Peter Spiros Dotsikas

The accused was stopped for using a cell phone while driving.

The officer smelled burnt marijuana and arrested the accused for possession of a controlled substance.

Following the arrest, the officer detected alcohol, demanded a roadside screening test, and subsequently obtained breath samples showing the accused was over the legal limit.

The court found the arrest for possession based solely on the odour of burnt marijuana lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) and acquitted the accused.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that her right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that the operative delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court attributed delay to various factors including intake, defence preparation, defence unavailability, and neutral delay inherent to the trial process.

Finding no actual or inferred prejudice and that societal interests did not weigh heavily, the court dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his blood (Over 80) following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown's case rested on an approved screening device (ASD) test that registered a "fail." The defence raised a Charter challenge arguing that residual mouth alcohol could have affected the reliability of the ASD result, claiming the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the accused's statement regarding the timing of his last drink (two hours prior) did not constitute credible evidence of recent alcohol consumption that would have required the officer to delay the test.

The conviction was entered.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving following an incident on the 401 highway in north Toronto on March 7, 2012.

The complainant and defendant provided directly conflicting accounts of the driving behaviour, each accusing the other of reckless and dangerous conduct.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility in cases of testimonial conflict.

While the complainant's evidence was found to be more persuasive, the court determined that the defendant's account could reasonably be true and that a reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and Over 80 following a motor vehicle stop in Milton on May 26, 2012.

The defence brought a section 8 Charter application challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and demand breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer's grounds were insufficient, relying on inconsistent and unreliable evidence from the officers regarding driving concerns.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed both charges, emphasizing the importance of police note-taking and the proper role of coach officers in investigations.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on a roadside screening device test that registered a fail, and subsequent breath analysis readings of 150 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the screening device demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the officer making the demand lacked the requisite subjective belief to form reasonable suspicion.

The court found that the officer's evidence was internally contradictory and unreliable, and that he had no reliable subjective basis for making the screening device demand.

The court concluded that the screening device test constituted an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded all evidence obtained as a result under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) following a three-vehicle collision on Lakeshore Boulevard in Toronto.

The Crown relied on observations of impairment and breath test results showing BAC readings of 120 and 116 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The court found that the evidence of impairment was ambiguous and fell short of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired.

Additionally, the Crown failed to establish that the first breath sample was taken within the two-hour statutory window required to invoke the presumption of identity, thereby rendering the breath test results inadmissible.