Sean Michael Bradley

The defendant was charged with racing a motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, specifically for outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another vehicle while driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed limit.

The Crown's evidence, provided by a police constable, alleged the defendant was driving in the northbound lane at 110-120 km/h beside another vehicle.

The defendant testified he remained in the southbound lane at approximately 60 km/h, attempting to pass a stopped vehicle.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and, when considered in context with all evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was outdistancing another vehicle or driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed.

The defendant was acquitted of racing but convicted of the included offence of speeding.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusal to provide a breath sample, impaired driving, and mischief under $5,000 arising from a single‑vehicle accident and subsequent conduct in a police cruiser and breath room.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings regarding whether the appellant intentionally refused a breath demand and whether her emotional state constituted a reasonable excuse.

The appeal court held that insufficient consideration had been given to the brevity of the officer’s questioning and the failure to warn the appellant of the legal consequences of refusal while she was crying uncontrollably.

The conviction for refusal to provide a breath sample was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The convictions for impaired driving and mischief and the sentence imposed were affirmed.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The institutional delay of between 8 months 5 days and 10 months 11 days was found to be reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court found that the defendant declined multiple earlier trial dates offered by the Crown and failed to demonstrate genuine prejudice from the delay.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, care or control with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the Crown conceded it had not proven the over 80 offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample, applying the three-part test from R. v. Boudreault regarding care or control, and finding the accused's claimed asthma did not explain his inability to provide samples.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown had proven that the accused was driving his vehicle on October 4, 2013, in Burlington.

The Crown called witnesses who observed the accused driving his car away from a strip club in the early morning hours.

The accused testified that a stranger who resembled him drove the vehicle instead.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on credible eyewitness identification and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and fantastical.

A one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in finding identity beyond a reasonable doubt and provided inadequate reasons.

The appellant contended the trial judge improperly relied on the contents of a telephone statement to establish identity and that the circumstantial evidence permitted other reasonable inferences.

The appeal court held there was sufficient independent evidence on a balance of probabilities to admit the statement and that, when combined with other circumstantial evidence, the only rational inference was that the appellant was the driver involved in the incident.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasoning was apparent from the record and adequate for appellate review.

The accused was convicted after trial of three counts of assault against his common-law spouse.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 60 to 90 days, while defence counsel sought time served and/or a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of imprisonment of four months to be served in the community, with the first 60 days subject to house arrest, followed by three years of probation.

A firearms prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code was also imposed for five years.

The court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the offender's lack of prior criminal record, good prospects for rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the offences, which occurred during a period of significant personal stress.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant sought to exclude evidence of his refusal based on alleged Charter violations regarding the right to be informed of the reason for detention and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant's evidence to be internally inconsistent and contradicted by multiple Crown witnesses.

The court rejected the Charter application and found the defendant guilty of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused was found sleeping in the front passenger seat of his vehicle with the engine running in a strip club parking lot.

The Crown did not have the benefit of the presumption under section 258(1)(a) as the accused was not in the driver's seat.

The central issue was whether the elements of care or control had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically whether there was a realistic risk that the vehicle could have been put in motion or a change of mind in deciding to drive while impaired.

The trial judge found the accused's evidence regarding his plans to avoid driving home to be incredible and defying common sense, and concluded there was a realistic risk the accused would drive the vehicle while impaired.

The accused was charged with three counts: assault on Charmaine Mangaoang (his wife), uttering a death threat to Charmaine Mangaoang, and assault on Robbin Patrick MacDonald (a tenant).

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial involved conflicting testimony regarding domestic violence allegations and a physical altercation between the accused and the tenant.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts based on the credible testimony of the tenant and an independent witness, while rejecting the testimony of the accused and his wife as not credible and potentially collusive.

The offender was sentenced for breach of a conditional sentence order.

The offender failed to report to his supervisor as required by the terms of his conditional sentence.

The court found the breach was without reasonable excuse and imposed a custodial sentence of 20 days, with the conditional sentence order to resume upon release without modification.

The court emphasized the importance of compliance with conditional sentence terms and the deterrent effect of potential incarceration.

The appellant appealed from convictions arising from impaired driving charges after the trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach based on audio and video recording of the appellant using a toilet in a police holding cell, but declined to grant either a stay or exclusion of evidence.

The appeal challenged the refusal of both remedies and the respondent sought to file fresh evidence about subsequent institutional responses by police to privacy concerns.

The court refused to admit the fresh evidence under the Palmer criteria, holding that the appeal had to be decided on the trial record.

Applying the deferential standards governing s. 24(1) and s. 24(2) remedies, the court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s balancing and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with operate over 80 following a traffic stop.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings from an Intoxilyzer device.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached with respect to facilitation of the right to speak to counsel of choice.

The police failed to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and instead imposed duty counsel upon the accused.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

Sentence appeal from a guilty plea to simple assault in a domestic context.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, but the trial judge instead imposed a suspended sentence and probation without addressing whether a discharge was in the appellant’s best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

Fresh evidence established that the conviction rendered the appellant inadmissible to Canada and led to his deportation.

Applying the principle that collateral immigration consequences may be considered in sentencing if the result remains proportionate, the court set aside the sentence and granted a conditional discharge on the same probationary terms.

The defendant was charged with fraud over $5,000 and public mischief for allegedly falsely reporting his motor vehicle stolen to his insurance company and police, receiving insurance proceeds of approximately $17,500, when he was actually involved in a fail-to-remain motor vehicle collision.

A production order was obtained for cellphone records registered to the defendant's girlfriend but used by the defendant.

The defendant brought a section 8 Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cellphone records despite not being the registered owner.

The court found the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records but dismissed the application, holding that the production order was properly issued on reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been committed, and that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of domestic assault.

On the trial date, the complainant, who had been personally served with a subpoena, failed to attend.

The trial judge refused the Crown's applications for a material witness warrant and an adjournment, leading to an acquittal when no evidence was called.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to act judicially by relying on speculation and generalized assumptions about the complainant's willingness to testify and the seriousness of domestic violence.

A new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and Over 80 following a motor vehicle stop in Milton on May 26, 2012.

The defence brought a section 8 Charter application challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and demand breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer's grounds were insufficient, relying on inconsistent and unreliable evidence from the officers regarding driving concerns.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed both charges, emphasizing the importance of police note-taking and the proper role of coach officers in investigations.

The defendant was charged with two offences: speeding at 88 km/h in a posted 50 km/h community safety zone, and failing to surrender a motor vehicle permit upon demand by a police officer.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates with conflicting evidence from the defendant and the investigating officer regarding both the speed of the vehicle and whether the permit was actually surrendered.

The court found the defendant guilty of both charges.

The speeding charge was classified as an absolute liability offence, requiring only proof of the prohibited act.

The permit charge was classified as a strict liability offence, allowing for a due diligence defence, which the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities.