Tyler Shuster

This decision concerns an application by Brandi Stewart-Sperry for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown’s case in a first-degree murder trial.

Stewart-Sperry argued that there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict her, particularly regarding her knowledge of the co-accused’s possession of a firearm and intent to shoot a police officer.

The court reviewed the legal principles for directed verdicts, the use of circumstantial and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses an application by several media organizations for virtual access to a high-profile murder trial, invoking the open court principle.

The court reviews the constitutional and statutory foundations of open courts, the discretion of judges to permit or deny virtual access, and the practical realities facing media coverage.

Ultimately, the court finds that while the open court principle does not require virtual access, it may be granted at the court’s discretion in light of modern realities and the decline of local news coverage.

The defendant, Keenan George, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing his brother, Kegan, during an argument over household cleanliness.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to five years in penitentiary, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court found the offence to be serious, driven by anger, and not mitigated by alcohol or drugs.

Considering the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed a sentence of 41 months imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody, deeming a conditional sentence inappropriate given the severity of the crime.

The accused, Jiapeng Wu, was charged with second-degree murder.

The central issue at trial was whether he was a party to the murder under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, specifically if he subjectively knew that murder was a probable consequence of the planned robbery.

The Crown argued that the accused orchestrated the violent robbery and foresaw the probable use of a firearm and murder.

The defence contended that the accused only intended robbery, not murder.

The court found the Crown's principal witness credible despite prior inconsistencies.

Considering the accused's history of violent currency exchange robberies, his role as organizer, his arming of accomplices with loaded handguns, and his post-offence conduct, the court concluded that the accused subjectively knew murder was a probable consequence.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application during a criminal proceeding to admit prior consistent statements made by two complainants under various exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The court ruled that utterances made by the complainants to civilian witnesses shortly after the alleged events, as well as a 911 call, were admissible for their truth under the res gestae or spontaneous utterance exception.

The court also admitted observations of the complainants' physical and emotional states as circumstantial evidence relevant to consent, and allowed certain statements to police under the narrative and prior identification exceptions.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for beating his wife to death with a metal mallet.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offence and the fact that the victim was his intimate partner and caregiver as significant aggravating factors.

The offender's major depressive disorder with psychotic features, his lack of prior criminal record, and his admissions to police were considered mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for the blunt force killing of his wife.

He admitted to causing her death but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that his major depressive disorder with psychotic features rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding that despite his false belief that his wife intended to put him in a home, he retained the capacity to make a rational choice and knew his actions were wrong.

The court inferred the requisite intent for murder from the circumstantial evidence and found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for stabbing his best friend 12 times in an unprovoked attack fueled by jealousy over a former domestic partner.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission of 13 years of parole ineligibility.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it within the appropriate range of 11-15 years, and sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.

The Crown brought an application to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased prior to his alleged murder by the accused.

The statements included a Facebook post, comments to a friend about the accused's drinking, text messages and a phone call to another friend, and utterances made during an altercation shortly before the death.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing necessity and threshold reliability.

The court admitted the text messages and certain utterances made during the altercation, but excluded the Facebook post, the phone call, and a comment about the accused's medication due to lack of reliability, lack of necessity, and high prejudicial effect.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of prior extrinsic misconduct by the accused against his former girlfriend in a trial for second-degree murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, animus, identity, and intent, showing the accused's jealousy after the deceased intervened in a dispute.

The court applied the Handy framework and ruled that the probative value of the prior assaults and threats outweighed their prejudicial effect, though graphic details of one assault were excluded to prevent impermissible propensity reasoning.

The application was partially granted.

The Crown brought an application to admit three statements made by the accused to police and to admit blood-stained clothes seized without a warrant.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, argued his Charter rights were violated and the statements were involuntary.

The court found the first two statements were made when the accused was considered a witness, not a suspect, and were voluntary.

The video statement was also found voluntary, with no threats, inducements, or Charter breaches.

The warrantless seizure of the clothes was deemed reasonable due to exigent circumstances, as the clothes could have been lost or destroyed.

