Brock Jones

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement of a deceased witness under the principled exception to hearsay in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had an extensive criminal record and was released on her own recognizance shortly before giving the statement, raising concerns about her motive to fabricate.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the inability to cross-examine the witness on her motives would seriously impair the respondent's right to make full answer and defence, thereby failing the threshold reliability requirement.

The defendant was charged with Operation Impaired and Blow Over 80 following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant applied to exclude breath test results based on alleged Charter breaches, including violations of section 8 (search and seizure), section 10(b) (right to counsel), and section 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that the officer breached the defendant's section 10(b) rights by failing to inform him immediately of his right to counsel and by facilitating access to a paralegal rather than a lawyer, without explaining the distinction.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding care or control of the vehicle and impairment without the breath readings.

Both charges were dismissed.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

Two youths, aged 16 at the time of the offence, were convicted of first degree murder in the execution-style killing of another youth.

The Crown applied to have them sentenced as adults.

The youth court judge allowed the Crown's application and imposed life sentences with ten years' parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the adult sentences, arguing that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the intensive rehabilitative custody supervision (IRCS) program would not adequately address their rehabilitation needs and that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness had not been properly considered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the youth court judge had made reversible errors in his analysis of the IRCS program and that the Crown had failed to overcome the presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The court substituted youth sentences with IRCS orders.

A judicial interim release hearing for a 17-year-old charged with aggravated assault, robbery while armed with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, possession of a dangerous weapon, and failing to comply with a peace bond.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found jurisdiction to consider detention as the accused was charged with serious offences.

The court rejected the proposed release plan with two sureties (the accused's father and aunt), finding that the sureties lacked adequate knowledge of the accused's criminal history, showed insufficient commitment to supervision, and that no conditions could adequately protect the public.

The court ordered the accused detained in custody pending trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual assault committed against three separate victims between 2006 and 2010.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence or, alternatively, a determinate sentence of 10-12 years with a 10-year long-term offender supervision order.

The court rejected the dangerous offender designation but found the accused met the criteria for long-term offender status.

The court imposed an 11-year global sentence (10 months, 3 years consecutive, and 3 years consecutive) with credit for pre-sentence custody resulting in 6 years and 10 months to be served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, section 161 order, and SOIRA registration.

A young person pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with a recognizance, all committed on November 1, 2012, five days before turning 18.

The offender, armed with a knife, attacked two victims in retaliation for a perceived slight to his cousin.

One victim suffered serious injuries including a punctured and collapsed lung and a severed tendon.

The attack occurred the same day the offender was offered extra-judicial sanctions for earlier knife-related charges.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months custody and supervision (two months secure custody, six months open custody, four months supervision) followed by 12 months probation, with conditions including a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

A young person pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of using an imitation firearm while committing robbery.

The offences were committed five days before the offender turned 18.

The court imposed a sentence of four months' secure custody followed by two months of supervision, and one year of probation with various conditions including a five-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court considered the violent nature of the offences, the planning involved, the vulnerability of the victims, and the offender's lack of insight or rehabilitative progress.

A 14-year-old young person pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown sought six months open custody followed by one year probation.

Defence counsel argued that custody was unavailable as the offences did not fall within the statutory gateway provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the circumstances constituted "exceptional circumstances" under section 39(1)(d) of the YCJA, permitting a custodial sentence.

However, the court imposed a deferred custody and supervision order rather than open custody, finding this to be the least restrictive sentence most likely to rehabilitate the young person while holding them accountable.

The accused pleaded guilty to four criminal charges relating to his involvement in a large-scale, organized fraud scheme targeting the Business Development Bank of Canada.

The total loss to the BDC was $14 million, with the accused's involvement resulting in approximately $850,000 in fraudulent loans.

The accused received approximately $50,000 for his participation.

The court imposed a two-year conditional sentence with onerous restrictive terms, followed by three years of probation and a $50,000 restitution order.

The sentencing balanced the serious nature of the fraud and the need for deterrence and denunciation against the accused's peripheral role, lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, early guilty plea, and willingness to cooperate with authorities.

The accused was charged with two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code, with alleged offence dates of November 14 and 16, 2011.

The Crown sought to admit an original information and a certified copy of a recognizance as evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of these documents on the basis that the Canada Evidence Act notice served by the Crown was deficient because it referred to an information with different offence dates than the one actually tendered.

The court ruled that while the notice was deficient under the Canada Evidence Act, both documents were admissible at common law as public documents and under the principled approach to hearsay established in R. v. Khan.

Sentencing following convictions for three robberies, two counts of using an imitation firearm during the commission of an indictable offence, and assault with a weapon.

The offender suffered from schizophrenia and had shown significant stabilization and improvement through psychiatric treatment in the community.

The court considered whether the seriousness of the robberies required a penitentiary sentence of two years or more, which would preclude a conditional sentence under the framework in R. v. Proulx.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence against rehabilitation and the risk that incarceration would significantly worsen the offender’s mental health, the court determined a global sentence under two years was appropriate.

A blended sentence was imposed consisting of a conditional sentence, a mandatory custodial term for the imitation firearm offences (reduced after enhanced pre‑trial custody credit), and probation.