Daniel Heath

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, breach of release order, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The Crown sought 15 months custody plus probation.

The defence argued for time served based on harsh pretrial custody conditions, extensive restrictive bail conditions, and the accused's rehabilitative potential.

The court sentenced the accused to 15 months custody but credited 104 days of Summers credit, 40 days for harsh institutional conditions (Duncan credit), and 454 days for restrictive bail conditions (Downes credit), totalling approximately 20 months of credit, resulting in a sentence of time already served.

The accused was placed on two years probation with conditions including non-contact with victims, weapons prohibition, and mandatory counselling for anger management and substance abuse.

The accused, Jiapeng Wu, was charged with second-degree murder.

The central issue at trial was whether he was a party to the murder under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, specifically if he subjectively knew that murder was a probable consequence of the planned robbery.

The Crown argued that the accused orchestrated the violent robbery and foresaw the probable use of a firearm and murder.

The defence contended that the accused only intended robbery, not murder.

The court found the Crown's principal witness credible despite prior inconsistencies.

Considering the accused's history of violent currency exchange robberies, his role as organizer, his arming of accomplices with loaded handguns, and his post-offence conduct, the court concluded that the accused subjectively knew murder was a probable consequence.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender, Kevin Gordon, pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature of fentanyl and his criminal record, and significant mitigating factors, such as his guilty plea, the fact that his trafficking was driven by addiction rather than greed, and his substantial rehabilitative efforts since his arrest (securing housing, employment, and becoming drug-free).

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

Applying sentencing principles, particularly the emphasis on rehabilitation for addict-traffickers, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 18 months of probation, along with ancillary orders.

The applicants brought several pre-trial Charter motions alleging unlawful arrest, excessive force, lost evidence, and delays in implementing their right to counsel.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 10(b) due to a delay in providing access to counsel, but the court declined to exclude the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was not causally connected to the discovery of the evidence and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All other Charter applications were dismissed, as the court found the officers had reasonable grounds for the warrantless arrests, did not use excessive force, and were not unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve video evidence.

The defendant, David Seemangal, was charged with having excess blood alcohol.

He applied to exclude breath samples and Intoxilyzer results, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the police conducted an unlawful pat-down search and made an ASD demand without reasonable suspicion, thereby breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court also found a s. 10(b) breach when the defendant invoked his right to counsel at the roadside but was not afforded an opportunity to consult.

However, the court found no s. 10(b) breach at the police station.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the breaches, while present, were not serious enough to warrant exclusion of the evidence, given the collective police knowledge and the minor impact on the defendant's interests compared to the significant impact on the administration of justice if the reliable evidence were excluded.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and Mr. Seemangal was found guilty.

The accused, Kenny Seegobinsingh, applied for a bail review after being detained following a bail hearing.

The application was based on two material changes in circumstances: new proposed sureties and the global COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found both constituted material changes, allowing for a de novo bail hearing.

Considering the new sureties' credible evidence and the amplified risks of COVID-19 in institutional settings, the court determined that the proposed strict house arrest plan would sufficiently reduce the risk of re-offending and would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, despite the serious nature of the break and enter charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of assault with a weapon arising from three separate stabbing incidents that occurred on October 31-November 1, 2018, in Waterloo.

The incidents involved unprovoked attacks on three victims using a knife, with one victim suffering life-threatening injuries.

The court imposed a sentence of 42 months concurrent, reduced to 17 months after credit for 501 days of pre-trial custody on an enhanced basis.

The sentence was further subject to a three-year probation order with conditions including counselling, employment requirements, and a 20-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was tried for robbery with a firearm at a residential property in Vaughan.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance footage, GPS tracking of the suspect vehicle, cell tower evidence, cell phone contact records, and DNA evidence.

The key issue was identification of the accused as one of the three perpetrators captured on church surveillance footage.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on a holistic assessment of the evidence, including video identification under the Nikolovski test, GPS evidence placing the suspect vehicle at the accused's residence and the robbery scene at relevant times, and DNA evidence linking the accused to a glove found in the suspect vehicle.

