38 total
The Court of Appeal upheld convictions and a 15-month sentence for online child luring, but corrected an unlawful 10-year SOIRA order to the mandatory 20 years.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Noah Dunnett’s conviction and sentence appeals for two counts of child luring, and allowed the Crown’s cross-appeal only to increase the SOIRA order from 10 to 20 years.
The court found no error in the trial judge’s handling of s. 11(b) Charter delay, the Garofoli application, or the sentence imposed.
The court emphasized the seriousness of child luring offences and the deference owed to trial judges on sentencing, especially where mitigating factors exist.
The SOIRA order was corrected to comply with statutory minimums.
The court dismissed the accused's pretrial motions to exclude evidence and allowed the Crown to introduce a dying declaration.
The defendant, Chard Patrick, who is charged with second-degree murder, brought several pretrial motions seeking to exclude DNA evidence, medical records, and phone data under section 8 of the Charter, as well as to prohibit in-dock identification and witness testimony.
The Crown brought a cross-application to introduce the deceased victim's ante mortem statement as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed all of the defendant's applications, finding no basis to exclude the challenged evidence or restrict the witness's testimony.
Conversely, the Court granted the Crown's application, allowing the victim's statement to be admitted at trial.
The court dismissed the applicant's bail review, finding the proposed release plan insufficient to mitigate secondary ground concerns.
The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds.
The court found a material change in circumstances due to charge withdrawals/amendments and new disclosure, allowing a fresh consideration of bail.
However, the proposed new release plan, including a new surety, was deemed insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of re-offending, given the seriousness and repetition of the charges, the applicant's history of non-compliance with release orders, and the surety's lack of insight and inadequate supervision plan.
The court also noted an error by the original Justice of the Peace in failing to consider the tertiary ground, but ultimately dismissed the bail review application, affirming continued detention on secondary grounds.
A section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay below the presumptive ceiling was dismissed.
The defendant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.
The total delay, even after accounting for a deduction for judicial illness, fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.
The defence argued that despite being under the ceiling, the Crown's "culture of complacency" regarding disclosure and the overall timeline meant the case took "markedly longer than it should have." The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate "sustained efforts to expedite proceedings" and did not establish that the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The application for a stay was dismissed, with the court reiterating that stays below the Jordan ceiling are rare, particularly in homicide cases.
The court stayed firearms charges due to unreasonable delay under the Jordan ceiling caused by the Crown's failure to provide core disclosure promptly.
The accused, Jedidiah Drummond, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in his firearms-related prosecution.
Despite the total delay falling below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, the court found that the Crown's persistent failure to provide core disclosure promptly, both when the accused was self-represented and after counsel was retained, caused the case to take "markedly longer" than reasonably required.
The court emphasized the Crown's constitutional disclosure obligations, especially towards self-represented litigants, and found no defence delay.
The application was granted, and a stay of proceedings was ordered.
Directed verdicts of acquittal granted for proceeds of crime but denied for drug trafficking charges.
The Crown closed its case in a trial where the accused were charged with possession of various prohibited substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.
The accused brought motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on all counts.
The court granted the directed verdict of acquittal for the charge of possession of property obtained by crime, finding no reasonable inference could connect the seized cash to drug trafficking.
However, the court dismissed the motions for the drug trafficking charges, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of constructive possession and intent to traffic for a reasonable jury to potentially convict.
The court dismissed the accused's application for a stay of proceedings for an under-ceiling delay.
The accused, Massimo Seibezzi, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The Crown opposed the application.
The court applied the 'Bright Line' approach from R. v. Jordan, noting that the total delay of 16 months and 21 days was below the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.
The defence failed to satisfy the onus to demonstrate that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, despite taking steps to expedite.
The court emphasized that stays below the ceiling should be rare and limited to clear cases, and that the Crown's actions in withdrawing a charge and consenting to re-election, which contributed to some delay, were in the spirit of Jordan.
The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.
Charter application to exclude evidence dismissed despite minor s. 10 breaches during search warrant execution.
The applicants, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, sought to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a rural property, alleging violations of their s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights.
The court found moderate and minor breaches of s. 10(a) and (b) due to a delay in transporting one applicant to the police detachment to contact counsel and a failure to promptly inform both applicants of additional charges.
However, the court found no breach of the duty to hold off eliciting evidence.
Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breaches were not deliberate or systemic, had a minor impact on the applicants' Charter-protected interests, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.
The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed.
Application for stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) dismissed as delay fell below presumptive ceiling.
The applicant, charged with several driving and weapons offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.
The total delay was 28 months and 10 days, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for matters in the Superior Court of Justice.
The court found that the defence did not take meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
The application was dismissed.
Bail review dismissed; no new evidence or errors of law found in original detention order.
The applicant sought a bail review after being detained on charges including drug trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and fleeing police.
She was arrested while on release for similar offences.
The reviewing judge found no new admissible evidence to justify a review, noting that opinions from a judicial pre-trial are privileged and not evidence.
The court also found no errors of law or inappropriate reasoning in the justice of the peace's decision to detain the applicant on the secondary and tertiary grounds.
The bail review application was dismissed.
Stay of disclosure order granted pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Peel Regional Police Service applied for a stay of a disclosure order pending an application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The disclosure order required the Crown to provide the investigative files of a police officer, who was charged with unrelated offences, to the accused as first-party disclosure.
