A. Ross

The applicant was charged with impaired driving by drug and possession of methamphetamine.

During the trial, the drug recognition evaluation (DRE) officer testified that the DRE room had video recording capacity and he believed the evaluation was recorded.

The Crown had previously informed the defence that no video existed.

The applicant brought a Charter section 7 application for lost evidence.

The court found that the video recording likely existed, was automatically generated, and was lost due to the unacceptable negligence of the police and Crown in failing to preserve it within the retention period despite defence requests.

Finding that the lost video prejudiced the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The Ontario Review Board held an annual review hearing for an accused found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault.

The accused, diagnosed with schizophrenia, remained treatment resistant but showed some improvement with medication adjustments.

The Board accepted the joint position and the uncontroverted psychiatric evidence that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Board ordered a continuation of the detention disposition at the hospital, with added privileges for indirectly supervised community access and community living in supervised accommodation to motivate her rehabilitation.

Gerard Cook, a security officer, pleaded guilty to assault after tackling and striking a loitering individual at Ikea.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of authority, vulnerability of the victim, and the public nature of the assault, alongside mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, lack of prior record, and ongoing therapy.

The court rejected a conditional discharge, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, and imposed a 90-day conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

Adhinath Sankar pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing or being reckless that it resulted in the death of Dianna Manan, contrary to s. 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The 16-year-old victim fell from Sankar's moving vehicle and was left incapacitated in a live lane of traffic, subsequently dying from her injuries.

The Crown sought 15-18 months imprisonment, while the defence sought 90 days.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, the shocking nature of leaving her in traffic, and the devastating impact on her family, balanced against mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, lack of prior record, youth, and good rehabilitation prospects.

The judge sentenced Sankar to 8 months imprisonment, less 3 days pre-sentence custody, 18 months probation with counselling and community service, a two-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking but not guilty to firearms-related offences.

Police seized a loaded prohibited handgun and ammunition from under the driver's seat of a vehicle the accused was operating.

The Crown sought to establish the accused's knowing possession of the firearm through circumstantial evidence.

The court found the police investigation incomplete, as the two other vehicle occupants who were released before the gun's discovery were never investigated or called as witnesses.

The court held that reasonable alternative inferences existed regarding who placed the gun under the seat, and the Crown failed to negate these reasonable possibilities beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of the firearms offences but convicted of the drug trafficking charge.

The applicants, who were charged with criminal offences and elected trial by jury before the Bill C-75 amendments came into force, brought pre-trial applications seeking a ruling that the amendments eliminating peremptory challenges did not apply retrospectively to them.

The court applied the framework from Dineley and concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges affects the substantive right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

As a result, the court held that the amendments operate only prospectively, and the applicants were entitled to exercise peremptory challenges at their upcoming trials.

Manuel Franco appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to reconcile adverse credibility findings regarding the complainant with the acceptance of other parts of her testimony, that the verdicts were unreasonable, and that the reasons were insufficient.

He also submitted that the trial judge erred in relying on a prior consistent statement.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's credibility issues, that the verdicts were reasonable, and that the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The court also found no consequential error in the use of prior consistent statements.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol.

She challenged the breath test results, arguing that the tests were not taken as soon as practicable due to delays at the police station, and that the presence of gum in her mouth may have affected the accuracy of the readings.

The court found that the delays were reasonably explained by booking procedures and the need to test another subject.

The court also held that there was insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt regarding the effect of the gum on the test results.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference.

The trial judge had found that the 90-day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 151(b) of the Criminal Code violated s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's finding, concluding that the mandatory minimum sentence could result in grossly disproportionate sentences in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios, such as an unwanted kiss by an 18-year-old on a 15-year-old.

The court also found that the violation was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with Operation Impaired and Blow Over 80 following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant applied to exclude breath test results based on alleged Charter breaches, including violations of section 8 (search and seizure), section 10(b) (right to counsel), and section 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that the officer breached the defendant's section 10(b) rights by failing to inform him immediately of his right to counsel and by facilitating access to a paralegal rather than a lawyer, without explaining the distinction.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding care or control of the vehicle and impairment without the breath readings.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference with a 14-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days in jail.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would be grossly disproportionate.

The court found that while 90 days was not grossly disproportionate for the particular offender, the mandatory minimum violated section 12 as applied to reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offenders.

The violation could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 45 days to be served in the community, followed by 3 years of probation, along with DNA and SOIRA orders.

The accused, a personal support worker, pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault against vulnerable, severely disabled residents of a group home.

The offences came to light only after the accused voluntarily confessed to the police.

Accepting a joint submission, the court sentenced the accused to seven years' imprisonment, reduced to four years net after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, noting the egregious breach of trust balanced against the mitigating factors of the voluntary confession and guilty pleas.

The accused was charged with Operation over 80 and Disobey Stop Sign contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The defence argued that the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to provide an opportunity to consult counsel between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the arrival of the roadside screening device (ASD).

The defence further contended this led to an unlawful seizure of breath, breaching s. 8 rights, and sought exclusion of the breath readings under s. 24(2).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights, as the officer had a reasonable expectation the ASD would arrive within minutes and was prepared to facilitate counsel access within 10 minutes.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court would not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) following a Grant analysis, as the seriousness of any breach was minimal and the public interest in adjudicating the serious charge on its merits outweighed exclusion.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, a truck driver with a clean driving record and no prior criminal history, was convicted of an offense related to impaired or dangerous driving.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite acknowledging the significant collateral consequences to the accused's employment and financial situation.

The court imposed a conviction, finding that denunciation and general deterrence principles were paramount given the accused's specialized commercial driving license.

A fine of $2,000 plus a victim surcharge of $600 was imposed, with 28 days imprisonment as the default term if unpaid.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile with excess alcohol and impaired care and control following his discovery asleep in his vehicle in his driveway.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, arguing inadequate section 10 rights due to language barriers and lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed based on the totality of circumstances including erratic driving reports, the defendant's condition, and odour of alcohol.

While a Charter breach was found regarding the failure to provide rights to counsel in Tamil, the evidence was not excluded as the defendant received legal advice and the breach was minor.

The defendant was found in care and control of the vehicle and guilty of impaired driving.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The sole issue at trial was whether the breath testing was conducted "as soon as is practicable" after the demand was made, as required by s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was stopped at 1:51 a.m., failed a roadside screening demand at 1:54 a.m., and provided the first breath sample at 3:08 a.m., approximately 72 minutes after the demand.

The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout the process and that the breath tests were taken within a reasonably prompt time under the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was stopped for impaired driving and arrested for driving with excess alcohol.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, including lack of grounds for arrest, breach of rights to counsel, and failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on observations of erratic driving, smell of alcohol, and admission of drinking, followed by a failed roadside screening device test.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, finding no breach of rights to counsel and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable despite cumulative delays.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after police conducted a roadside stop for speeding.

Officers detected an odour of alcohol on the driver's breath and requested an approved screening device (ASD).

Although the officers informed the driver that another officer would attend with an ASD, they did not advise him of his right to counsel or make a formal demand at that time.

A formal ASD demand was made 12 minutes later, which registered a fail.

The driver was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples showing alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The driver applied to exclude the breath test results under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no section 8 violation but determined there was a section 10(b) violation warranting exclusion under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Refuse Breath Sample following an incident in September 2014.

He brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay.

The Information was not sworn until February 2015, approximately five months after arrest.

Full disclosure was not provided until August 2015, approximately ten months after the accused's first court appearance.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets an 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while there was significant Crown and institutional delay, particularly in the disclosure process, the total delay of approximately 8.5 months fell within acceptable parameters and did not markedly exceed the reasonable time requirements for a routine impaired driving case.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed acts of professional misconduct, including sexual abuse of a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Committee's reasons were flawed.

Specifically, the Committee failed to distinguish between the complainant's honesty and the reliability of her evidence, subjected the appellant's evidence to a different level of scrutiny, and improperly used after-the-fact conduct to support the complainant's version of events.

The matter was remitted for a re-hearing.