The Crown applied to admit recognition evidence from a police officer identifying the defendant in surveillance video footage from a church parking lot.

The officer claimed to recognize the defendant as one of the suspects fleeing from a gunpoint robbery in Vaughan.

The application turned on whether the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance with the defendant to satisfy the Leaney/Brown test for admissibility of lay recognition evidence.

Despite reliability concerns regarding the officer's recollection of certain physical characteristics and limited prior contact, the court found the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance through a face-to-face interaction and was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the perpetrator.

The recognition evidence was admitted.

The defendant, Vladimir Hussain-Marca, was found guilty of break and enter and robbery following a home invasion.

The court adopted a joint sentencing submission from the Crown and Defence, imposing a three-year custodial term (less pre-sentence credit), 18 months probation, a 20-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The court considered aggravating factors such as planning, violence, and dwelling house violation, alongside mitigating factors including the defendant's youth, first-time offender status, remorse, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court also commented on the harsh conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, which were implicitly accounted for in the joint submission.

The accused, young first-time offenders and parents, pleaded guilty to causing the death of their one-month-old infant son.

Tran pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking the child twice in the face to stop him from crying, fearing discovery by his brother.

Bui pleaded guilty to failure to provide necessities of life after failing to seek immediate medical attention due to fear of family discovery of the out-of-wedlock birth.

The court imposed sentences reflecting principles of denunciation and general deterrence while considering mitigating factors including genuine remorse, guilty pleas, and the momentary nature of the assault.

The defendant was charged with three offences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: making a material omission in her Statement of Affairs, failing to disclose approximately $40,000 in cash to her trustee, and failing to disclose the same funds in a subsequent Statement of Affairs.

The defendant had declared bankruptcy in September 2007, omitting reference to cash seized by police in January 2007.

She later sought recovery of the seized funds in July 2008, claiming ownership.

The court found the defendant not guilty of the first and third counts but guilty of the second count for failing to inform the trustee of her ownership of the funds between September 2007 and August 2008.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 and required a Tigrigna interpreter for trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether a conditionally accredited interpreter was qualified to provide interpretation services.

The court found that the interpreter, despite being bilingual and having seven years of court experience, was not qualified to interpret for the trial based on his performance on the Ministry of the Attorney General's accreditation test.

The court emphasized that bilingualism alone does not equate to interpretation competence and that objectively valid skills testing is the most reliable way to assess interpreter qualifications for complex trials.

In a joint first‑degree murder trial arising from a gang‑related shooting, the court considered whether the accused had put his character in issue through testimony denying gang affiliation and explaining incriminating letters written while in custody.

The court held that the accused’s narrative about his upbringing and alleged reluctance to join a gang implicitly asserted good character and therefore opened the door to cross‑examination on prior criminal conduct and gang‑related activity.

The court also ruled that certain previously redacted portions of letters written by the accused from custody could be admitted after reconsideration of a pre‑trial ruling, because the accused’s testimony materially altered the probative value of the evidence and risked misleading the jury.

The court concluded that the probative value of the additional passages outweighed their prejudicial effect and that severance of the co‑accused was not required.

The accused, Jermaine Gager, brought an application for a mistrial during his joint trial for first-degree murder with co-accused Corey Smelie.

The application was based on the closing address of counsel for the co-accused, who improperly commented on his client's failure to testify and suggested he was afraid of retribution from the moving party.

The court found the remarks were improper but concluded that the resulting prejudice was not irremediable.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, holding that a specific curative instruction to the jury would be sufficient to ensure trial fairness.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown applied to qualify a police detective as an expert on Toronto street gangs.

The defence brought parallel applications seeking further disclosure of police records, including confidential informant databases, debriefing notes, training presentations, and wiretap intercepts from other investigations.

The court ordered redacted disclosure of the debriefing notes and presentations but denied access to the informant database and the massive wiretap files, finding the latter to be third-party records that did not meet the threshold for likely relevance.

The court qualified the detective as an expert but strictly limited the scope of his permissible opinion evidence to prevent him from usurping the jury's fact-finding function, particularly regarding whether specific individuals were gang members or whether a 'gang war' existed.