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Youth found guilty of manslaughter, not second-degree murder, due to severe intoxication negating subjective intent.
The young person accused was charged with second-degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm after shooting a flea market manager during a robbery.
The accused admitted to the robbery, firearm possession, and manslaughter, but contested the murder charge, arguing a lack of subjective intent for murder due to severe drug intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental health issues.
The court declined to apply the common-sense inference of intent, finding that the cumulative effect of the accused's substance abuse, sleeplessness, and other health issues left the accused without the requisite subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.
The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm.
Conviction appeal dismissed; trial judge properly admitted discreditable conduct and lay opinion demeanour evidence.
The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his step-daughter.
He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to re-examine the complainant on his prior discreditable conduct, admitting a police officer's lay opinion evidence regarding the mother's demeanour upon learning of the allegations, and giving an unbalanced corrective instruction regarding defence counsel's closing submissions.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly varied his ruling on discreditable conduct after defence cross-examination created a distorted view of the appellant's character.
The Court also held that the demeanour evidence was admissible lay opinion, and any error in admitting the officer's opinion that the reaction was 'odd' was cured by the trial judge's jury instructions.
Sentence reduced to five and a half months to avoid unexpected deportation consequences.
The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter and breach of probation, receiving an eight-month sentence based on a joint submission.
Four months later, an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force retrospectively, rendering him inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality with no right of appeal due to the sentence length.
The appellant sought to reduce his sentence to five and a half months to preserve his right of appeal against deportation.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reduced sentence remained proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's circumstances.
Leave to appeal refused; inoperable vehicle stopped in driving lane posed realistic risk of danger.
The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.
He was found asleep in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle stopped in a driving lane.
The trial judge acquitted him, finding no realistic risk of danger, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered convictions.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assuming an inoperable vehicle could not create a realistic risk of danger, entitling the appeal judge to intervene.
Appeal from committal order dismissed; preliminary inquiry judge properly considered range of reasonable inferences.
The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a committal order made at a preliminary inquiry.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arguments advanced confused the function of a trial judge with that of a preliminary inquiry judge.
The Superior Court judge properly limited his review to whether the totality of the evidence provided a basis for the committal order.