David North

During an impaired driving investigation, police found the accused unresponsive in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with open alcohol nearby.

The officer searched the vehicle and a personal bag inside, discovering drugs and a scale.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing the search violated her s. 8 rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the search was lawfully authorized under s. 42(1) of the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019, as the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol was being stored illegally and was genuinely searching for it.

The accused, previously found not criminally responsible for first-degree murder, was living in the community under an Ontario Review Board disposition.

After missing doses of his antipsychotic medication due to paranoia, he was readmitted to the hospital for safe re-titration, resulting in a restriction of his liberty.

The hospital notified the Board, which held a mandatory review hearing.

The Board found that the initial restriction of liberty and its continuation were warranted, necessary, appropriate, and represented the least onerous and least restrictive measure in the circumstances.

The Ontario Review Board held a mandatory annual review of the accused's conditional discharge disposition.

The accused, who was found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, has a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

While she had a generally successful year living independently and maintaining employment, she incurred a new charge for breaching a no-contact condition and purchased a vehicle without consulting her treatment team.

The Board found that she continues to pose a significant threat to public safety due to her limited insight and potential for rapid decompensation.

The Board ordered the continuation of her conditional discharge.

The Ontario Review Board held an annual review hearing for an accused found not criminally responsible for first-degree murder.

The accused is diagnosed with treatment-resistant schizophrenia and cognitive impairment, lacking insight into his condition and the need for treatment.

The treatment team testified that the accused requires 24-hour supervision to ensure medication compliance and prevent violent decompensation.

The Board accepted this evidence and ordered the continuation of the current detention order with the same terms and conditions, finding it necessary to protect public safety.

The accused, A.G., a foster father, was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault of the complainant, S.R., a minor in his care.

The Crown presented evidence including DNA found on underwear, which matched the accused.

The defence argued that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations to secure her removal from the foster home.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, issues with the provenance of the DNA evidence, and a plausible motive for fabrication.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for numerous offences, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, incest, and child pornography, committed against his biological daughter.

The grounds of appeal included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, material misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias due to the trial judge's strong language.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed that credibility findings are entitled to significant appellate deference, that any misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome, and that while the trial judge's language was strong, it did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in the context of a thorough and even-handed analysis.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to challenge the validity of search warrants issued for his residence, vehicle, and electronic devices following a carjacking incident.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and that a second warrant application to a different Justice of the Peace after an initial partial refusal constituted "judge-shopping." The court reviewed the ITO under Garofoli principles, finding that the affiant provided full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court affirmed that a second warrant application is permissible and does not constitute "judge-shopping" if the subsequent Justice of the Peace is aware of the prior application and considers the matter de novo.

The court concluded that there were credibly-based probable grounds to issue the warrants, including for electronic devices, based on the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences regarding post-offence conduct.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 1153 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court calculated defence-caused delay (412 days) due to counsel changes, JPT scheduling, resolution discussions, and late filing of the s. 11(b) application.

It also recognized the COVID-19 pandemic (225 days) as an exceptional circumstance causing systemic delay.

After deducting these periods, the remaining delay was 516 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants were stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently investigated for a stolen vehicle.

The police arrested the driver for driving under suspension, detained the passenger, and searched the vehicle based on the smell of burnt marijuana and the presence of two roaches, locating a loaded handgun and drugs.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and delay in providing rights to counsel, as the officers lacked reasonable grounds for the stolen vehicle investigation and the vehicle search.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of possession of 15 kilograms of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a sting operation involving the US-DEA and RCMP.

Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the failure to bring it prior to trial was fatal and that the net delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court sentenced the accused to 8 years' imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the large quantity and high purity of the cocaine.

The Crown sought to vacate the accused's release order on a bail review under section 521 of the Criminal Code, arguing the initial release was "clearly inappropriate" or that a "material change in circumstances" (new video evidence) justified detention.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the Justice of the Peace's decision was not "clearly inappropriate" and that the video evidence did not constitute a material change.

However, the court recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances, but held it did not, on its own, justify reopening a hearing where the accused was already released.

Dimytri Ingram-Piruzevski pleaded guilty to manslaughter following the fatal stabbing of Keegan Blyth during a drug transaction.

Ingram-Piruzevski, who armed a youth with a lethal weapon, was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, reduced to a net 4 years and 9 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions.

The court balanced significant aggravating factors, including the context of a drug deal, arming a minor, and flight from the scene, against mitigating factors such as the defendant's youth, lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and cooperation with the police.

Ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items were also imposed.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought a pre-sentencing order compelling the defendant to produce personal and business financial documents to assist in determining an appropriate fine.

The defendant had been convicted of operating an electrical contracting business without a valid license under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The court held that while a sentencing court has implied jurisdiction under s. 57(3) of the Provincial Offences Act to compel production of financial documents in exceptional circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The application was dismissed as premature.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's testimony reliable by framing the legal test for collusion too narrowly and failing to consider the possibility of inadvertent collusion between the complainant and his mother.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's description of collusion may have been narrow, she carefully reviewed communications between the parties and found they were limited to discussing timing of events and did not influence the complainant's recollection of the substance of the allegations.

The trial judge's findings regarding credibility and reliability were upheld as open to her on the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with the complainant, his spouse's daughter, over a period when the complainant was between 9 and 11 years old.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial judge misapprehended his evidence regarding a January 2011 assault on the complainant's mother; and (2) the trial judge applied a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence than to the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her credibility findings.

The defendant was charged with three counts of operating an electrical contracting business without a valid electrical contractor license under the Electricity Act, 1998.

During the trial, the self-represented defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process due to prosecutorial misconduct, including sarcastic comments, eliciting hearsay, and improper cross-examination.

The court dismissed the abuse of process application, finding that while the prosecutor's conduct was at times unwarranted and sarcastic, it did not render the non-jury trial unfair or undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

On the merits, the court found the defendant guilty on two counts, as he performed electrical work during home renovations without a license and failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The defendant was acquitted on the third count due to insufficient evidence that he performed electrical work at that residence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four sexual offences involving his 16-year-old daughter.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents of fondling, corroborated by explicit messages sent immediately after the first incident and a photograph showing an inappropriate cuddle.

The appellant's primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's rejection of his girlfriend's alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) test and was entitled to reject the girlfriend's evidence in light of her friendship with the appellant, the opportunities he had to be alone with his daughter, and her role in photographing the inappropriate cuddle.

An applicant sought to terminate his Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order after serving 11 years of a 20-year mandatory registration requirement.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his step-daughter between ages 9 and 14, with over 50 sexual encounters occurring over time.

The applicant argued that the impact of continued registration, including stress, anxiety, and fear of disclosure, was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown opposed termination.

The court applied the statutory test under section 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and rejected the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold of demonstrating gross disproportionality between the impact on the offender and the public interest in protecting society through effective prevention and investigation of sexual offences.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the impaired driving conviction and erred in dismissing a section 8 Charter motion regarding a delayed breath demand.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge's reasons met the functional test for sufficiency.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath demand, made 15 minutes after arrest because the officer forgot in the chaotic scene, was made 'as soon as practicable'.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment and disobeying a court order.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of both charges based on two incidents where he was within 500 meters of the complainant, contrary to a court order.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in her use of extensive evidence of prior discreditable conduct, particularly hearsay, when determining the "repeatedly followed" element of criminal harassment.

The failure to make findings on these allegations and explain their limited use rendered the basis for conviction unclear.

Consequently, the criminal harassment conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for disobeying a court order was upheld as it was based on evidence unrelated to the prior misconduct.