Mark Poland

The accused, a police officer and qualified breath technician, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a collision with a parked pickup truck.

The accused fled the scene and attempted to obstruct justice by having his wife falsely claim she was the driver.

The Crown relied on expert toxicological evidence to "read back" breath test results to the time of the collision, as the presumption of identity was unavailable due to the delay in testing.

The accused claimed bolus drinking and that distracted driving, not impairment, caused the collision.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and unreliable, found the Crown proved the absence of bolus drinking beyond a reasonable doubt, and convicted on both charges based on the expert evidence and the accused's own admissions regarding his impaired judgment and decision-making.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired care or control based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's disorientation, admission of drinking, odour of alcohol, and the manner in which the vehicle was parked on a highway.

However, the trial judge found that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying 16 minutes to administer an Approved Screening Device test.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown brought a motion to admit hearsay statements made by the accused's two children (ages 12 and 8) immediately after his arrest at the family home.

The children told police that their father had been drinking and speeding while driving them home, and that they were afraid.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, over 80, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, and two offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court found the statements admissible under both the res gestae exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The Crown's case rested on the evidence of Provincial Constable Jason Mask, who conducted the breath tests and prepared a Certificate of Qualified Technician.

The defence objected to the admission of the certificate on the grounds that it was defective, missing the manufacturer's name of the alcohol standard solution.

The court ruled the certificate admissible, distinguishing the defence's reliance on R v. Pearce and finding that oral evidence from the qualified technician could cure the defect.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to the mandatory minimum: a $1,000 fine, a one-year driving prohibition, and victim fine surcharge.

The accused sought exclusion of a knife alleged to be the murder weapon in a first‑degree murder prosecution, arguing it was discovered as a result of statements obtained in breach of their Charter s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that several statements were indeed elicited in violation of the right to counsel, including roadside questioning and later questioning in hospital.

However, applying the framework in Grant, the court concluded that the knife was independently discoverable through the planned search of the defined area and the canine track leading to the creek.

While the seriousness of the Charter breaches favoured exclusion, the reliability of the physical evidence and its independent discoverability attenuated the impact on the accused’s interests.

The statements were excluded but the knife was admitted into evidence.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case, arguing there was insufficient evidence of participation or of planning and deliberation.

The accused also sought exclusion of the victim’s eyeglasses, alleging police testimony regarding their discovery was fabricated and compromised trial fairness.

The court held that the Crown had led evidence capable of supporting findings of identity, causation, and the requisite mental state, including forensic evidence and BlackBerry Messenger communications indicating a planned killing.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could reasonably find the murder was planned and deliberate and dismissed the directed verdict motion.

The court also refused to exclude the eyeglasses, finding credibility issues regarding the officer’s testimony were matters for the jury and noting the defence had not objected when the exhibit was admitted.

In a first‑degree murder prosecution, the court ruled on the admissibility of a video statement given by one accused to police after earlier Charter breaches involving statements obtained before the right to counsel was provided.

The defence argued the later statement was derived from and tainted by the earlier unconstitutional interrogations.

The court held the statement to the interviewing detective was voluntary and not sufficiently connected to the earlier breaches.

A “fresh start” occurred after the accused consulted counsel, received proper cautions, and was interviewed hours later by a different officer.

Even if s. 24(2) of the Charter applied, the court concluded the statement would still be admitted under the Grant framework.

In a murder prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of multiple statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, and further challenged the legality of his arrest.

The court found that statements made at the crime scene, during a witness video interview, and in post‑arrest interviews were voluntary and not the product of threats, promises, or oppression.

The court determined that the accused was detained prior to arrest without being immediately informed of his right to counsel, constituting a s.10(b) Charter breach.

Applying the s.24(2) framework from Grant, the court held the breach was technical, had minimal impact on the accused’s interests, and did not justify exclusion of the statements.

The court also concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for murder.

During a jury trial for robbery and murder, the Crown sought to reference similarities between a prior cheque fraud scheme and the alleged murder during closing submissions.

The prior fraud evidence had previously been admitted only to establish financial motive and not as evidence of modus operandi.

Defence counsel objected, arguing that such submissions would improperly expand the permitted use of the evidence and prejudice the defence.

The court held that permitting the Crown to rely on the fraud to characterize the accused’s roles would effectively revisit the earlier evidentiary ruling and risk distracting the jury from the central issue of guilt.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from referring to similarities between the fraud and the murder in closing argument.

In a jury trial for first-degree murder, the court ruled on pre‑charge issues concerning the theories of liability that could be left with the jury.

The Crown sought to rely on constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code based on alleged forcible confinement, and on contracted murder under s. 231(3) arising from BBM messages suggesting a promise of a vehicle in exchange for participation in the killing.

The court held there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave constructive first‑degree murder to the jury because there was no evidence of unlawful confinement distinct from the killing itself.

