Her Majesty The Queen v. Cory Fenn, 2022 ONSC 2117

Oshawa Court File No.: CR-18-15006 Date: 2022-04-05 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Her Majesty The Queen – and – Cory Fenn, Defendant

Counsel: Michael Newell and David Slessor, for the Crown Self-Represented, for the Defendant Mary Cremer, as Amicus curiae

Heard: March 18, 2022

Reasons on Parole Ineligibility

Leibovich J.

[1] On February 10, 2022, I found Mr. Fenn guilty of murdering his intimate partner Krissy Pejcinovski and two of her children, Roy and Vana. My reasons are set out in R. v. Fenn, 2022 ONSC 23. The sentence for murder is life. The law precludes the imposition of multiple life sentences. Therefore, for each count of second degree murder Mr. Fenn will receive a life sentence to be served concurrent to each other.

[2] I must decide what period of time Mr. Fenn must serve in jail before he can apply for parole. The decision whether to grant parole is left to the National Parole Board. At a minimum, the law requires that Mr. Fenn serve ten years in jail before he is eligible to apply for parole. I have the ability to increase that period of parole ineligibility from ten years up to a maximum of 25 years. I also have the discretion to impose consecutive periods of parole ineligibility, although the constitutionality of the legislation that vests me with that discretion is currently being considered by the Supreme Court of Canada.

[3] The Crown submits that Mr. Fenn should receive a life sentence and not be eligible to apply for parole for 72 years. Mr. Fenn, who is self-represented, submits that I impose the minimum period of parole ineligibility of 10 years.

Law and Analysis

Applicable Legal Principles

[4] Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code empowers the sentencing judge to increase the parole ineligibility period from the minimum of 10 years to the period that the judge deems fit, up to the maximum of 25 years. The sentencing judge, in deciding the period of ineligibility, must have regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendation of the jury, if any. In this case, there was no jury as Mr. Fenn elected to have a trial by judge alone. In R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court of Canada noted at para. 31 that the different potential periods of parole ineligibility reflects the fact that "within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability". As a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by the sentencing judge’s determination that, according to the criteria set out in section 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability for release assessed. The determination of the parole ineligibility period is “a very fact sensitive process”: see R. v. Shropshire, at para. 18. An increased parole ineligibility period does not require unusual circumstances: R. v. Shropshire, at paras. 26 to 27.

[5] Determining the period of parole ineligibility is part of the sentencing process. Therefore, the sentencing judge must consider the general principles that apply to sentencing as set out at in s. 718 - 718.2 of the Criminal Code: R. v. Shropshire, at paras. 23-24; R. v. Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299; R. v. Zekarias, [2018] O.J. No. 6827 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 30.

[6] Section 718 of the Criminal Code describes the purpose of sentencing:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

a. To denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; b. To deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; c. To separate offenders from society, where necessary; d. To assist in rehabilitating offenders; e. To provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and, f. To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[7] Further, s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that:

A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[8] Mr. Fenn murdered his intimate partner and her two children. 718.2 a(ii) and 718.2(a)ii.1 deems that these factors are aggravating factors for sentencing. The section states that:

(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s intimate partner or a member of the victim or the offender’s family, (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years

shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;

[9] In addition, section 718.01 is clearly at play in these sentencing proceedings. The section states:

When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

[10] Where a court imposes consecutive sentence, it must consider s.718.2 (c) of the Criminal Code, which states that

where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.

[11] This principle extends to the exercise of the discretion to direct that periods of parole ineligibility be served consecutively: R. v. Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299 at para.39, R. v. MacKinnon, 2019 ONSC 3436, at para. 48.

[12] All the objectives of sentencing – including deterrence, denunciation, retribution and rehabilitation – are relevant in deciding whether to increase a period of parole ineligibility. Retribution is not vengeance. Retribution is an “objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the offender's conduct”. Retribution incorporates a principle of restraint. It requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.”: R v. C.A.M, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras. 79-82. The concept of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct. In this regard, in R. v. CAM, the Supreme Court of Canada quoted with approval the following from Lord Justice Lawton in R. v. Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 74, at p. 77:

society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass.

