Andrew Scott

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to attend a second independent medical examination (IME) with a replacement expert.

The defendants' initial expert, Dr. Steven M. Dilkas, conducted an IME on June 26, 2024, but subsequently ceased communicating with the defendants and failed to deliver any report or draft report.

After numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain the report from Dr. Dilkas between August 2024 and January 2025, the defendants retained a replacement expert, Dr. Richard Kaminker, and sought a second IME.

The plaintiff refused consent.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants had adduced sufficient evidence of Dr. Dilkas's non-responsiveness and that the request for a second IME was legitimate and necessary.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendants must first pursue a Rule 33.06 motion to compel Dr. Dilkas's report, finding such a requirement would be inefficient and contrary to principles of proportionality.

The court ordered the plaintiff to attend the second IME with Dr. Kaminker and directed the defendants to reimburse all incidental expenses.

The accused, an Indigenous offender, pleaded guilty to breaching his Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by failing to report his contact with a female.

The LTSO was imposed following a prior conviction for sexual assault, and the breached condition was central to managing his risk of reoffence.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal record, his history of non-compliance with court orders, and the systemic factors detailed in his Gladue report.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while applying Gladue principles, the court sentenced the accused to 42 months' imprisonment, less 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 120 days to serve.

The accused, Malachi McTague, was charged with aggravated assault.

He admitted to wounding the complainant with a knife but claimed self-defence.

The court found that the Crown failed to disprove the self-defence claim beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and the reasonableness of his response given the circumstances, including the presence of other potentially armed individuals.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, Mark Champagne, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to edit his prior criminal record for cross-examination on credibility.

The defence sought to exclude portions of both his adult and youth records and to limit the scope of cross-examination.

The court, applying the Corbett factors (nature, similarity, remoteness, risk of distorted picture), ruled that the accused's entire adult criminal record, including serious convictions like attempted murder and aggravated assault, was admissible for cross-examination on credibility.

The court found the probative value outweighed any prejudice, especially given the accused's attacks on Crown witness credibility.

However, the court ruled that the youth record was inadmissible, finding its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect due to its age, similarity to adult convictions, and limited relevance to credibility.

The cross-examination was restricted to the fact of conviction, not the details of the offences.

The accused was charged with conspiracy, break and enter, and possession of stolen property relating to the theft of copper plates from railway boxcars.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two unsavoury accomplices, cellphone tower data, and similar fact evidence from a prior conviction.

The court found the accomplice testimony contradictory regarding the accused's involvement in the break and enters, resulting in acquittals on those charges.

However, the court found the cellphone data and similar fact evidence sufficiently confirmed the accomplices' testimony regarding the accused's assistance in loading the stolen copper, resulting in a conviction for possession of stolen property.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration following his convictions for sexual assault, fraudulent personation, and multiple breaches of a long-term supervision order.

The respondent conceded that he met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation but argued for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order, relying on his recently discovered Aboriginal heritage and the availability of culturally sensitive programming.

The court found that the respondent's Aboriginal heritage did not impact his moral blameworthiness and that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public given his high risk to reoffend, his history of deception, and his poor response to past treatment.

The respondent was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration.

The accused, subject to a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), was arrested on a suspension warrant after being found at an unauthorized location with an unauthorized female.

Upon arrest, a concealed, unauthorized cell phone was found on his person.

Parole officers conducted a cursory search of the phone to check for LTSO compliance.

Later, a parole officer interviewed the accused without informing him that he was also under police investigation for sexual assault and personation.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude his statements and the cell phone evidence.

The court held that the failure to inform the accused of the new criminal jeopardy before the interview violated his s. 10 rights, and excluded those statements under s. 24(2).

However, the court found no s. 8 violation regarding the cell phone search, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the unauthorized phone and the parole officers' search was lawful for compliance purposes.

The accused was convicted by a jury of multiple historical sexual assaults and an indecent assault committed against three young female family members over extended periods when they were children or teenagers.

The offences involved repeated abuse of trust by an uncle and included acts of sexual touching, sexual intercourse, exposure, and grooming behaviour occurring in family homes over many years.

The court considered the severe psychological and social impact on the victims, the abuse of trust, the young age of the victims, and the offender’s prior sexual assault conviction as significant aggravating factors.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in sentencing for sexual offences against children, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary sentence along with several ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a bar altercation in which a bouncer was struck with a brick.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, particularly because the trial judge rejected portions of eyewitness testimony and relied heavily on a brief surveillance video.

The appellate court reviewed the video evidence and the trial judge’s reasoning, including the finding that the footage established a chain of events leading from the blow to the victim immediately pinning the accused to the ground.

Applying the principles governing convictions based on video evidence, the court held the verdict was one that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably reach.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and threatening conduct, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility by overemphasizing her demeanour, failing to reconcile inconsistencies in her statements, and making unsupported factual findings.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the inconsistencies as minor and contextualized them within the complainant's emotional state.

The court held there was no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings and the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.