Cole Perry

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim sustained serious facial injuries including a 5-inch gash requiring 18 stitches and a 2-inch cut requiring 3 staples, resulting in permanent scarring and nerve damage.

The assault occurred in a restaurant when the accused threw beer and glass bottles at the victim during an altercation.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months of probation with conditions including anger management and substance abuse counselling, a no-contact order, and a weapons prohibition.

The court rejected the defence proposal for a conditional sentence, finding that denunciation and general deterrence required incarceration despite the accused's difficult background and mental health issues.

Following a jury conviction for sexual interference, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on the loss of the complainant's diary and the late disclosure of a police officer's email regarding the diary.

The trial judge assumed jurisdiction to hear the post-verdict application but dismissed it on the merits.

The court found that the police acted reasonably in photographing rather than seizing the diary, and that while the late disclosure of the email breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights, it was not a deliberate attempt to undermine the trial's fairness and did not warrant the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings.

In a sexual interference trial, the child complainant refused to continue testifying during the second trial.

The defence moved for a mistrial, while the Crown sought to admit the complainant's testimony from the first trial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application and admitted portions of the complainant's prior testimony, finding that her emotional struggle was the reason for her unresponsiveness and that the defence had a full opportunity to cross-examine her at the first trial.

The decision applied the three-factor test from R. v. Hart and allowed the admission of evidence under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The young person accused was charged with second-degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm after shooting a flea market manager during a robbery.

The accused admitted to the robbery, firearm possession, and manslaughter, but contested the murder charge, arguing a lack of subjective intent for murder due to severe drug intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental health issues.

The court declined to apply the common-sense inference of intent, finding that the cumulative effect of the accused's substance abuse, sleeplessness, and other health issues left the accused without the requisite subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm.

The defendant, Kenton Lee-Diggs, was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device, mischief under $5000, and cruelty to animals.

Following a dismissed Charter voir dire, the defendant conceded the impaired driving and mischief charges.

The court found the defendant guilty of cruelty to animals based on the complainant's credible and detailed testimony.

However, the defendant was found not guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample because the specific demand for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) as charged was never made by any officer; rather, demands were made for an approved instrument.

This is a Charter application brought by the accused, Kenton Lee-Diggs, alleging violations of his s. 7 (security of person) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused claimed a s. 7 violation due to being forced to urinate in an interview room, and s. 10(b) violations due to an unreasonable delay in accessing counsel and being denied counsel of choice.

The court found no s. 7 violation, as the accused did not clearly communicate his need for a washroom to officers.

Regarding s. 10(b), the court found no violation of the right to counsel of choice, noting the accused declined an early offer to contact his lawyer and did not express dissatisfaction with duty counsel.

The court also found no unreasonable delay in accessing counsel, attributing much of the time to the accused's uncooperative conduct and the reasonable operational demands of a busy police station.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the impugned evidence was ruled admissible for trial.