ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE DATE: 2022 01 07 COURT FILE No.: Brampton 20-5864

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

ADHINATH SANKAR

Reasons for Sentence

Justice Paul F. Monahan

Plea of Guilt taken on September 1, 2021 Sentencing Submissions held on November 23, 2021 Reasons for Sentence released on January 7, 2022

Counsel: Mr. D. Galluzzo......................................................................................................... for the Crown Mr. A. Ross......................................................................................................... for the defendant

MONAHAN J.:

Introduction

1Mr. Adhinath Sankar pled guilty before me on September 1, 2021 to one count of operating a motor vehicle that he knew, or was reckless as to whether, the motor vehicle was involved in an accident that resulted in the death of Ms. Dianna Manan, and failed without reasonable excuse to stop the motor vehicle and give his name and address and offer assistance contrary to s. 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code. The offence date was on or about January 5, 2020 and the offence is straight indictable.

Circumstances of the Offence

2The evidence on this sentencing hearing included a 19 page agreed statement of facts which included numerous photographs and a further 14 pages of two appendices containing medical information. A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was filed as were two victim impact statements. A letter explaining that Mr. Sankar has done 200 hours of volunteer hours was also filed.

3I will not go over all the facts contained in the exhibits filed but I have had regard to them in arriving at the sentence in this case.

4Briefly stated, the facts may be summarized as follows:

5On January 4, 2020, Mr. Sankar picked up Ms. Diana Manan at her home. He was driving a 2008 Infiniti G37. The PSR describes Ms. Manan as being the “girlfriend” of Mr. Sankar. He was 20 years old and Ms. Manan was 16 years old.

6Mr. Sankar and Ms. Manan spent the day together before eventually attending a baby shower at 68 Princess Valley Crescent in Brampton at around 8 pm. Photographs taken at the party show Mr. Sankar holding what is believed to be alcoholic beverages. Ms. Manan is not observed consuming alcohol in the photographs, but her blood alcohol concentration obtained after her death was 126 mg of alcohol in 100 mL blood at the time of the sample collection.

7Mr. Sankar and Ms. Manan left the party at approximately 12:00 am on January 5, 2020. Video surveillance shows that as they walked away from the party Ms. Manan stopped and sat down and then lay down on the sidewalk and did not move for a period of time. She was picked up off the ground by Mr. Sankar and his friends and apparently put in the front passenger seat of Mr. Sankar’s car.

8At approximately 12:17 AM on January 5, 2020 Mr. Sankar was operating his car eastbound on Queen Street at Cherrycrest Drive in the City of Brampton. Ms. Manan was seated beside him in the front passenger seat. The temperature was approximately 0°C. Queen Street in the area of Cherrycrest Drive is an undivided level roadway with three lanes of traffic in each direction eastbound and westbound. The posted speed limit is 80 km per hour. As Mr. Sankar passed through the intersection of Queen Street and Cherrycrest Drive, Ms. Manan, for an unknown reason, fell from the car while it was in motion. Mr. Sankar continued eastbound on Queen Street and left the scene. He did not stop his vehicle or provide any assistance to Ms. Manan. There were no witnesses to the incident and the incident was not captured on video surveillance.

9Several motorists travelling eastbound on Queen Street stopped to render assistance to Ms. Manan. She was found by passersby’s lying in the middle of the eastbound lanes on Queen Street motionless, unresponsive, and bleeding from her head. This was at approximately 12:17 am. Emergency services were called. Ms. Manan was transferred to a hospital where she succumbed to her injuries and died.

10Peel Regional Police investigated the incident and found no evidence of a collision. There was no vehicle debris, tire marks, glass, or other evidence that would be consistent with the vehicle striking a pedestrian.

11Dr. Andrew Williams, a forensic pathologist, determined that Ms. Manan died from blunt head injury. A postmortem examination demonstrated multiple blunt injuries concentrated on the left side of Ms. Manan’s face/head and right side of her torso and extremities. She had brush type abrasions on her left forehead and face. These injuries are typical of those seen in interactions with a road surface. Dr. Williams concluded that all Ms. Manan’s injuries could be accounted for by interaction with the road surface. Furthermore, Dr. Williams found that the injuries were not typical of a simple fall from a standing height onto a road surface, but rather of a body that is in motion interacting with the road surface. According to Dr. Williams, the injuries are not typical of a vehicular run over.