[13] Fuerst J. in R. v. Fernandes, 2018 ONSC 7784, at para. 67 noted that denunciation and deterrence are particularly important in dealing with the murder of an intimate partner:

Denunciation and general deterrence are particularly important in setting the parole ineligibility period for an offender who murdered a spouse or partner. Notwithstanding many judicial pronouncements that domestic abuse cannot be tolerated and must stop, homicides of one spouse or partner by another unfortunately persist. Courts must continue to send the message that those who perpetrate domestic homicides will face life sentences with significantly elevated periods of parole ineligibility.

Circumstances and Nature of the Offences

[14] The circumstances of the offences are set out in detail in my reasons for judgement. But briefly, Mr. Fenn viciously and brutally killed Krissy while they were in the garage. At the time she was naked. He then covered up her body with tires and bags. Krissy suffered stab wounds, blunt force injury to her head, neck, torso and limbs. She had 24 small puncture wounds to her breast and 17 rib fractures. Her jaw was broken. Her cheekbone was broken. While Mr. Fenn was strangling her she was still breathing, so he left the garage, went to the house and took the knife from the kitchen, returned to the garage, and finished the job by stabbing her to death.

[15] Afterwards Mr. Fenn was in a violent rage from having killed Krissy. He went into the house, saw Roy sleeping and attacked him. Roy struggled but Mr. Fenn strangled him to death. Roy was not only strangled to death. Roy also received a large blow to his head that resulted in a 12-centimetre contusion and that he received contusions to his right ear, back, and triceps. Mr. Fenn described punching and strangling Roy.

[16] With respect to when Krissy and Roy were killed on the 14th, I stated in my reasons that “While I think it was more likely that Krissy and Roy were attacked after Vana and Sylvia went to sleep since they would have likely heard the commotion (especially from the attack on Roy, which happened in the house and his head board was broken) I simply do not know. However, in my view both Krissy and Roy must have been killed by 5:00 a.m.”

[17] Vana was attacked over five hours later between 10:38 am and 10:48 am. With a butter knife he found in the kitchen, he stabbed her four times in the chest, stabbed her on the left side of her neck. She had numerous other cuts. Mr. Fenn did not just cut her; he savagely beat her. She had two black eyes, massive bruising to her lips and along the left side of her jaw and bruising on the back of her head and to her right and left ears. The trauma to her face was so severe that Detective MacIver could not tell her age when he found her. When asked how he caused so much damage to Vana’s face, Mr. Fenn said he was kicking her. He ultimately stuck her halfway under his bed and left her there. I found that Mr. Fenn attacked Vana in a futile pathetic attempt to escape detection.

[18] Victim impact statements were filed by family members, Ms. Robinson, the kids’ school and hockey community. The murders have had a devastating effect on the family, friends and the community at large. For example:

1. The children’s aunt stated that even though it has been four years she lives with “a debilitating grief and constant, unending pain”. Sometimes she cannot get out of bed due to the grief. She stated that their deaths were not just a local tragedy but it impacted the family across five countries. Krissy’s sister noted that the family has had to take medication to deal with the aftermath;
2. Ms. Robinson, apart from the grief she feels, now suffers from post traumatic stress disorder and panic attack disorder. It was because of her concern and caring for Krissy that she attended at Krissy’s house to check on her. Ms. Robinson is weighed down by guilt, thinking about what would have happened if she had arrived earlier. Ms. Robinson, the guilt is not on you;
3. Roy’s hockey trainer commented about the loss felt by Roy’s hockey community and that “no 15-year old child/young man should have to attend grief counselling over something that should have never happened”; and
4. Vana’s principal stated that in the wake of Vana’s murder, absenteeism increased and there were significant requests for psychological services to help the students who were struggling to come to terms with the violent nature of her death. Anxiety and negative behaviour by the students increased.

[19] Victoria, the surviving daughter and sibling wrote:

It is hard to put how I feel into words, because there are no words to describe the pain of losing someone. Losing all three of them at once was unimaginable. I watched my world crumble in front of my eyes and all I could think about was how none of it felt real.

Everything went quiet and my body went numb. I watched as everyone’s life kept moving forward as mine was put on pause. I completely disengaged from everyone and everything. I wasn’t present or living in the present. I lost the meaning of what it meant to live, because I didn’t want to without them.

