Jina Lee

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation of a person with a mental disability in September 2013.

The trial evidence was completed in January 2017.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the accused's Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that the net delay of 512 days fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court attributed significant delay to defence conduct and found that exceptional circumstances, including surprise witness testimony leading to expanded investigation and case complexity, reasonably explained the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted at trial of failing to comply with Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) reporting requirements and a breach of Christopher's Law regarding provincial sex offender registry obligations.

The accused was bound by a 20-year SOIRA order from September 5, 2007, following conviction for sexual assault and possession of child pornography.

He failed to report two residential moves in the York Region between March and May 2015.

The Crown sought 45 days concurrent custody; the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed 30 days custody to be served intermittently, finding that general and specific deterrence and public protection necessitated a custodial sentence despite the accused's seven-year compliance history.

The Crown applied without notice to adjourn a trial scheduled for the date of the hearing.

The accused was charged with Assault, Forcible Confinement, Failing to Comply with a Recognizance, and Mischief arising from an alleged altercation with his wife.

The Crown's primary reason for the adjournment was the lack of an available courtroom.

The complainant did not attend on the first day and was unable to remain on the second day due to childcare constraints.

The defence opposed the adjournment, citing restrictive bail conditions on the accused.

The court granted the adjournment, noting the systemic overbooking of trials in the jurisdiction and the practical impossibility of proceeding.

The court agreed to narrow the trial to one day instead of two and encouraged the Crown to consider amending restrictive bail conditions on consent.

The accused was charged with assault and brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay.

The trial commenced in November 2015 but required multiple adjournments, with trial dates scheduled for November 27, 2015, February 3, 2016, June 10, 2016 (for the s. 11(b) application), and July 19-20, 2016.

The court analyzed the delay from the swearing of the Information, distinguishing between neutral intake time, inherent time for Crown preparation, and institutional delay.

The court found total institutional delay of approximately 5 months and 8 days, which was well below the guidelines established in R v Morin.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) reporting requirement contrary to section 490.031(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, a sex offender bound by a 20-year SOIRA order, failed to report a change of address to the designated registration centre within the required seven-day period after moving from Toronto to Markham in York Region.

The Crown proved the mens rea element of the offence, establishing that the accused intentionally failed to report rather than merely acting carelessly.

The accused's defence of reasonable excuse—that he believed the SOIRA system would be automatically updated through his bail conditions—was rejected as neither credible nor legally sound.

The court found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with assault and disobeying a court order (non-communication bail condition) in relation to a domestic incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence applied for a directed verdict (non-suit) on the breach charge.

The court considered six issues: admissibility of the original Information as evidence; whether documentary evidence of a bail order constitutes proof of the accused's knowledge; whether a voice mail message constitutes "communication" under the bail condition; whether the Crown proved the accused made the call; whether the message necessarily breached the order given other residents in the home; and whether the Crown proved the timing of the breach.

The court dismissed the defence application, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed trier of fact to find guilt on the breach count.

The accused brought a recusal application during the second day of trial on an assault charge, alleging that the trial judge had previously heard a guilty plea from the accused on a related offence approximately four and a half years earlier.

The defence argued that a judge who has heard a plea cannot preside over a subsequent trial involving the same accused and requested that the judge recuse himself and declare a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the prior judicial dealings.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to s. 249(2) of the Criminal Code following an incident at MacKenzie Health hospital.

Security officers had asked the accused to move his taxi from a fire zone.

After refusing and being placed under arrest for trespass, the accused drove into a security guard multiple times, then reversed at high speed through a hospital crosswalk, narrowly missing a pedestrian.

The central issues were witness credibility and whether the Crown proved the driving was dangerous within the statutory meaning.

The court found the Crown witnesses credible and accepted their evidence that the accused deliberately struck the security officer and drove recklessly through the crosswalk.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and found the conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

A witness observed the accused driving erratically, swerving into oncoming traffic, striking pylons, and eventually driving off the roadway into a ditch.

Police observed signs of impairment including the odour of alcohol, unsteadiness, and balance problems.

The accused testified that he drove off the road while reaching for a dropped cellphone.

The court found the accused not credible, accepted the evidence of the independent witness and police officers, and found the accused guilty based on the pattern of dangerous driving and physical signs of impairment.