12The notes of the paramedics who attended on scene which notes are referred to in the appendices of the agreed statement of facts indicate that Ms. Manan was alive at the time the paramedics attended on the scene. She had a pulse and was breathing spontaneously although irregularly. There was some moaning and minimal movement of her legs. Dr. Williams concluded that while her injuries were not necessarily immediately fatal, the extent of her injuries could readily be immediately incapacitating and would not be expected to be survivable.

13Following the incident, Mr. Sankar’s vehicle was observed on video surveillance driving around the immediate area of where the incident occurred and where Ms. Manan was located. His vehicle was observed travelling westbound on Queen Street and making a U-turn at the intersection of Cherrycrest Drive to travel eastbound. Dashcam footage from a witness shows Mr. Sankar’s vehicle driving past the incident travelling eastbound. Mr. Sankar parked his car at a nearby Burger King/plaza just east of where Ms. Manan fell. He stayed at the plaza for a period of time before eventually travelling westbound on Queen Street.

14Mr. Sankar eventually returned to 68 Princess Valley Crescent. Mr. Sankar and two of his friends looked at his vehicle on the passenger side with a flashlight.

15Police investigated Mr. Sankar. I infer that considerable police resources were expended attempting to piece together what had happened. A judicial authorization was sought and obtained to search Mr. Sankar’s phone. The analysis of the data on his phone places Mr. Sankar in the general area of the collision and baby shower on January 4-5, 2020. Police also obtain judicial authorization to search his vehicle. There were no signs of any physical disturbance in the vehicle. There was no blood found in the interior or on the exterior of the vehicle.

16Mr. Sankar was initially arrested on January 17, 2020 for failure remain resulting in death but was released unconditionally and the investigation continued. On June 25, 2020 Mr. Sankar was re-arrested and charged with failure to remain resulting in death. He was held for a bail hearing. He was interviewed three times: January 16, January 17 and June 25, 2020. On each occasion Mr. Sankar exercised his right to silence and refused to provide a statement to investigators.

Victim Impact Statements

17I had the benefit of hearing victim impact statements from the mother and father of Diana Manan. I will not recite in detail their statements. I cannot do justice to what they told me in their statements. Their statements were moving and compelling. They have been devastated by her death. Life will never be the same for them. She filled their lives with joy. They had the great privilege of being her parents, doing all the things that parents try to do and enjoying life together. Their statements helped me in some small way to understand what a wonderful person Diana Manan was and the magnitude of the promise her life held. The statements explained the devastation of the loss Ms. Manan’s family and friends have endured. Her parents’ words of anguish are not lost on me.

Circumstances of the Offender

18Mr. Sankar was born in April 1999. He was 20 years old at the time of the offence. He is currently 22 years old. There is no criminal record or driving record alleged. He has led a pro-social life. He has strong family supports. He has done volunteer work totaling 200 hours since January 2020. He is a high school graduate. He has done some post-secondary studies and has also worked at an auto dealership and local retail store since he graduated from high school. It appears from the PSR that due to stress related to the matters before the court that he has been unable to continue with work or studies.

Position of the Parties

19The Crown seeks a sentence of 15 to 18 months imprisonment; an 18 month probation order with counselling and community service; a 2 year driving prohibition as well as a DNA order.

20The defence seeks a sentence of 90 days imprisonment less 3 days pre-sentence custody; 18 months’ probation and a 2 year driving prohibition. They oppose the DNA order as unnecessary for Mr. Sankar as a youthful first offender.

Law

General Principles of Sentencing

21The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender (section 718.1 of the Criminal Code). This is achieved by identifying and considering the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances of the offence and the offender bearing in mind the established principles of sentencing including those set out in section 718.2 of the Criminal Code. The sentencing objectives listed in section 718 of the Criminal Code must be considered. In addition, the Court must always be mindful of the principle of restraint contained in section 718.2 (c) to (e) of the Criminal Code. The impact on any victim must also be considered. It is in this context and in considering these principles, goals, objectives and factors, that the Court selects a fit sentence that will best achieve the sentencing objectives and is similar to sentences imposed in similar cases (see section 718.2 (b) of the Criminal Code). The foregoing description of the sentencing process is based largely on Justice Paciocco’s statements in R. v. Casselman, [2014] ONCJ 198 at para. 3.

Relevant Criminal Code Provisions

22Section 320.16 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

(1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance and who at the time of operating the conveyance knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the conveyance has been involved in an accident with a person or another conveyance and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the conveyance, give their name and address and, if any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.

(2) Everyone commits an offence who commits an offence under subsection (1) and who at the time of committing the offence knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the accident resulted in bodily harm to another person.

