Mary Elizabeth Cremer

Sentencing for second degree murder arising from the killing of the offender's mother while the offender was suffering from schizophrenia.

The court treated the parent-child relationship and the resulting breach of trust as aggravating, but found the offender's severe mental illness significantly diminished moral blameworthiness and elevated rehabilitation and treatment as major sentencing considerations.

Rejecting the Crown's submission that planning and deliberation should aggravate sentence, the court fixed parole ineligibility near the low end of the range.

A life sentence was imposed with 11 years' parole ineligibility, together with DNA, lifetime weapons prohibition, and communication prohibition orders.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm after fatally shooting the victim in a restaurant.

The court rejected the offender's claim that he acted in self-defence, finding his belief that the victim posed a threat was unreasonable and unfounded.

Balancing the aggravating factor of using an illegal handgun in a public place against the offender's lack of a prior record and good prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 12 years, along with a concurrent five-year sentence for the firearms offence.

The accused, suffering from severe untreated schizophrenia, stabbed and killed his mother in a park.

At trial, the defence argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, claiming he acted on an auditory command hallucination.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the psychiatric opinions relied too heavily on the accused's uncorroborated hearsay self-reports.

However, the court also found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate, as the accused's mental illness raised a reasonable doubt about his capacity to plan and deliberate.

The accused was found not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of the included offence of second-degree murder.

During a jury trial for second-degree murder and firearms offences arising from a shootout at a restaurant, the court ruled on the admissibility of the criminal records and police occurrence reports of one of the co-accused, the deceased, and the other co-accused.

The court excluded the co-accused's criminal record, finding its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its limited probative value regarding credibility and self-defence.

The court admitted the deceased's criminal record and related occurrence reports, as they were relevant to the accused's claim of self-defence and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

The court excluded double hearsay occurrence reports and unproven police synopses relating to the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim sustained serious facial injuries including a 5-inch gash requiring 18 stitches and a 2-inch cut requiring 3 staples, resulting in permanent scarring and nerve damage.

The assault occurred in a restaurant when the accused threw beer and glass bottles at the victim during an altercation.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months of probation with conditions including anger management and substance abuse counselling, a no-contact order, and a weapons prohibition.

The court rejected the defence proposal for a conditional sentence, finding that denunciation and general deterrence required incarceration despite the accused's difficult background and mental health issues.

On a pre-trial severance application, one accused sought a separate jury trial from a co-accused arising out of a fatal restaurant shooting captured on surveillance video.

The moving party argued antagonistic self-defence positions, lack of nexus between counts, general prejudice, and impairment of full answer and defence because the co-accused would not be compellable on a joint indictment.

Applying the co-accused severance factors and the two-step inquiry for severance sought to compel a co-accused witness, the court held there was no evidentiary foundation showing a reasonable possibility that the proposed testimony would affect the verdict favourably.

Because the evidence against both accused was virtually identical, a joint trial better served truth-seeking, efficiency, and witness interests, and the application was dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for sexual interference, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on the loss of the complainant's diary and the late disclosure of a police officer's email regarding the diary.

The trial judge assumed jurisdiction to hear the post-verdict application but dismissed it on the merits.

The court found that the police acted reasonably in photographing rather than seizing the diary, and that while the late disclosure of the email breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights, it was not a deliberate attempt to undermine the trial's fairness and did not warrant the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with drug and firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at a residence.

During the search, police found drugs and cash, and subsequently questioned the accused without providing rights to counsel or a caution, eliciting statements about vehicle keys.

The police used these statements to seize the keys and search two vehicles, locating firearms.

The court found egregious violations of the accused's ss. 8 and 10(b) Charter rights, noting that senior officers acted carelessly, showed blatant disregard for Charter rights, and misled the court.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearms evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, Ahman Ottley, sought to exclude evidence (drugs and a gun) obtained from searches of his car and residences, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court addressed a preliminary issue regarding the disclosure of confidential informant (CI) information, finding that the judicial summary provided was sufficient for the defence to make full answer and defence.

The court then found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Mr. Ottley's arrest, based on CI information, police surveillance, and a prior "found in" incident.

Consequently, his section 9 rights were not violated.

The search of his car incident to arrest was deemed lawful and reasonable, as it was connected to the investigation, thus not violating his section 8 rights.

Finally, the searches of his residences, authorized by a warrant, were also found to be reasonable, as the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at those locations.

As no Charter breaches were found, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, Cynthia Kirschner, was found guilty of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a collision where Kirschner, making a left turn at an uncontrolled intersection, failed to yield to an oncoming e-bike, resulting in the rider's death.

The court determined that Kirschner's conduct fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, concluding she failed to see the e-bike despite clear visibility and did not take evasive action.