The first year after I lost my family was the hardest, because after a year of numbness was when it really sunk in. I couldn’t handle the pain of losing them so I began engaging in self destructive things like drinking and smoking, because that was the only escape of reality I could get. Being a big sister all I ever wanted to do was protect them and I felt guilty for a long time because I wasn’t able to.

Sometimes I like to think about the people they would have become. It breaks my heart knowing I’ll never know. But what I do know is that I will see them again one day. I know they’re watching over me in heaven and I will spend the rest of my life trying to make them proud.

Character of Mr. Fenn

[20] Mr. Fenn is now 33 years old. He was 29 at the time of the murders. Mr. Fenn refused to participate in the preparation of the pre-sentence report. He has a minor criminal record. He was convicted of assaulting a peace officer in 2009 and received a suspended sentence and placed on probation for 12 months. In 2011 he was convicted of mischief and received a suspended sentence and probation for 12 months. Mr. Fenn’s probationary records have been filed. It appears from the materials filed that both incidents involved alcohol. With respect to each term of probation he was required to complete an anger management course. He completed both courses.

[21] The probation filed revealed that Mr. Fenn had been drinking since he was 13 years old. Mr. Fenn told the probation officer that he was a binge drinker and that he would drink 26 beers per sitting on occasion. He also admitted to experimenting with drugs such as marijuana, ecstasy and cocaine and described his use as social. Mr. Fenn had a good relationship with his parents even though they were violent towards each other. His father was an alcoholic and did not think that Mr. Fenn’s drinking was problematic, but his mother was concerned with his drinking. Mr. Fenn has an older sister. Mr. Fenn has two young children.

[22] It was learned through the trial that Mr. Fenn, at the time of the murders, was on medical leave from the Toronto District School Board. It is evident from the probation file that he had worked off and on with the school board for over a decade. Mr. Fenn told Officer Pillman during his police interview that he was selling and consuming cocaine at the time of the offences.

[23] Mr. Fenn pleaded not guilty to the offences. I found that his statement to the police the day after the murders showed a great deal of remorse for his actions, but I did not accept Mr. Fenn’s various assertions that he killed the victims during a cocaine-induced psychosis, nor did it raise a reasonable doubt with respect to the issue of intent. At trial, he took the position that he should be acquitted. He submitted that he found his soul, his true purpose at the Toronto South Detention Centre. He submitted that once you have your true purpose of life, the beginning, the root, “that’s everything, and that cancels out any heinous crime.” He submitted that he is a new person and that he has redeemed himself from his transgressions and thus should be acquitted. He took a similar position when he spoke at the outset of the sentencing hearing. He interrupted the reading of one victim impact statement and said “don’t look at me, I didn’t do it”. Mr. Fenn had nothing to say about the pain he has caused. Rather, he focused on his problems. He indicated that he wanted to sue because he was incarcerated during the pandemic. He would use the monies received to fund his education. He again blamed amicus and suggested that she be subject to violence, even though she has said everything that could be said in support of his position. Mr. Fenn is simply unable at this moment in time to accept true responsibility for his horrific actions. Perhaps, Mr. Fenn’s comments that he has been reborn/redeemed is his coping mechanism to deal with the immense harm he has caused. But he cannot start on his road to rehabilitation until he has accepted the full truth. The absence of remorse is not an aggravating factor but as stated by Justice MacDonell in R. v. MacKinnon at para. 72:

Accordingly, there is nothing to indicate that he accepts responsibility for what he has done, and there is no sign of remorse either directly from him or indirectly from anywhere else. The absence of such evidence is not an aggravating circumstance but its absence deprives him of a potential source of mitigation and deprives the court of a reason for optimism with respect to his rehabilitation: see R. v. Granados-Arana, 2018 ONSC 1756, at paragraphs 50 to 52; R. v. Zekarias, supra, at paragraph 44.

[24] Mr. Fenn was not a leading a pro-social life before the murders. He was spending his days selling and consuming cocaine. Amicus submits that Mr. Fenn’s substance abuse disorder, as diagnosed by Dr. Klassen and as supported by his probation file, should be considered a mitigating factor. I found that the night of the murders he had been consuming cocaine and drinking alcohol. I found that irrespective of whatever amount of cocaine and alcohol he had consumed at the time, Mr. Fenn had the state of mind for murder. I found that he was not intoxicated when he killed Vana. I am prepared to accept that Mr. Fenn’s addiction to alcohol and to drugs has adversely affected the trajectory of his life and, in that sense, I find that it is a limited mitigating factor: R. v. Fernandes at para. 65; R. v. Kairi, 2015 ONCA 279. There are no other mitigating factors.

