Peter Spiros Dotsikas

This decision addresses the issue of whether a police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, Silvia Taboada, for impaired driving by drug, following a motor vehicle collision.

The officer, PC Zold, relied on observations including the accused's behavior, physical signs, and information from dispatch, despite not smelling alcohol and lacking training in standard field sobriety tests.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples, dismissing the accused's Charter application.

The decision also includes a detailed section 24(2) analysis, ultimately admitting the breath test evidence as reliable and critical to the Crown's case.

The accused was charged with Operation Over 80 after being found unconscious in her motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

Following arrest and booking, she was subjected to a strip search (level 3 search) after a small amount of marijuana was discovered in her purse.

The accused challenged the strip search as a violation of her Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

The court found that the officer-in-charge lacked reasonable and probable grounds to order the strip search, as he failed to conduct an individualized assessment of the detainee's circumstances as required by law.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire.

The defendant brought applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was arrested for public intoxication but never formally arrested for impaired driving, despite reasonable grounds existing after the defendant's statements to police.

The investigating officer failed to provide the defendant with rights to counsel when the nature of the investigation changed to a more serious criminal offence.

The breathalyzer technician proceeded on the basis of an arrest for a provincial offence and left the caution section blank on the alcohol influence report.

The court found violations of sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2).

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, arising from an incident on September 11, 2015.

The trial proceeded on March 8 and 10, 2017.

The Crown established reasonable grounds for arrest based on dispatch information, observations of the accused's condition, and her admission of alcohol consumption.

The accused raised a bolus drinking defence, claiming she consumed a significant quantity of vodka after relinquishing control of her vehicle.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, determining that the consumption of alcohol occurred after she relinquished care or control of the vehicle.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused sought to exclude evidence of Intoxilyzer test results pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the approved screening device demand was not made "forthwith" and that his right to counsel was infringed.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the evidence.

The accused was convicted based on reliable breath test results showing 100 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right under s. 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the new framework established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

After deducting time for a discrete exceptional circumstance (judicial conflict of interest) and defence delay, the net delay was 15.5 months, falling below the ceiling.

However, the court found that the case had taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering local institutional delay standards and the defence's meaningful efforts to expedite.

The court granted the stay, finding that under the previous Morin framework the case would have been stayed, and the Jordan framework should not transform previously unreasonable delays into reasonable ones in transitional cases.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused applied to exclude breath test results pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device sample and reasonable and probable grounds to demand an Intoxilyzer breath sample.

The trial judge found that the officer infringed the accused's section 8 Charter rights by making both demands without the requisite legal grounds.

The trial judge excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2), finding that the seriousness of the Charter breach and the impact on the accused's liberty interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device on October 30, 2014.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to establish an essential element of the offence because there was no lawful demand for the sample, contending the investigating officer lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion.

The Crown submitted that sufficient factors existed to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds for the demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the nature of the driving, the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, and the defendant's glossy eyes.

A conviction was entered.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (impaired driving with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood) following a roadside stop.

During a pat-down search incident to arrest, a female officer unzipped the accused's sweater without warning, exposing her breasts in a see-through bra while two male officers watched from nearby.

The court found this constituted an unreasonable strip search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The Crown failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search, and the search was conducted in the field without demonstrated necessity or urgency.

The evidence of the breath tests was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving following a serious motor vehicle collision on Islington Avenue in Toronto on October 7, 2014.

The defendant's vehicle left the roadway, struck a fire hydrant and hydro pole, and came to rest in an apartment building driveway.

The Crown relied on forensic toxicological evidence establishing the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant testified that he had consumed only one glass of wine and two bottles of beer over the course of the evening and attributed the collision to another vehicle veering into his lane.

The court found the defendant's evidence unreliable and accepted the expert toxicological evidence demonstrating significant impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol in his system following a motor vehicle collision on October 3, 2014.

The Crown relied on breath sample readings from an Intoxilyzer 8000C device taken outside the two-hour presumption window, supported by expert toxicology evidence projecting the accused's blood alcohol content at the time of driving.

The defence argued the accused had consumed less alcohol than the Crown's hypothetical suggested and attributed observed symptoms to fatigue and an acid reflux condition.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, finding that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt both impairment and a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

A stay was entered on the impaired driving count to avoid double punishment.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and over 80 care or control of a motor vehicle.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from an off-duty police officer and his son who observed the defendant in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with the engine on, and who testified the defendant stated he was going home.

The defendant testified he entered the vehicle using a key fob to search for cigarettes, did not start the engine, and had no intention to drive.

The court found that evidence regarding the vehicle's "super fob" capabilities created reasonable doubt as to whether the engine was actually running, and that the defendant's testimony raised reasonable doubt regarding his intention to drive.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath sample results, alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the right to counsel in the context of language comprehension.

The defendant, whose first language was Punjabi, expressed difficulty understanding English and stated he understood only approximately 90 percent of what duty counsel told him.

Police officers failed to offer Punjabi-speaking duty counsel or interpretation services despite these clear indications of language barriers and despite such services being readily available in the jurisdiction.

The court found a serious breach of section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and "Over 80".

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and arrest the accused.

The officer's observations of driving behaviour were unreliable, his inference regarding the accused's direction of travel was unsupportable, and he failed to use available investigative tools such as an Approved Screening Device.

The court found breaches of both sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), resulting in acquittals on both charges.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the defendant was impaired and over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant testified he had no intention to drive and was waiting for his partner to pick him up.

The court found that the defendant occupied the driver's seat with a contemporaneous intention to drive, or alternatively, that there was a realistic risk he would change his mind and drive home given the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was stopped for using a cell phone while driving.

During the stop, the officer detected a strong odour of burnt marijuana and arrested the accused for possession of a controlled substance.

The accused was subsequently arrested for impaired driving based on the odour of alcohol detected when being released from the police cruiser.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of marijuana based solely on the odour of burnt marijuana.

The court determined there was a breach of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charge.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that her right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that the operative delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court attributed delay to various factors including intake, defence preparation, defence unavailability, and neutral delay inherent to the trial process.

Finding no actual or inferred prejudice and that societal interests did not weigh heavily, the court dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his blood (Over 80) following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown's case rested on an approved screening device (ASD) test that registered a "fail." The defence raised a Charter challenge arguing that residual mouth alcohol could have affected the reliability of the ASD result, claiming the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the accused's statement regarding the timing of his last drink (two hours prior) did not constitute credible evidence of recent alcohol consumption that would have required the officer to delay the test.

The conviction was entered.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving following an incident on the 401 highway in north Toronto on March 7, 2012.

The complainant and defendant provided directly conflicting accounts of the driving behaviour, each accusing the other of reckless and dangerous conduct.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility in cases of testimonial conflict.

While the complainant's evidence was found to be more persuasive, the court determined that the defendant's account could reasonably be true and that a reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and Over 80 following a motor vehicle stop in Milton on May 26, 2012.

The defence brought a section 8 Charter application challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and demand breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer's grounds were insufficient, relying on inconsistent and unreliable evidence from the officers regarding driving concerns.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed both charges, emphasizing the importance of police note-taking and the proper role of coach officers in investigations.