A. Fiszauf

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit.

The Crown's evidence showed breath samples with a BAC of 100-110 mg/100ml.

The accused challenged the validity of the police investigation on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arbitrary detention, and right to counsel.

While the court found the approved screening device demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion, it found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel of choice by steering him toward duty counsel without providing him with the means to select a lawyer of his choosing.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to admit statements made by the accused to a police officer following breath testing as voluntary.

The court conducted a voluntariness analysis under the confessions rule established in R. v. Oickle.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key factors included the accused's youth and first arrest, questioning on a detain sheet prior to legal advice, a compelled breath demand with questioning during the procedure, and the absence of a secondary caution.

The court held that the circumstances created a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused understood his right to silence when questioned by the officer.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a collision and brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of statements and breath test results.

She argued police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, that her roadside statements were compelled under statutory accident‑reporting obligations, and that her rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter were violated.

The court held the accused failed to prove her statements were compelled and found the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on observations of impairment, witness information, and the unexplained collision.

The court further found no breach of the right to counsel or the informational component of detention.

The Charter application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant sought to exclude evidence of his refusal based on alleged Charter violations regarding the right to be informed of the reason for detention and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant's evidence to be internally inconsistent and contradicted by multiple Crown witnesses.

The court rejected the Charter application and found the defendant guilty of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded on a blended hearing addressing two main issues: whether breath testing was conducted as soon as practicable, and whether there was a Section 8 Charter breach related to video surveillance of the cell area and the presence of a police officer during the accused's use of the toilet.

The court found no breach of the "as soon as practicable" requirement and determined that even if a privacy breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under Section 24(2).

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,000 fine, a $300 victim fine surcharge, and a one-year driving prohibition.