Sean Michael Bradley

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused, Christine Birt, who was charged with manslaughter.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of her Charter rights (right to silence and right to counsel).

The court found the statement inadmissible, ruling that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary, specifically due to an improper inducement by the police during interrogation.

The court found no breach of the right to silence or the right to counsel regarding a new charge, as the new charge was less serious and no interrogation occurred on it.

The accused, William Schatz, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a 17-year-old student.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the egregious breach of trust by a teacher and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her sister.

Mitigating factors included the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and strong community support.

The Crown sought a two-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a 6 to 12-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing that carceral sentences are the norm for sexual offences against children, and imposed an 18-month incarceration period followed by two years of probation.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding it disproportionate given the accused's low risk of reoffending and the significant time elapsed since the offence.

The accused, J.C., was charged with assault and sexual assault against the complainant, A.T. The Crown alleged three sexual assaults in 2015 and one choking assault in 2016.

The court applied principles of reasonable doubt and credibility assessment, including the W.(D.) analysis.

The court found material inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence regarding both the sexual assault and choking allegations, and that the accused's testimony was unshaken.

Consequently, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and found J.C. not guilty on both counts.

W.G. was found guilty of sexual assault (stayed) and sexual interference.

The court considered sentencing submissions, including a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the Crown's concession that the mandatory minimum was unconstitutional, relying on prior Superior Court declarations.

Considering W.G.'s low blameworthiness (negligence in ascertaining age), lack of criminal record, and community support, the court imposed a conditional sentence of one year, to be served in the community, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, R.M., applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay was 33 months, reduced to 32 months after deducting defence waiver, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that an error during jury selection, where an incorrect number of peremptory challenges was stated, constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court found the error to be an unforeseen exceptional circumstance, directly causing 11 weeks of delay.

Deducting this period brought the net delay below the 30-month threshold.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, W.G., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of L.S., who was 15 years old at the time.

The central issue was whether W.G. had an honest but mistaken belief that L.S. was at least 16 years of age, and if so, whether he took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain L.S.'s age as required by s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while W.G. genuinely believed L.S. was 18, he failed to take all reasonable steps to verify L.S.'s age, given the significant age disparity and L.S.'s efforts to conceal his true age.

Consequently, the defence under s. 150.1(4) was unavailable, and W.G. was found guilty of both offences.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample analysis showing readings of 130 mg and 140 mg.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that police breached the accused's section 8 rights by unlawfully entering and remaining in the home beyond the scope of the implied invitation to knock doctrine, and breached section 10(b) by failing to inform the accused of his right to counsel without delay during an investigative detention.

The court also found a breach of section 10(b) regarding the timing of rights to counsel.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the serious Charter breaches outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Both charges were acquitted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit a statement made by the accused, Jan Goro, to police in 2003, in a second-degree murder case.

The statement was given after Goro was arrested on a foot impression warrant.

The court found that the police failed to inform Goro that he was free to leave after the warrant was executed, thereby undermining his free will and right to choose whether to speak to police.

Consequently, the statement was deemed involuntary and inadmissible at trial for any purpose, including cross-examination.

Jan Goro, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to admit details of incidents involving a third-party suspect, Jack Laforge, where charges were initiated but no convictions resulted.

The Crown brought a similar cross-application to admit details of incidents involving Mr. Goro where police investigated but no charges were laid.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the unproven allegations had minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect, especially given that both parties' criminal convictions would already be admitted.

The offender was convicted after trial of sexually exploiting a 16-year-old complainant by violating his position of trust as a coach at a cheerleading gym.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 years old with explicit sexting and escalated to multiple acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio after she turned 16.

The offender was a 25-year-old employed full-time and working as a coach at the gym where he met the complainant.

The complainant was highly vulnerable, dealing with parental conflict, self-harm, depression, anxiety, and her mother's terminal cancer diagnosis.

The court found the offender deliberately exploited these vulnerabilities and kept the relationship secret, knowing it was wrong.

A separate charge of sexual assault was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The offender received a six-month jail sentence followed by three years of probation with conditions including a mandatory 10-year SOIRA order and DNA order.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by drug on October 20, 2013, in Milton, Ontario, contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused admitted to being prescribed methadone since 2011 or 2012 and was using this drug at the time of the offence.

