decision regarding the application of secondary grounds or sufficiency of reasons.

However, the accused's new proposal to wear a GPS ankle bracelet, with his parents agreeing to cover the costs, constituted a material change in circumstances.

This new evidence addressed the Justice of the Peace's primary concern about the accused's compliance.

Consequently, the application for bail review was allowed, and the accused was released on strict conditions including house arrest, a $75,000 surety, and mandatory GPS monitoring.

The appellant, Suzana Kovacevic, brought a motion for the recusal of Justice McKelvey from her appeal seeking to set aside a peace bond.

The appellant alleged bias based on the judge's rulings regarding witness cross-examination, perceived delays, mispronunciation of her name, and refusal to assign another judge.

The appellant also asserted that the judge lacked the necessary life experience to understand the case.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The offender, Julia Schulz, pleaded guilty to one count of fraud over $5,000, having defrauded her employer of over $330,000 through 187 forged cheques over eight months.

This was her third fraud conviction, with previous conditional sentences.

The Crown sought a jail term of six months less a day, while the self-represented offender requested a conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, repeated conduct, large amount, impact on a small business, minimal restitution, and prior convictions.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, remorse, being a dedicated mother, and current employment.

General and specific deterrence were paramount.

While a longer sentence was justifiable, the court reduced the jail term to six months less a day, followed by two years of probation, and a restitution order of $312,827.61, to mitigate severe immigration consequences for the permanent resident offender.

During a murder trial involving a Mr. Big undercover operation, the Crown sought to introduce statements the accused made to an undercover officer about his prior involvement in the cocaine trade.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court applied the framework for propensity evidence and found that the evidence was highly probative to the jury's assessment of the reliability of the accused's confession, as it provided context regarding his sophistication and vulnerability to inducements.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice, which could be managed with a limiting instruction.

During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.

The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered the shackles removed.

Kenneth Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the circumstances of the assault on his roommate, Richard Skupien, which resulted in Skupien's death from a ruptured spleen and rib fractures.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the attack on a vulnerable individual in his home, and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, reduced to two years and four months after applying credit for pre-trial custody and the onerous conditions.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to file their expert pathologist's report as a numbered exhibit, which the Crown opposed.

The report detailed the pathologist's critique of the Crown's expert and offered opinions on the timing of injuries, which could support the defence's theory.

The court denied the request, citing the convention against filing expert reports as exhibits, concerns about them acting as prior consistent statements, and the risk of overemphasizing expert evidence without the full context of cross-examination.

The judge also noted the imprecision of the scientific methods for aging injuries and the potential for misuse if the report was admitted without express caveats.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit preliminary hearing testimony of a witness, Mr. Nassirnia, as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (KGB application).

Mr. Nassirnia could no longer recall incidents he testified about at the preliminary hearing.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing evidence lacked sufficient reliability due to the witness's apparent lack of genuine recollection, having repeatedly refreshed his memory from a police statement.

The court found that the necessity requirement was met and that sufficient indicia of reliability were present, particularly the oath and opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, with a direction that Crown counsel should first attempt to refresh the witness's memory with his police statement at trial.

The Crown brought a blended application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act and the principled exception to hearsay (KGB application) to cross-examine its own witness, Michelle Paul, on prior inconsistent statements and to admit those statements as substantive evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had testified at trial but claimed inability to recall details from her prior police statement and preliminary hearing testimony.

The defence opposed, citing reliability concerns due to the witness's apparent intoxication during the police statement and arguing that some evidence constituted inadmissible propensity evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that certain details of the "Birthday Incident" were inadmissible propensity evidence, the "Phone Call" evidence did not materially differ from trial testimony, and the "Misinterpretation" evidence lacked legal relevance.

The court was not satisfied that the ends of justice warranted cross-examination or the substantive admission of the prior statements.

This ruling addresses a Crown application to admit two statements made by the accused, Kenneth Johnson, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a murder trial.

The statements, one to police and one to his landlord, were alleged to be false and fabricated.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court found a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude the statements were false and fabricated, and capable of supporting an inference of guilt, despite some reservations about the compelling nature of the inference for the landlord statement.

The court also considered and rejected the defence's request to exclude the evidence based on residual discretion, finding the probative value, though modest, was not outweighed by prejudice.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior disreputable conduct and ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased in a murder trial where the accused allegedly beat his roommate to death.

The court ruled that statements by the deceased expressing a desire to move out and fear of the accused were admissible under the present state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

However, a statement attributing a 'hard punch' to the accused was excluded for lacking threshold reliability.

The court also admitted most of the circumstantial evidence of the accused's prior physical abuse of the deceased to show context and animus, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, but excluded observations of bruising that could not be directly linked to the accused.

During a jury trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police after he called 911 regarding his roommate's medical emergency.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of the accused's s. 10 Charter rights, alleging he was psychologically detained without being cautioned.

The court found that a reasonable person in the accused's position would not have felt detained, as the police were responding to a medical emergency and had no reason to suspect foul play at the time.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The Crown brought an application for the forfeiture of a $50,000 recognizance against a surety after the accused absconded to Pakistan on the morning of his sentencing for sexual assault.

The surety, the accused's wife, argued for partial forfeiture due to financial hardship and lack of fault.

The court applied the 'pull of bail' principle, finding that the surety failed to strictly supervise the accused and that absconding is the most serious breach of a recognizance.

The court ordered the full $50,000 forfeited, but stayed enforcement for 45 days to allow the accused an opportunity to voluntarily return to Canada.