Aggravating Factors

[25] The aggravating factors are as follows:

a) Mr. Fenn murdered his girlfriend, an intimate partner. He did so when she was in a vulnerable state: naked in the garage; b) His murder of her contained elements of planning and deliberation as he stopped strangling her and left to get the knife from the kitchen to finish the job: R. v. A.(T.S.), [1995] O.J. No. 535 (C.A.), at paras. 17 to 21; R. v. Fernandes, at para. 55; c) His murder of her was vicious and brutal; R. v. Fernandes at para. 59; R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477; d) He covered and concealed her body: R. v. Boukhalfa, 2017 ONCA 660; e) He murdered another vulnerable victim, a 14 year old boy. Not only was he vulnerable because of his age but Mr. Fenn attacked Roy when he was sleeping in his bed; f) His third murder victim was another vulnerable victim, a 13 year old girl; g) Mr. Fenn’s murder of Vana could only be described as savage and cruel. Mr. Fenn left her half under the bed revealing how little regard he had for the sanctity of human life; and h) As evidenced by the numerous victim impact statements, Mr. Fenn’s actions destroyed a family and caused considerable harm to the community.

Positions of the Parties

[26] The court must ensure, as stated in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, that the sentence imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In order to ensure this, courts look to sentences given in other cases. The parity principle, which is mandated by s. 718.2 (b) of the Criminal Code, requires that similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances be given similar sentences. Past cases, or precedents, create sentencing ranges to help guide the court. But sentencing is an individualized process and sentencing ranges are not meant to handcuff the court, nor should they be seen as straight jackets. Judges must still exercise their discretion in each case; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para. 57; R. v. McDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, at para. 33; R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 45; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 44.

[27] The Crown submits that Mr. Fenn should be ineligible for parole for a period of 72 years. Mr. Fenn submits that he should be eligible for parole after the minimum statutory period of ten years. Again, bearing in mind that past cases are not meant to be seen as a straight jacket, neither the Crown nor Mr. Fenn’s position is supported by precedent. Mr. Fenn’s seeks the minimum. The murder of an intimate partner by itself, let alone the murder of three people, support an elevated period of parole ineligibility: R v. McKnight (1999), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41; R. v. Borberly, 2021 ONCA 17, at para. 38; R. v. MacKinnon, at para. 60.

[28] First degree murder is the most serious category of murder known in Canadian law and carries a mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility of 25 years. The Crown in essence, requests that I sentence Mr. Fenn as if he had been found guilty of three counts of first degree murder. He has not. Clearly Mr. Fenn’s crimes are horrific, but he committed three acts of second degree murder, not three acts of first degree murder. The Crown has provided a very helpful sentencing chart. The chart does not support the period of parole ineligibility that the Crown is seeking. The cases that have received sentences approximate to what the Crown is seeking are the following:

1. R. v. Ostamas 2016 MBQB 136. The accused received a parole ineligibility period of 75 years. He was convicted of three counts of first degree murder. He killed one victim and then the second one two weeks later and the third two hours later;
2. R. v. Saratzky, 2017 ABQB 496. The accused received a parole ineligibility period of 75 years. He was convicted of three counts of first degree murder for three murders that took place at distinct times; and
3. R. v. Millard. The accused received a parole ineligibility period of 75 years. He was convicted at three separate trials of first degree murder. The offences were clearly separate and distinct. There was no relationship in time or circumstance.

Are Consecutive Periods of Parole Ineligibility Appropriate in This Case?

[29] Section 745.51 of the Criminal Code was enacted to deal with parole ineligibility in cases involving the conviction of multiple murders. It reads as follows:

At the time of the sentencing under section 745 of an offender who is convicted of murder and who has already been convicted of one or more other murders, the judge who presided at the trial of the offender or, if that judge is unable to do so, any judge of the same court may, having regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendation, if any, made pursuant to section 745.21, by order, decide that the periods without eligibility for parole for each murder conviction are to be served consecutively.