Two civilian witnesses observed the accused's vehicle exhibiting extremely erratic and dangerous driving patterns for approximately 10 to 15 minutes, including running red lights, mounting curbs, swerving abruptly, and driving into oncoming traffic.

Police located the accused shortly thereafter under her vehicle attempting to replace a flat tire.

A Standard Field Sobriety Test was conducted, followed by a Drug Recognition Evaluation, which concluded the accused was impaired by a narcotic analgesic.

A urine sample detected methadone, diazepam, nordiazepam, oxazepam, temazepam, carboxytetrahydrocannabinol, and mirtazapine.

The accused testified that her impairment was attributable to sleep deprivation, assault by her boyfriend earlier that day, and side effects of prescribed medications.

The defence called Dr. David Rosenbloom to provide alternative explanations for the signs of impairment.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and found the defence expert's evidence to be biased and of no weight.

The court convicted the accused based on the totality of the evidence, including the dangerous driving observations, the DRE evaluation, and the medical evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drug and with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge prior to the close of its case.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving after the court rejected her defence of necessity, which was based on claims that she was experiencing suicidal ideation and drove to seek help.

The court found no evidence of imminent peril, reasonable legal alternatives existed, and the proportionality requirement was not satisfied.

Mohammed Karimullah appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged factual errors by the trial judge, the rejection of expert evidence regarding alcohol impairment, and the failure to adequately address good character evidence.

The court found that the alleged factual errors were either insignificant or not palpable and overriding.

The trial judge was entitled to reject expert opinion, even if uncontradicted, and to use common sense in evaluating the evidence, particularly regarding the appellant's changed driving behavior.

The court also determined that the trial judge's brief reference to good character evidence was sufficient, as a judge is presumed to know the law, and counsel did not emphasize it in closing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to demand a breath sample and that the accused was properly informed of the reasons for detention and arrest.

However, the court found that the breath technician breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) by withholding the first breath test result, thereby preventing the accused from making an informed decision about whether to seek legal advice.

The second breath test result was excluded.

The accused was convicted of impaired operation based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and the first breath test result.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a severe single-vehicle collision in Burlington on April 23, 2013.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications challenging the validity of the arrest, the breath demand, and the procedures followed at the hospital.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on a constellation of factors including the unexplained severe collision, observations of disorientation and unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, admission of alcohol consumption, and physical indicators consistent with impairment.

The court found the accused's rights to counsel were properly respected and that the hospital setting did not prevent adequate privacy for consultation with counsel.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving.

The defendant was charged with racing a motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, specifically for outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another vehicle while driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed limit.

The Crown's evidence, provided by a police constable, alleged the defendant was driving in the northbound lane at 110-120 km/h beside another vehicle.

The defendant testified he remained in the southbound lane at approximately 60 km/h, attempting to pass a stopped vehicle.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and, when considered in context with all evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was outdistancing another vehicle or driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed.

The defendant was acquitted of racing but convicted of the included offence of speeding.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The institutional delay of between 8 months 5 days and 10 months 11 days was found to be reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court found that the defendant declined multiple earlier trial dates offered by the Crown and failed to demonstrate genuine prejudice from the delay.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, care or control with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the Crown conceded it had not proven the over 80 offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample, applying the three-part test from R. v. Boudreault regarding care or control, and finding the accused's claimed asthma did not explain his inability to provide samples.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown had proven that the accused was driving his vehicle on October 4, 2013, in Burlington.

The Crown called witnesses who observed the accused driving his car away from a strip club in the early morning hours.

The accused testified that a stranger who resembled him drove the vehicle instead.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on credible eyewitness identification and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and fantastical.

A one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The accused was convicted after trial of three counts of assault against his common-law spouse.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 60 to 90 days, while defence counsel sought time served and/or a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of imprisonment of four months to be served in the community, with the first 60 days subject to house arrest, followed by three years of probation.

A firearms prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code was also imposed for five years.

The court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the offender's lack of prior criminal record, good prospects for rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the offences, which occurred during a period of significant personal stress.