J. Giuliana

The applicants, the driver and passenger of a motor vehicle, sought to exclude a firearm, ammunition, and drugs seized during a traffic stop, alleging violations of their ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial stop was lawful and not the result of racial profiling.

However, the court held that the search of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest for driving under suspension violated his s. 8 rights, and a brief delay in providing his rights to counsel violated his s. 10(b) rights.

The passenger's Charter rights were not violated.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the breaches were not egregious, the impact on the driver's rights was minimal, and the evidence should be admitted.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and multiple firearms offences related to a planned armoured truck robbery.

The accused testified that he believed he was participating in an 'inside job' where no firearms would be used and the guards would cooperate.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony as unbelievable, finding it inconsistent with common sense and the circumstantial evidence, including the presence of loaded firearms, disguises, and the lack of identification on the participants.

The court found the accused guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery and the firearms possession charges, but not guilty of altering a firearm's serial number due to lack of evidence.

The plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk in Toronto, sustaining a fractured back.

She sued the City of Toronto for gross negligence under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court found that the City had knowledge of the dangerous sidewalk conditions following a significant weather event but failed to deploy sidewalk clearing crews for over 48 hours.

The court concluded that the City's failure to maintain the sidewalk amounted to gross negligence and held the City liable for agreed-upon damages of $110,000.

The accused were charged with production of marihuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after arriving at a residence containing a grow operation.

The police arrested them immediately upon their arrival without reasonable grounds, and failed to properly communicate their Charter rights due to language barriers.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the evidence obtained, including a house key and a garage door opener, under s. 24(2).

Even if the evidence were admitted, the court found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused were found not guilty.

The accused, Jermaine Gager, brought an application for a mistrial during his joint trial for first-degree murder with co-accused Corey Smelie.

The application was based on the closing address of counsel for the co-accused, who improperly commented on his client's failure to testify and suggested he was afraid of retribution from the moving party.

The court found the remarks were improper but concluded that the resulting prejudice was not irremediable.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, holding that a specific curative instruction to the jury would be sufficient to ensure trial fairness.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown applied to qualify a police detective as an expert on Toronto street gangs.

The defence brought parallel applications seeking further disclosure of police records, including confidential informant databases, debriefing notes, training presentations, and wiretap intercepts from other investigations.

The court ordered redacted disclosure of the debriefing notes and presentations but denied access to the informant database and the massive wiretap files, finding the latter to be third-party records that did not meet the threshold for likely relevance.

The court qualified the detective as an expert but strictly limited the scope of his permissible opinion evidence to prevent him from usurping the jury's fact-finding function, particularly regarding whether specific individuals were gang members or whether a 'gang war' existed.