Tyler Shuster

During a trial for a shooting that resulted in one death and two injuries, the Crown sought to introduce photographs of a mark on a hallway baseboard taken seven years after the incident, along with related property manager testimony and expert opinions from a forensic video analyst and a firearms expert.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in determining whether the accused fired a weapon and in assessing witness credibility significantly outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The expert opinions met the threshold requirements for admissibility.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to re-open its examination-in-chief of a witness to refresh her memory using a prior statement, after having closed its examination but before cross-examination began.

The witness had given testimony inconsistent with her prior statement regarding the actions of the accused after the shooting.

The trial judge granted the request, applying the Coffin procedure and finding that allowing the Crown to refresh the witness's memory would not cause prejudice or trial unfairness, as the defence could cure any prejudice through cross-examination.

The defence applied to exclude evidence of prior discreditable conduct, known as the "Austin incident" in a murder and aggravated assault trial involving Tyrone Chambers and Joshua Warner.

The Austin incident, a minor assault accompanied by a threat to shoot, occurred shortly before the main shootings.

The defence argued its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The Crown contended the incident was relevant to the accused's knowledge of each other's gun possession, their willingness to back each other up, and the overall narrative of the night's events, forming part of a continuing transaction.

Applying the R. v. Handy test for similar fact evidence, the court treated the Austin incident as prior discreditable conduct but found its high probative value, particularly concerning narrative, the accused's knowledge and state of mind, Section 21 party liability, and self-defence, greatly outweighed the limited moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence admissible.

During a second trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied under section 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the prior trial testimony of a key witness who had left Canada for Ghana just before the trial commenced.

The court reviewed the principles from R. v. Potvin and subsequent jurisprudence regarding the principled approach to hearsay and the Crown's obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to establish necessity as it had not pursued alternatives like commission evidence or offered to fund the witness's return, and that admitting the evidence would operate unfairly against the accused.

The Crown and the two accused brought several pre-trial motions ahead of a re-trial for murder and aggravated assault arising from a shooting at a house party.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various pieces of evidence, including post-offence conduct, a photograph of the deceased, a lead fragment, ammunition, and black socks with gunshot residue.

The court also dismissed a Charter application challenging a search warrant, finding the accused lacked standing as he had abandoned the apartment.

Finally, the court denied the accused's request to sit at counsel table, ordering them to remain in separate prisoner's docks with leg belts due to significant security concerns and antagonistic defences.

The accused, Jeremy Gough, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the admissibility of two videotaped statements made to police.

The first statement was challenged on grounds of voluntariness and breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b)), alleging he was a suspect and detained without proper caution or counsel notification.

The second statement was challenged on voluntariness and as tainted by the first.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the first statement beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, the court found Gough was psychologically detained by police without being informed of his Charter rights, leading to breaches of ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

Consequently, both statements were ruled inadmissible at trial.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion concerning the admissibility of and testimony about two police-prepared PowerPoint presentations containing video clips of a vehicle and an unidentified male.

The court ruled the presentations admissible for efficiency and organization, but restricted the police officer's testimony regarding lay opinion evidence on vehicle identification.

The officer could testify to factual observations and reasons for selection, but not offer an opinion on whether vehicles matched or were the same.

Video clips of the unidentified male were deemed relevant circumstantial evidence and admissible.

The court also allowed the use of annotations in the presentations and directed mid-trial instructions to the jury.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to determine the admissibility of ante mortem statements made by the deceased, Jessica Scanlon, to her sister, friend, and boyfriend, in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Gough.

The statements concerned the nature of Scanlon's relationship with Gough, their separation, and Gough's reaction.

The court found the statements relevant and material to Gough's state of mind, Scanlon's state of mind, and motive.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the statements met the necessity and threshold reliability criteria, noting that most were recorded text messages and corroborated by multiple recipients available for cross-examination.

The court also determined that the probative value of the statements outweighed their minimal prejudicial effect, making them admissible.

The applicant sought judicial screening leave under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code to empanel a jury to reduce his parole ineligibility period for first degree murder arising from a fatal bank robbery.

He argued that the post-2011 amendment changing the threshold from a 'reasonable prospect' to a 'substantial likelihood' of success violated ss. 11(h) and 11(i) of the Charter when applied retrospectively.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, holding the amendment was procedural and did not alter the applicant’s settled expectation of liberty or amount to additional punishment.

On the merits, the court found the applicant’s institutional record, only recent rehabilitative efforts, qualified remorse, failure to fully accept responsibility, and the brutal nature of the offence meant there was not a substantial likelihood that a jury would unanimously reduce parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed, with leave to reapply in five years.

The accused applied to exclude evidence, including a loaded handgun, seized from a hotel room following a warrantless police entry.

The accused argued the initial police entry violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court held that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room because his lawful entitlement to occupy the room had expired before police entered.

In the alternative, the court found that the brief warrantless entry by police was justified as a safety search to secure a firearm and ensure no persons remained in the room.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of human trafficking offences (exercising control over movements for exploitation and receiving money from exploitation), three counts of assault with a weapon, two counts of threatening, three counts of assault, and four counts of breach of recognizance.

The trial involved a credibility assessment of the complainant, who admitted to being a con artist and fraudster, against the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon, simple assault, and breach of recognizance counts, but acquitted him of the trafficking offences due to insufficient evidence of control exercised for exploitative purposes.

The court applied a Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant's credibility.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the parties agreed to a statement of facts establishing that the accused operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration between 150 and 195 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The sole issue was whether the accused possessed the necessary mens rea.

The accused testified that she believed her drink had been spiked with a date-rape drug, claiming she had no memory of consuming most of the alcohol and that her symptoms were inconsistent with voluntary alcohol consumption.

The court found the accused guilty, distinguishing the case from R. v. Sitarz on the basis that while the accused's belief was genuine, it did not raise a reasonable doubt as to her guilt.

The accused, a foreign national, pleaded guilty to assaulting his child with a hockey stick.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence, while the accused sought a conditional discharge to avoid deportation.

The court noted that while a conditional discharge for such an offence is extremely rare following 2005 Criminal Code amendments, the accused had already served 36 days in pre-sentence custody.

The court granted a conditional discharge, reasoning that it was in the public interest to allow the family to remain in Canada where the child could be protected by the terms of a probation order, rather than facing deportation to their home country.