The statements and clothes were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with first degree murder following the abduction, severe beating, and death of the victim over a drug debt.

The accused conceded causing the death and forcible confinement, leaving the sole issue of whether he had the requisite intent for murder.

The court found that the accused's actions, including the brutal attack and leaving the victim in a remote, freezing field with severe injuries, demonstrated the requisite intent for murder.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application requesting that the Court call two third-party suspects as witnesses, or alternatively, permit the defence to call and cross-examine them.

The court declined to call the witnesses itself, finding it unnecessary and potentially disruptive to the adversarial process.

However, the court exercised its common law discretion to permit the defence to cross-examine the witnesses on specific topics, noting that the provisions of section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act were inadequate for this situation.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit expert evidence from a Brazilian Jiu Jitsu practitioner regarding the mechanics and effects of blood chokeholds.

The Crown theorized that the accused used a rear naked choke to kill the victim, explaining the lack of structural damage to her neck.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the Abbey two-step process to assess the admissibility of the evidence.

The court found that the evidence had low probative value because there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to martial arts training, and high prejudicial effect.

Furthermore, the court held that evidence regarding the physiological effects of chokeholds should be introduced by medical experts, not a martial arts practitioner.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to determine the admissibility of rebuttal evidence in response to the defence's allegations of inadequate police investigation in a murder trial.

The court provided general guidelines, ruling that the reviewing officer could not give opinion or hearsay evidence about the original investigation, but could testify about his own investigative steps.

The court also made specific rulings on several areas of challenge, deferring a decision on the admissibility of the accused's bad character evidence regarding firearms until later in the trial.

This decision addresses the judge's proposed opening comments and jury selection procedures for a first-degree murder trial.

The judge adopted several suggestions from counsel, including referring to the accused as "defendant" and strongly emphasizing that jurors must not conduct external research.

The judge also accepted defence counsel's request to defer their opening statement and for potential jurors with knowledge of the case to submit written notes.

The judge declined to remove all references to the elements of the offence from the opening comments, affirming their general inclusion.

The accused, Michael Ball, brought a pre-trial application seeking evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning third-party involvement in the death or disposal of the body of Erin Howlett, and the adequacy of the police investigation.

The court found that evidence suggesting third parties were present at Howlett's death or assisted in disposing of her body was admissible, as it could raise reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt, even if not directly alleging they caused the death.

The court also affirmed the defence's right to challenge the police investigation's adequacy, including specific failures to investigate third parties or conduct certain tests.

The accused, Michael Ball, is charged with first-degree murder.

In this pre-trial application, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of ante mortem statements made by the deceased, Erin Howlett.

The defence also sought a ruling on the admissibility of certain statements, some for the truth of their contents (hearsay) and others for non-hearsay purposes (original evidence).

The court ruled on the admissibility of various statements, excluding double hearsay, statements about the deceased's job loss due to "money gone missing" due to high prejudice and low probative value, and limiting the use of false statements about studying to be a financial planner to assessing credibility and corroborating the accused's police statement, not as evidence of other plans.

The accused, Michael Ball, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of a statement made to police.

Police staged a break-in at Ball's residence, removed firearms, and left a threatening note linking him to the murder.

Ball reported the break-in and the note, leading to an interview where he was cautioned but felt compelled to speak due to statutory obligations (reporting stolen firearms) and perceived threats.

The court found that police tactics, including creating an aura of violence and using statutory compulsion, breached Ball's s.7 Charter rights (right to silence, principle against self-incrimination).

The court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown applied under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code for a pre-trial ruling from the first trial (which ended in a mistrial) to be binding on the second trial.

The prior ruling by Justice Taylor found the accused's statement to police voluntary and admissible, but did not address a Charter s. 7 issue.

The accused sought to raise a s. 7 Charter challenge regarding the statement at the second trial.

The court, applying factors from R. v. Victoria, found it would not be in the interests of justice to bind the second trial to the prior ruling, as new Charter arguments were being advanced, and the public interest in a serious criminal case warranted hearing constitutional concerns on their merits.