However, the BBM messages were capable of supporting a reasonable inference of a murder-for-hire arrangement involving a vehicle as consideration.

The court therefore ruled that the contracted‑murder pathway under s. 231(3) could be left with the jury but not the constructive first‑degree theory.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling that gestures made by the deceased immediately before death constituted dying declarations.

The deceased, who had suffered catastrophic stab wounds and could not speak, pointed to his abdomen and then toward one of the accused while officers attempted to render aid.

The court considered whether such gestures could qualify as hearsay falling within the dying declaration exception.

Applying the criteria for dying declarations, the court found the circumstances permitted the inference that the deceased expected imminent death and that the gestures related to the circumstances of the homicide.

The judge concluded that the gestures could constitute assertions by conduct and therefore fall within the dying declaration exception, subject to further argument regarding admissibility.

In a first‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct arising from Blackberry Messenger chats and related events, including possession of a stolen vehicle, a cheque‑cashing fraud, a concurrent plot to rob and kill another individual, and evidence relating to the accused’s financial misrepresentations.

The court considered the governing principles for admitting prior discreditable conduct, requiring a link to a live issue and a probative value that outweighs prejudice.

The court admitted evidence relating to a stolen vehicle, a cheque fraud shortly before the murder, efforts to obtain firearms, and chats revealing a concurrent plot to rob and kill another individual because they were intertwined with the narrative and relevant to motive, planning, deliberation, and state of mind.

However, the court excluded certain other evidence, including a photograph involving an imitation firearm, related web searches, and earlier unrelated robbery‑murder planning discussions, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their limited probative value.

Evidence concerning the accused’s financial misrepresentations was admitted as relevant to motive.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of digital evidence obtained from Blackberry phones and a Blackberry Playbook after the court previously found the searches violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the Charter breach, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court admitted certain communications data, including BBM chats, SMS messages, emails, notes, and call logs, but excluded other categories of device data such as browser history, cookies, multimedia files, and related metadata.

The accused also challenged production orders issued to telecommunications and health authorities.

The court rejected those challenges, holding that sufficient grounds existed for the issuing justice and declining to excise references to chats that were also lawfully obtained from another device.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a Charter motion challenging the search of Blackberry devices and other electronic devices seized during the investigation.

The police conducted physical chip extraction and later re‑examined the resulting data using updated forensic software, which revealed deleted Blackberry Messenger communications.

The applicants argued the search warrant was overbroad and the searches were conducted unreasonably contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the police exceeded the limits of the warrant by conducting a sweeping search of multimedia, browser data, and other information beyond communications authorized in the Information to Obtain.

The searches of the Blackberry devices were found to violate s. 8, while other search warrants and production orders challenged by one accused were upheld.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant used to extract data from their Blackberry phones.

They argued the warrant was facially invalid because it referenced the OPP property vault as the place to be searched, contained outdated language permitting searches related to the 'suspected commission' of an offence, and imposed a time limit that allegedly expired before the forensic analysis occurred.

They also argued the warrant did not authorize data extraction and that a later re‑analysis of the data with updated software required a new warrant.

The court held that the warrant, read together with the Information to Obtain and appendix, authorized the search of the phones and their data.

The court further found the time limitation applied only to entry and seizure, not to later forensic analysis, and that the subsequent software‑based re‑analysis constituted a further analysis of lawfully seized data rather than a new search.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on observations of poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and the accused's own admission.

However, the court found that the Intoxilyzer technician caused an unreasonable delay by administering breath tests to another person between the accused's first and second breath samples, contrary to the requirement that samples be taken "as soon as practicable" under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the over 80 charge.

The court also rejected Charter applications alleging breaches of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights, finding the police acted reasonably in all circumstances.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol content in excess of eighty milligrams percent while operating a motor vehicle.

The offences allegedly occurred on October 28, 2012 in the Town of Caledon.

The accused struck a tree in a residential area after proceeding through a stop sign.

The court dismissed a Charter Section 8 application challenging the arrest and breath sample demand, finding sufficient grounds existed.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, relying on expert toxicology evidence projecting a blood alcohol concentration of 165 to 215 milligrams percent at the time of driving, corroborated by the circumstances of the accident and police observations.

A judicial stay was imposed on the impaired charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused applied for a bail review under s.520 of the Criminal Code after a justice of the peace ordered detention on all three grounds under s.515(10).

The accused faced charges including attempted murder with a firearm, assault with a weapon, pointing a firearm, and robbery with a firearm arising from a planned armed robbery connected to a drug transaction.

The defence argued that there were material changes in circumstances, including a closer relationship with proposed sureties and a stricter supervision plan involving house arrest.

The court reviewed the strength of the Crown’s case, the accused’s criminal history, flight risk, alleged gang associations, and the adequacy of the proposed sureties.

Concluding that the Crown’s case had strengthened and that the sureties lacked sufficient influence or ability to control the accused, the court found detention remained justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.