Linsay Weis

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a jury trial for sexual assault to adduce uncharged discreditable conduct of the respondent.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various categories of evidence, including verbal and emotional abuse, shoving, and threats, balancing their probative value against potential prejudice.

The court admitted most of the proposed evidence, with some exclusions for hearsay or excessive prejudice, and provided a limiting instruction for the jury.

J.B., convicted of multiple sexual assault charges, applied to reopen his judge-alone trial before sentencing to admit fresh evidence from the complainant's Victim Impact Statement (VIS) and sought a mistrial.

The new evidence concerned alleged inconsistencies between the VIS and trial testimony regarding physical injuries and school incidents.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and the additional considerations from R. v. H.S. for VIS-based applications.

The court found a lack of due diligence by the defence and determined that the new evidence, even if admitted, would not have affected the outcome or B.B.'s credibility, as there were no plain and obvious inconsistencies.

The application to reopen the trial was dismissed, and the conviction stood.

This decision addresses an application for directions by the accused (B.W.) in a criminal proceeding.

The applicant sought a ruling on whether certain emails in his possession were "records" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and permission to use them for cross-examination of the complainant.

The court conducted an in camera review, classifying some emails as records due to their intimate and highly personal nature (e.g., marital difficulties, financial status) and others as not (mundane exchanges).

The application to use the emails deemed "records" was dismissed due to the applicant's non-compliance with procedural requirements, including late service and failure to provide detailed particulars.

The application to use the emails deemed "not records" was granted, subject to a potential s. 276 application for two specific emails and general rules of evidence.

The court also allowed the applicant to challenge the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence, despite an earlier indication of no objection, emphasizing the right to a fair trial.

The accused, A.G., a foster father, was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault of the complainant, S.R., a minor in his care.

The Crown presented evidence including DNA found on underwear, which matched the accused.

The defence argued that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations to secure her removal from the foster home.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, issues with the provenance of the DNA evidence, and a plausible motive for fabrication.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The accused was charged with two bank robberies, disguise with intent, and assault resist arrest.

The Crown relied on video surveillance and a statement made by the accused upon arrest.

The court excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a systemic breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel when police asked if he had anything to say immediately after he requested a lawyer.

On the robbery charges, the court found the video evidence insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

However, the court found the accused guilty of assault resist arrest for struggling and striking an officer during his lawful arrest.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a young child.

The police videotaped the initial interviews with the child complainants but negligently failed to record the audio.

The defence brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing the lost evidence impaired the accused's right to make full answer and defence under s. 7.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police resulting in a s. 7 breach, but denied the stay as the defence failed to show irreparable prejudice.

At trial, the court found significant inconsistencies and credibility issues in the children's evidence, raising a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device on October 30, 2014.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to establish an essential element of the offence because there was no lawful demand for the sample, contending the investigating officer lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion.

The Crown submitted that sufficient factors existed to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds for the demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the nature of the driving, the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, and the defendant's glossy eyes.

A conviction was entered.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for the unprovoked stabbing death of his stepfather.

The accused suffers from severe schizophrenia and was likely in an acute psychotic state at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence sought a sentence equivalent to 4 years and 3 months followed by probation.

The court weighed the gravity of the unprovoked attack against the mitigating factor of the accused's major mental illness.

The court sentenced the accused to 6 years' imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a further 33 months to serve, and recommended placement in a specific facility to ensure ongoing psychiatric treatment.