The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there was a serious question to be determined, the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the appeal became moot, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.
The stay was granted, subject to terms regarding its expiration.
The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry due to insufficient evidence establishing constructive possession.
At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on two counts: possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and simple possession of oxycodone contrary to s. 4(1).
The accused was arrested following six weeks of police surveillance and a search warrant executed at a residence.
Police seized cocaine and oxycodone from the residence and dime bags of cocaine from the accused's person.
The court discharged the accused on both counts, finding that while the Crown's theory was plausible, the evidence was fatally deficient in detail necessary to support the essential elements of knowledge and control of the drugs found in the residence.
The court emphasized that the Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence that lacked sufficient foundational facts, including inadequate evidence of the accused's exclusive or primary connection to the residence and the specific rooms where drugs were secreted.
The court ordered first-party disclosure of investigative files for an officer's outstanding criminal charges but denied third-party disclosure of files underlying past disciplinary findings.
The applicants, Dyllan Ali and Diquan Taylor, facing firearms and drug trafficking charges, brought a motion for disclosure of the full contents of disciplinary and criminal investigation files relating to Constable Sean Osborne, a key police witness.
The court dismissed the request for disclosure of files related to past disciplinary findings, citing principles of finality and lack of demonstrated likely relevance.
However, the court granted the request for disclosure of investigative files related to Constable Osborne's outstanding criminal charges for assault and obstruction of justice, finding them "obviously relevant" to the applicants' Charter application and trial, particularly concerning the officer's credibility and potential propensity for misconduct.
Defendants found guilty of drug trafficking based on circumstantial evidence linking them to buried drugs.
The defendants were jointly charged with trafficking in various drugs and possession of proceeds of crime after police executed a search warrant at their rural hobby farm.
Police found over $800,000 worth of drugs and $82,000 in cash buried in a drive shed, along with packaging materials and scales in the main residence.
The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including matching containers found in the residence and the drive shed, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had constructive and joint possession of the drugs and currency.
The defendants were found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession, and possession of proceeds of crime.
New trial ordered after W.(D.) error in credibility analysis.
On a summary conviction appeal from an assault conviction, the appellant argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard in assessing credibility.
The appeal court rejected the unreasonable verdict ground, holding that the alleged inconsistencies, intoxication concerns, and absence of corroboration did not render the conviction unreasonable.
However, the court held that the trial judge's reasons treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to address whether the defence evidence, even if disbelieved, nonetheless raised a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.
The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the only count under appeal.
The court dismissed the defendant's application to exclude evidence, finding the search warrants valid and no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment hallway.
The defendant, Abdul Shahin, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his apartment unit (595 Proudfoot Lane, unit 808) and police observations in the building's common areas.
The court found that Shahin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unit, but not in the common areas (eighth-floor hallway).
The general warrant and subsequent search warrant were deemed valid, and no Charter breaches occurred.
Even if s. 8 Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.
The court stayed drug trafficking charges against the defendants due to an unreasonable delay of 30.5 months.
The defendants applied under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of charges due to unreasonable delay, as the time from charge to the anticipated end of trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.
The court found no defence-caused delay and no discrete events that would justify the delay.
Furthermore, the case was not deemed particularly complex to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.
Despite acknowledging significant judicial resource limitations, the court concluded that the 30.5-month delay was unreasonable and granted the application, staying the charges against both defendants.
Tax Relief denied
The Crown sought to admit expert forensic accounting evidence from Jeffrey J. Good to establish that approximately $49,500 in seized currency was proceeds of drug trafficking.
The defendants were jointly charged with possession of various prohibited substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.
The court applied the two-step admissibility test for expert evidence from *Mohan* and *White Burgess*.
While the expert was qualified, the court found the evidence lacked logical relevance to directly link the seized funds to drug trafficking over the seven-year period analyzed.
Concerns were also raised regarding the unexplained expansion of the expert's mandate from one defendant to both, and the arbitrary selection of the seven-year period.
The court concluded that the potential prejudicial effects of the evidence, including inviting speculation and devolving the case into a remote inquiry, outweighed its slight probative value.
Consequently, the expert evidence was deemed inadmissible.
Costs application against the Crown dismissed; late disclosure was an inadvertent administrative error.
The defendant applied for $5,000 in costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 7 rights due to the late disclosure of a witness statement which caused a trial adjournment.
The court found that the late disclosure was the result of an inadvertent administrative error by Crown staff, not a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards expected of the prosecution.
The court dismissed the application, holding that no s. 7 breach occurred and that costs are not an appropriate remedy for inadvertent disclosure errors or trial adjournments.
The offender received a conditional discharge and 12 months of probation for possessing a weapon dangerous to the public peace.
Deion Campbell was found guilty by a jury of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, following acquittals on aggravated assault and assault with a weapon charges.
In sentencing, the court considered mitigating factors including the possibility of self-defence, a positive pre-sentence report, stable family, no criminal record, and efforts towards education and employment.
Aggravating factors included the public location of the offence, the escalation caused by brandishing the knife, and ongoing non-medicinal marijuana use.
The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence requested an absolute discharge.
The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation, including conditions such as a non-communication order, a prohibition from attending Humber College (unless registered), a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a mandatory $200 victim surcharge.
A request for a DNA sample order was declined.