[30] In deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences of parole ineligibility, the sentencing judge must consider the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission.

[31] I will address the constitutional issue in a moment, but a critical preliminary question is whether consecutive sentences, irrespective of length, are appropriate in this case.

[32] Where an accused has been convicted of multiple counts of murder, including a conviction of first degree murder, a consecutive sentence may be the only means to ensure that the sentence reflects the added moral culpability. On the other hand, given that second degree murder comes with a range of parole ineligibility options from 10 to 25 years, it is possible that the accused’s higher moral culpability can be reflected within that range without resort to the imposition of consecutive sentences. As stated by MacDonnell J in R. v. MacKinnon at paras. 51 and 52:

Where it is followed, and where one or more of the murders is first degree murder, it will often as a practical matter lead to consecutive ineligibility periods. The fact that the minimum period of ineligibility for one count of first degree murder is 25 years may well persuade the sentencing judge that the total period for all of the murders should be greater than 25 years. That is, the judge may well conclude that the minimum period of ineligibility for one murder should not be the maximum for all of them, which would be the result if concurrent periods of parole ineligibility were imposed. Thus, the judge might decide, a fit and appropriate total period of ineligibility would require that the separate periods be served consecutively.

On the other hand, if all of the murders are second degree murders, the minimum period of ineligibility for one murder is not the maximum period for all of them. In that situation, it would be for the sentencing judge to decide whether a total parole ineligibility period of 25 years or less would be appropriate. If so, the appropriate total could be achieved with concurrent periods. If the judge were to determine that a total ineligibility period greater than 25 years was called for, the only mechanism for achieving that objective would be to direct that the periods be served consecutively.

[33] A critical factor in deciding whether a concurrent or consecutive sentence should be imposed is whether the murders were part of one continuous criminal act or whether the murders emanated from separate events. A concurrent sentence is appropriate where there is "one continuous criminal act" or "one single criminal enterprise"": R. v. Salehi, 2019 BCSC 698, at para. 26; R. v. Koopmans, 2015 BCSC 2120, at para. 107; R. v. MacKinnon, paras. 61-65.

[34] In my view, the murders of Krissy and Roy were part of one continuous heinous criminal act. I found that Mr. Fenn killed Roy while he was in a violent rage from having killed Krissy. The principles of sentencing require that concurrent periods of parole ineligibility be imposed for the murders of Krissy and Roy. This does not mean that Mr. Fenn receives a discount. Rather, the parole ineligibility range from 10-25 years is elastic enough to allow for the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility that adequately reflects Mr. Fenn’s moral culpability for committing two murders.

[35] However, in my view, the murder of Vana requires the imposition of a consecutive period. The murder of Vana took place over 5 hours later. It was a separate and distinct act. It took place under a different set of circumstances. Mr. Fenn killed Vana in a desperate and futile attempt to escape detection. While all three murders are connected, the killing of Vana was a separate act. In R. v. Forman, 2019 BCSC 2165, Mr. Forman was convicted of the second degree murder of his wife and the subsequent first degree murders of his daughters hours later. All agreed that the two first degree murder convictions should receive concurrent periods of parole ineligibility. The dispute was whether that period should be consecutive or concurrent to the parole ineligibility period for murdering his wife. The trial judge determined it should be consecutive. He stated at para. 32:

While there may be an element connecting the act of killing his wife to the decision to kill his children, I do not agree, however, that it can be considered as a single act. The former, the killing of his wife, was an act in anger. The latter, the killing of his two daughters, was premeditated.

[36] In R. v. W.G.C., 2015 ABQB 252 similar to the case here, a consecutive sentence was imposed where the second murder was committed to eliminate a witness to the first.

[37] In my view, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offences and the character of Mr. Fenn, a consecutive parole ineligibility period must be imposed for the savage and cruel murder of Vana. There are countless other measures Mr. Fenn could have employed to effect his escape without the brutalization and discarding of poor Vana.

