Agapi Anthi Mavridis

The defendant, Chard Patrick, who is charged with second-degree murder, brought several pretrial motions seeking to exclude DNA evidence, medical records, and phone data under section 8 of the Charter, as well as to prohibit in-dock identification and witness testimony.

The Crown brought a cross-application to introduce the deceased victim's ante mortem statement as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed all of the defendant's applications, finding no basis to exclude the challenged evidence or restrict the witness's testimony.

Conversely, the Court granted the Crown's application, allowing the victim's statement to be admitted at trial.

The defendant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay, even after accounting for a deduction for judicial illness, fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The defence argued that despite being under the ceiling, the Crown's "culture of complacency" regarding disclosure and the overall timeline meant the case took "markedly longer than it should have." The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate "sustained efforts to expedite proceedings" and did not establish that the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The application for a stay was dismissed, with the court reiterating that stays below the Jordan ceiling are rare, particularly in homicide cases.

Mr. Walker pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg and possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm.

For the firearm offence, a joint submission resulted in a two-year net prison term.

For the Over 80 offence, while counsel agreed on the minimum fine and driving prohibition, they disagreed on whether Mr. Walker should receive credit for a 14-month pre-sentence driving prohibition.

The court, applying the reasoning from R. v. Basque, granted the credit, finding that the common law discretion to credit pre-sentence driving prohibitions applies and that failing to do so would result in double punishment.

This judgment provides supplementary reasons for a not guilty verdict in a criminal trial involving charges of sexual assault and sexual touching.

The court found the complainant's account to be fabricated due to significant inconsistencies, the unlikelihood of the alleged events, and the complainant's documented mental health and behavioral issues.

The decision critically examines the police investigation, concluding it was not impartial or thorough, and highlights how the school board's directive hindered the disclosure of relevant evidence, thereby compromising investigative fairness.

The accused, an educational aide, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of a 12-year-old student.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and contrived, noting significant inconsistencies regarding the location, timing, and circumstances of the alleged offences, as well as the complainant's history of behavioural challenges and deceitfulness.

The court accepted the accused's denial of wrongdoing as credible and acquitted her of all charges.

The accused was charged with historical sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose relating to an incident that allegedly occurred 30 years prior when the complainant was four years old.

The Crown alleged the accused sexually assaulted the complainant and transmitted gonorrhea to her.

The court found that while the complainant was sexually assaulted and contracted gonorrhea as a result, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator.

The court noted inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainant and other Crown witnesses, and found the accused's denial to be credible and unshaken.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. framework and erred in assessing credibility.

An off-duty officer had observed the appellant driving erratically on Highway 401, which was captured on dash camera.

The appellant later crashed his vehicle and was arrested, exhibiting signs of impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, did not reverse the onus, and sufficiently explained his reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the officers' observations.

The applicant, Kirk Matthew Fairley, sought to sever one count of assault (December 1, 2018) from five other counts (December 14, 2018) on an indictment, arguing potential prejudice from photographic evidence of the first assault.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Last to balance the risk of prejudice against the public interest in a single trial.

Despite acknowledging potential for impermissible propensity reasoning or credibility bolstering, the court found the factual nexus, lack of complexity, the accused's intention to testify on all counts, and administrative efficiency favored a joint trial.

The application to sever was dismissed, with the court noting that a clear jury instruction could mitigate prejudice.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a Probation Order (x2), failing to comply with a Release Order, failing to comply with an undertaking, failing to comply with a Weapons Prohibition Order, and uttering a death threat.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the surety, who admitted to perjury at the bail hearing and had an extensive criminal record.

The court found the surety's evidence unreliable due to his credibility issues, lack of corroborating evidence, and the substantial amount of alcohol and drugs he consumed on the evening in question.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused, Kenny Seegobinsingh, applied for a bail review after being detained following a bail hearing.

The application was based on two material changes in circumstances: new proposed sureties and the global COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found both constituted material changes, allowing for a de novo bail hearing.

Considering the new sureties' credible evidence and the amplified risks of COVID-19 in institutional settings, the court determined that the proposed strict house arrest plan would sufficiently reduce the risk of re-offending and would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, despite the serious nature of the break and enter charges.