David North

The accused, A.G., a foster father, was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault of the complainant, S.R., a minor in his care.

The Crown presented evidence including DNA found on underwear, which matched the accused.

The defence argued that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations to secure her removal from the foster home.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, issues with the provenance of the DNA evidence, and a plausible motive for fabrication.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for numerous offences, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, incest, and child pornography, committed against his biological daughter.

The grounds of appeal included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, material misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias due to the trial judge's strong language.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed that credibility findings are entitled to significant appellate deference, that any misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome, and that while the trial judge's language was strong, it did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in the context of a thorough and even-handed analysis.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to challenge the validity of search warrants issued for his residence, vehicle, and electronic devices following a carjacking incident.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and that a second warrant application to a different Justice of the Peace after an initial partial refusal constituted "judge-shopping." The court reviewed the ITO under Garofoli principles, finding that the affiant provided full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court affirmed that a second warrant application is permissible and does not constitute "judge-shopping" if the subsequent Justice of the Peace is aware of the prior application and considers the matter de novo.

The court concluded that there were credibly-based probable grounds to issue the warrants, including for electronic devices, based on the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences regarding post-offence conduct.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 1153 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court calculated defence-caused delay (412 days) due to counsel changes, JPT scheduling, resolution discussions, and late filing of the s. 11(b) application.

It also recognized the COVID-19 pandemic (225 days) as an exceptional circumstance causing systemic delay.

After deducting these periods, the remaining delay was 516 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to vacate the accused's release order on a bail review under section 521 of the Criminal Code, arguing the initial release was "clearly inappropriate" or that a "material change in circumstances" (new video evidence) justified detention.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the Justice of the Peace's decision was not "clearly inappropriate" and that the video evidence did not constitute a material change.

However, the court recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances, but held it did not, on its own, justify reopening a hearing where the accused was already released.

Dimytri Ingram-Piruzevski pleaded guilty to manslaughter following the fatal stabbing of Keegan Blyth during a drug transaction.

Ingram-Piruzevski, who armed a youth with a lethal weapon, was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, reduced to a net 4 years and 9 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions.

The court balanced significant aggravating factors, including the context of a drug deal, arming a minor, and flight from the scene, against mitigating factors such as the defendant's youth, lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and cooperation with the police.

Ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items were also imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's testimony reliable by framing the legal test for collusion too narrowly and failing to consider the possibility of inadvertent collusion between the complainant and his mother.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's description of collusion may have been narrow, she carefully reviewed communications between the parties and found they were limited to discussing timing of events and did not influence the complainant's recollection of the substance of the allegations.

The trial judge's findings regarding credibility and reliability were upheld as open to her on the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with the complainant, his spouse's daughter, over a period when the complainant was between 9 and 11 years old.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial judge misapprehended his evidence regarding a January 2011 assault on the complainant's mother; and (2) the trial judge applied a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence than to the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her credibility findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four sexual offences involving his 16-year-old daughter.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents of fondling, corroborated by explicit messages sent immediately after the first incident and a photograph showing an inappropriate cuddle.

The appellant's primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's rejection of his girlfriend's alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) test and was entitled to reject the girlfriend's evidence in light of her friendship with the appellant, the opportunities he had to be alone with his daughter, and her role in photographing the inappropriate cuddle.

An applicant sought to terminate his Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order after serving 11 years of a 20-year mandatory registration requirement.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his step-daughter between ages 9 and 14, with over 50 sexual encounters occurring over time.

The applicant argued that the impact of continued registration, including stress, anxiety, and fear of disclosure, was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown opposed termination.

The court applied the statutory test under section 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and rejected the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold of demonstrating gross disproportionality between the impact on the offender and the public interest in protecting society through effective prevention and investigation of sexual offences.

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment and disobeying a court order.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of both charges based on two incidents where he was within 500 meters of the complainant, contrary to a court order.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in her use of extensive evidence of prior discreditable conduct, particularly hearsay, when determining the "repeatedly followed" element of criminal harassment.

The failure to make findings on these allegations and explain their limited use rendered the basis for conviction unclear.

Consequently, the criminal harassment conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for disobeying a court order was upheld as it was based on evidence unrelated to the prior misconduct.

The applicant, Valeri Gueorguiev, challenged search warrants executed on his property, alleging that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors and misleading information, thereby violating his rights under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The Crown conceded some errors in the ITO but argued that, even with corrections, sufficient reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrants.

The court found that the corrected ITO provided adequate grounds for the warrants and that the police errors were not intentional or reckless.

Consequently, the application to quash the warrants and exclude evidence was dismissed, and the evidence was deemed admissible.

The accused was charged with assault and disobeying a court order (non-communication bail condition) in relation to a domestic incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence applied for a directed verdict (non-suit) on the breach charge.

The court considered six issues: admissibility of the original Information as evidence; whether documentary evidence of a bail order constitutes proof of the accused's knowledge; whether a voice mail message constitutes "communication" under the bail condition; whether the Crown proved the accused made the call; whether the message necessarily breached the order given other residents in the home; and whether the Crown proved the timing of the breach.

The court dismissed the defence application, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed trier of fact to find guilt on the breach count.

The two accused were charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hotel room.

The complainant alleged she blacked out from alcohol consumption and awoke to find one accused sexually assaulting her while the other was present, after having been assaulted by the first accused while unconscious.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding her memory loss unreliable, noting it conflicted with toxicological evidence and her behavior captured on video.

Both accused testified, with one claiming consensual sex and the other denying any sexual contact.

The court found the evidence of the accused raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted both men.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to assault with a weapon and failing to appear.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission recommending a 60‑day intermittent sentence and probation and instead imposed consecutive six‑month custodial sentences after the appellant failed to attend for sentencing.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by effectively sentencing the offender for the later failure to appear, disregarding the joint submission without explanation, and imposing a sentence far outside the appropriate range.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a probation order and in refusing to make mandatory ancillary orders, including a DNA order and consideration of a weapons prohibition order.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence reduced to time served, and a probation order and ancillary orders were imposed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, and speeding.

On August 24, 2012, police observed the defendant operating a van at excessive speed on Keele Street in Toronto.

Following a roadside investigation, the defendant registered a fail on a screening device and was arrested.

Breath samples taken at the police station showed readings of 100 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving due to lack of temporal connection between observed impairment and driving.

The court also found the defendant not guilty of driving over 80 mg due to unreasonable delays in obtaining breath samples that violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code.

The accused brought an application for a change of venue in a criminal proceeding.

The written reasons for decision were subject to a publication order and therefore omitted from the publicly available decision.

However, the court issued an order under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code directing that the trial be moved from Barrie to another location.

The precise location of the trial was to be determined by the Regional Senior Justice pursuant to the protocol of the Council of Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Ontario.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sentencing following convictions for three robberies, two counts of using an imitation firearm during the commission of an indictable offence, and assault with a weapon.

The offender suffered from schizophrenia and had shown significant stabilization and improvement through psychiatric treatment in the community.

The court considered whether the seriousness of the robberies required a penitentiary sentence of two years or more, which would preclude a conditional sentence under the framework in R. v. Proulx.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence against rehabilitation and the risk that incarceration would significantly worsen the offender’s mental health, the court determined a global sentence under two years was appropriate.

A blended sentence was imposed consisting of a conditional sentence, a mandatory custodial term for the imitation firearm offences (reduced after enhanced pre‑trial custody credit), and probation.