[38] At this moment in time, there is constitutional uncertainty regarding section 745.51 of the Criminal Code. Three trial courts in Ontario have declared the section constitutional. The Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Bissonnette, 2020 QCCA 1585, has declared it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal from that decision on March 24, 2022. It has reserved its decision. I appreciate that Mr. Fenn has not filed a notice of constitutional challenge. However, Mr. Fenn is representing himself. I have a duty as the trial judge to ensure that his Charter rights are protected. It also assists no one for me to impose a sentence for it to be undone on appeal.

[39] Therefore, I will impose a period of parole ineligibility for counts 1 and 2, the murders of Krissy and Roy, since I have already determined that those periods of parole ineligibility should be made concurrently, and I need not resort to s. 745.51. I will adjourn the setting of the period of parole ineligibility for count 3, the murder of Vana, until the Supreme Court of Canada renders its decision in R. v. Bissonnette. If s.745.51 is declared unconstitutional, I will impose a concurrent period for count 3. If not, I will impose a consecutive period, having regard, of course, to the principle of totality.

Counts 1 and 2

[40] In R. v. McKnight, the Court of Appeal for Ontario identified a range of parole ineligibility of 12 to 15 years for brutal second degree murders of an unarmed wife or girlfriend. But higher periods have been imposed where there have been particularly aggravating features: R. v. Wristen (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 66 (C.A.); R. v. Czibulka, 2011 ONCA 82, at para. 67; R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477; R. v. Borbely. As set out above, the murder of Krissy had numerous aggravating features: it was vicious and brutal, it had elements of planning and deliberation, Krissy was in a vulnerable state being naked in the garage, and Mr. Fenn concealed her body afterwards. These factors would, by themselves, require a parole ineligibility period in at least the high teens. But Mr. Fenn then proceeded to attack Roy, her 14 year old son, when he was sleeping, and kill him. It is impossible to imagine what threat Roy posed to him. Nevertheless, Mr. Fenn murdered him. I have considered Mr. Fenn’s character including his addiction to substances, and the nature and circumstances of the offence. A parole ineligibility period of 25 years is required to adequately denounce and condemn these murders which have destroyed a family and damaged a community.

[41] In addition, there will be a lifetime s.109 order, a DNA order and a non communication order pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code.

[42] As stated, I will adjourn the sentencing of count 3 until after the Supreme Court of Canada releases its decision in R. v. Bissonnette.

Krissy, Roy and Vana

[43] Given the nature and purpose of these proceedings, the focus has been on how Krissy’s, Roy’s and Vana’s lives tragically came to an end. However, it seems only fair and appropriate to end these reasons by describing some of the wonderful things the court has heard about how Krissy, Roy and Vana lived their lives so that the community can be left with that as a final image.

[44] Krissy was an aesthetician. She was described at trial as being, at one point, the backbone of the Sedona spa. Ms. Robinson said that she was her most requested employee and that she had compassion and caring for everyone she met. Ms. Robinson commented that her clients mourned Krissy’s death because they had a deep relationship with Krissy. She was like a family member to them. Victoria described her mother as follows:

My mom was such a beautiful person inside and out and was the most amazing mother. She was so strong and worked hard to make sure that we had a better life than she did growing up. She showed me how to love and care for others and I am so grateful to have learned that from her.

[45] Roy was 14 years old when he was murdered. He was a highly skilled hockey player. More importantly, he was described by his school as an excellent young man, kind, noble and generous. The school established a scholarship for grads who best exemplified his qualities. Victoria described Roy as follows:

My brother was one of the most kind-hearted and respectful people ever. He always had my back whenever I needed him and would drop everything to help others if they were down or in need. I am so proud to call him my brother.

[46] Vana was 13 years old when she was murdered. Vana’s principal described her as a role model who participated in track and field, volleyball, badminton, basketball, soccer and cross country. She was an excellent student and athlete. Her friends described her as generous, unique, caring, supportive, humorous, outgoing, positive, enthusiastic, kind, strong, confident, cheerful, beautiful, smart, athletic, brilliant and respectful. Victoria described Vana as her best friend:

We did everything together for as long as I can remember. She knew how to brighten anyone’s day with just a smile and a few jokes. I was always so serious but she was able to bring out the goofy side in me and I don’t think I’ve ever laughed harder with anyone else.

[47] It is evident that Krissy, Roy and Vana were loved and cared for by their family and community.

Justice H. Leibovich

Released: April 5, 2022