Eva Dianna Flynn

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that her right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that the operative delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court attributed delay to various factors including intake, defence preparation, defence unavailability, and neutral delay inherent to the trial process.

Finding no actual or inferred prejudice and that societal interests did not weigh heavily, the court dismissed the application.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The charges arose from an alleged impaired driving incident on January 16, 2010.

The matter had a complex procedural history, including an initial stay granted by a trial judge in September 2011, which was subsequently overturned on Crown appeal in May 2012.

The court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed, finding no unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors, and no sufficient actual prejudice to warrant Charter relief.