Arguments regarding the e-bike's modifications or sun glare were dismissed as not excusing the defendant's duty of care.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple offences arising from a years-long sexual exploitation of a child by an older authority figure who groomed the complainant, breached a position of trust, recorded some of the abuse, and sold the recordings for profit.

The court treated the offender's age, lack of prior record, community support, and strict bail conditions as mitigating factors, but gave little weight to the guilty pleas because they were late, followed continued victim-blaming, and did not reflect genuine remorse.

Applying the child-sex-offence sentencing guidance in Friesen, the court found profound breach of trust, repeated sexual assaults, child pornography production and distribution, and devastating victim impact to be highly aggravating.

A global sentence of 15 years was imposed, reduced by 6½ months' enhanced credit for pre-sentence detention, together with ancillary orders.

The young person accused was charged with second-degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm after shooting a flea market manager during a robbery.

The accused admitted to the robbery, firearm possession, and manslaughter, but contested the murder charge, arguing a lack of subjective intent for murder due to severe drug intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental health issues.

The court declined to apply the common-sense inference of intent, finding that the cumulative effect of the accused's substance abuse, sleeplessness, and other health issues left the accused without the requisite subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Anthony Holtorf, in a criminal trial for criminal harassment and child luring.

The evidence consisted of a 2008 peace bond and a 2015 guilty plea, both related to similar incidents of approaching young, unsupervised girls.

The Crown argued the evidence was probative of mens rea and to rebut anticipated innocent explanation defences.

The defence argued the evidence was remote, dissimilar, and highly prejudicial.

The court, applying the R. v. Handy framework, found significant similarities in the pattern of behaviour, despite temporal gaps and minor dissimilarities.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence, in establishing a pattern of behaviour and intent, outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application to admit the similar fact evidence was granted.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and child luring after allegedly approaching young girls in a park.

Police placed him under investigative detention, searched him, and later arrested him, conducting a strip search and a search of his vehicle incident to arrest.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breaches, concluding the searches were lawful and justified by safety concerns.

While the court found a s. 10(b) breach due to a delay in fully advising the accused of his right to counsel, it declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), emphasizing society's interest in adjudicating serious offences involving children on their merits.

This decision addresses the parole ineligibility period for the defendant, Cory Fenn, who was convicted of three counts of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought a 72-year parole ineligibility period, while the self-represented defendant requested the minimum 10 years.

The court imposed a 25-year parole ineligibility period for the murders of the intimate partner and one child, finding these acts to be part of a continuous criminal enterprise.

The sentencing for the third murder (of the second child) was adjourned pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on the constitutionality of consecutive parole ineligibility periods under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in cases involving domestic homicide and abuse of minors, citing the brutal nature of the offences and the defendant's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for stabbing his best friend 12 times in an unprovoked attack fueled by jealousy over a former domestic partner.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission of 13 years of parole ineligibility.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it within the appropriate range of 11-15 years, and sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.

During a trial for three counts of second-degree murder, a voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the accused's videotaped statement to police.

The accused, who was self-represented with the assistance of amicus curiae, argued the statement was involuntary due to excessive force during arrest, oppressive conditions in custody, and a lack of an operating mind.

The court found that the police use of force was a reasonable response to the accused's resistance, the custody conditions were not oppressive, and the accused demonstrated an operating mind throughout the interview.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown brought a motion to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct and the deceased's ante-mortem statements in a trial for second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to show the accused's animus and motive by introducing evidence of jealousy, arguing, and prior assaults.

The court applied the tests for prior discreditable conduct and threshold reliability for hearsay.

The court admitted evidence of recent threatening behaviour, jealousy, and a recent assault, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect and the statements met threshold reliability.

However, the court excluded evidence of older alleged assaults and a threat without context, finding them insufficiently reliable or probative.

The applicant sought a bail review to vacate his existing detention order and be released on terms pending trial for drug trafficking charges involving over 2 kilograms of fentanyl.

While the court found a material change in circumstances due to trial adjournments, the application was dismissed.

The court held that the applicant's history of breaching release conditions, including a recent arrest for drug trafficking while on bail, and the unsuitability of his proposed principal surety justified his continued detention on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The Crown brought an application to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased prior to his alleged murder by the accused.

The statements included a Facebook post, comments to a friend about the accused's drinking, text messages and a phone call to another friend, and utterances made during an altercation shortly before the death.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing necessity and threshold reliability.

The court admitted the text messages and certain utterances made during the altercation, but excluded the Facebook post, the phone call, and a comment about the accused's medication due to lack of reliability, lack of necessity, and high prejudicial effect.