Doug Lent

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown relied on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses and breath sample analysis.

The accused claimed his poor driving was due to unfamiliarity with his new vehicle's technology and fear of being robbed.

The court rejected the accused's explanations as internally and externally inconsistent, finding them incapable of raising reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the 22-minute delay in obtaining breath samples, which resulted from facilitating the accused's right to counsel, was reasonable and did not violate the "as soon as practicable" requirement.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c), which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offence.

The central issue was whether the 57-minute delay between the traffic stop and the first breath sample was reasonable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden by establishing that the police acted reasonably throughout the chain of events, including the time spent on booking procedures, facilitating contact with duty counsel, and preparing the approved instrument.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial addressed two Charter issues: whether the police breached the accused's rights under section 10(b) by failing to provide an interpreter or Polish-speaking officer, and whether the police breached section 8 rights by making an illegal demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding of English and his rights to counsel.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 8 rights because the officer failed to provide direct evidence of forming a reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body while driving, as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was convicted of driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused alleged Charter violations and sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court found no s. 8 or 10(b) violation but determined that the accused's s. 9 Charter rights were violated when he was unjustifiably held at the police station for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was completed.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude evidence but considered whether a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum was an appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood.

The accused alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) rights.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to arbitrary detention (overholding) for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was complete.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence as remedies, finding that the breach occurred post-offence and was unrelated to evidence gathering.

The breath test readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty, with the court indicating it would consider a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge and did not introduce breath test results.

The defence initially pursued a Charter application but abandoned it after evidence was heard.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's poor driving was caused by alcohol impairment rather than a medical condition or language barrier.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the totality of evidence, including aggressive driving patterns, inconsistent defence testimony, and the accused's behaviour following police intervention.

The Crown brought an application to recall Constable Bell to provide additional evidence regarding the location and circumstances of a vehicle stop.

The defence raised a Charter argument regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, arguing the stop occurred on private property without legal authority.

The Crown sought to recall the witness to elicit evidence relevant to this Charter issue, which had not been specifically particularized in the defence's notice of application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the defence was not at fault for failing to provide specific notice due to inadequate disclosure, it had an ongoing obligation to alert the Crown once the issue became apparent.

The court balanced procedural fairness to both parties and permitted the Crown to recall the witness to address the Charter claim.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol after registering a fail on an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued that the ASD result was unreliable due to the presence of a throat lozenge in the accused's mouth and the officer's failure to consider the effects of certain foods and substances on the device, as outlined in an Ontario Provincial Police memorandum.

The court found that the officer could not have reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the breath samples were obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results to prove the second charge.

The accused applied to exclude the breath test results based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample, there was a violation of the accused's section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted on the impaired driving charge but acquitted on the excess blood alcohol charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the validity of breath demands made under sections 254(2) and 254(3) of the Criminal Code, and argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on observed driving behavior and the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath.

The court also found that the ASD fail result provided reasonable and probable grounds for the section 254(3) breath demand, and that the presence of empty beer cans in the vehicle did not undermine the reliability of the ASD result.

The court concluded that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, considering the lodging process, counsel contact, and the overall timeline.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operate over 80 following a traffic stop.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings from an Intoxilyzer device.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached with respect to facilitation of the right to speak to counsel of choice.

The police failed to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and instead imposed duty counsel upon the accused.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the defendant to Constable Foreman in the Intoxilyzer room for purposes of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs. per cent blood alcohol.

The court conducted a voluntariness voir dire and found that the Crown failed to call all persons in authority who had dealings with the defendant, specifically the Staff Sergeant and booking officer who were observed in conversation with the defendant on video.

The court excluded the statement, finding that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses prevented it from satisfying the burden of proving the statement was voluntarily made.

The accused, a newly trained police officer with Peel Regional Police, was charged with impaired operation and over 80 following a single-vehicle collision on the QEW in Burlington on August 3, 2011.

The trial involved three Charter applications: one alleging violation of s. 7 (right to remain silent), one alleging violation of s. 10(b) (right to counsel), and one alleging violation of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure).

The court found a s. 10(b) breach due to inadequate facilitation of access to counsel of choice and poor note-taking by the arresting officer.

However, the court excluded the breath test results and statements made after rights were read, but found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the erratic driving observed by an independent witness and the accused's conduct at the scene.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol content in excess of eighty milligrams percent while operating a motor vehicle.

The offences allegedly occurred on October 28, 2012 in the Town of Caledon.

The accused struck a tree in a residential area after proceeding through a stop sign.

The court dismissed a Charter Section 8 application challenging the arrest and breath sample demand, finding sufficient grounds existed.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, relying on expert toxicology evidence projecting a blood alcohol concentration of 165 to 215 milligrams percent at the time of driving, corroborated by the circumstances of the accident and police observations.

A judicial stay was imposed on the impaired charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle stop in Caledon, Ontario on October 28, 2010.

The Crown withdrew the companion charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 milligrams) due to a breach of the defendant's right to consult with counsel in private, as his voice was inadvertently recorded on the breath room video while he spoke to his lawyer in the privacy booth.

The defendant raised three Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on extensive evidence of impairment, including breath test results of 283 and 267 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was sentenced to a $1,700 fine plus victim fine surcharge and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a rear-end collision in Brampton.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the equivocal nature of the evidence, particularly the absence of overt signs of intoxication such as slurred speech or significant balance problems.

However, the court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol based on the breath test results.

The court also dismissed the accused's Charter application regarding trial delay, finding the delay was reasonable under the Morin factors.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on August 1, 2010.

An information was sworn on August 9, 2010.

A trial date was set for June 20, 2011, but the trial did not proceed due to disclosure issues, particularly the late delivery of a 911 call recording and surveillance footage from the police division.

A second trial date was set for May 23 and 24, 2012, resulting in a total delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the delay infringed his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and granted the stay.