(3) Everyone commits an offence who commits an offence under subsection (1) and who, at the time of committing the offence, knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the accident resulted in the death of another person or in bodily harm to another person whose death ensues.

23Section 320.21 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

Everyone who commits an offence under subsection 320.13(3), 320.14(3), 320.15(3) or 320.16(3) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of,

(a) for a first offence, a fine of $1,000;

(b) for a second offence, imprisonment for a term of 30 days; and

(c) for each subsequent offence, imprisonment for a term of 120 days.

24Section 320.16 of the Criminal Code came into force in 2018. It replaced section 252 of the Criminal Code which was repealed when section 320.16 of the Criminal Code came into force. While the provisions of s. 320.16 are somewhat different than s. 252 in that, among other things, they eliminate the need for the crown to prove that the failure to stop was intended to escape civil or criminal liability, in my view the case law under s. 252 remains highly relevant under s. 320.16. The essence of an offence under s. 320.16(3) is largely the same as an offence under the former s. 252 (1.3) of the Criminal Code.

25When Courts seek to arrive at a proportionate sentence, the Court must, among other things, consider other cases with a view to achieving some consistency in the common law. In R. v. Francis, 2020 ONCJ 581 I reviewed the law under s. 252 of the Criminal Code. I adopt the conclusions I reached in that case as applying to both s. 252 and s. 320.16 offences. At para 25 of the Francis case I summarized the law under s. 252 as follows:

“I make the following observations based on my consideration of the case law:

(a) At least two Ontario Superior Court judges have observed that the range of sentence for a section 252 offence ranges from three months at the low end to two years at the high-end. (see R. v. Sanford, [2014] O.J. 4596 at para 22; and R. v. Oliveira, [2016] O.J. No. 140 at para 20). Clearly, both judges were referring to section 252 cases which involved bodily injury or death to the victim or victims.

(b) It is sometimes said that it is not an element of a section 252 offence that the injuries are caused by the “fault” of the defendant (see Sanford at para 4). However, it is clearly aggravating as concerns sentence where bodily harm or death occurs or where the person knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm.

(c) The Ontario Court of Appeal has said that a section 252 offence is a serious offence and that the conduct underlying it is not only “contrary to the Criminal Code, but contrary to any standard of decency”: see R. v. Ramdass, [1982] O.J. 177 (C.A.) at para 5. Having said that, to be clear, while a section 252 offence is serious it is not as serious as an impaired driving causing death or dangerous driving causing death conviction. Such cases involve a direct linkage or connection between the wrongdoing of the defendant and the death of the victim.

(d) Denunciation and general deterrence are the paramount principles of sentencing for a failure to remain conviction (see Oliveira at para 26).

(e) Justice Hill in Sanford observed that a s. 252 charge is often a companion charge to other charges on an information or indictment. A consecutive sentence is normally imposed for the section 252 offence although there may be some reduction or rounding down due to the principle of totality (see Sanford at para 17).

(f) A prior record for a Criminal Code driving offence is aggravating: R. v. Fortin, [1984] O.J. 158 (C.A.). A prior record for a provincial offences Highway Traffic Act offence is also aggravating (see Oliveira at para 27).

(g) It is aggravating where a defendant takes steps to evade detection or misleads police (see R. v. Lapensee (2009), 2009 ONCA 646, 99 O.R. (3d) 501 (C.A.) at para 59; and R. v. Arruda [2001] O.J. 6288 at para 10 and 32 affirmed [2002] O.J. 2403](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2002/2002canlii2403/2002canlii2403.html)).

(h) While a sentence of three months to just under 2 years of imprisonment is said to be the range of sentence for a section 252 offence where bodily injury or death occurs, many of the sentences in such cases fall somewhere in the middle of that range rather than at either end of it. Three month sentence cases are definitely at the low end of the range of sentence and are not common (see R. v. Sandu [2014] O.J. 960 (ONCJ) for example). To be clear, the Sanford case was not a 3 month sentence case. That was the net sentence [in] that case. The true sentence was 5 to 9 months. In my view, three months sentences in failure to remain cases involving death or bodily injury are unusual and not in keeping with the weight of authority in this area which points towards higher sentences.

(i) In my view, a significant number of cases establish that the lower to middle end of the range is a sentence of imprisonment of 5 to 9 months. Sentences in this range will usually not involve a prior criminal driving record but may involve a provincial offences driving record: see R. v. Wieczorek, 2010 ONCJ 582, [2010] O.J. 5260 (5 months); R. v. Aman, 2012 ONCJ 654, [2012] O.J. 4998 (5 months); R. v. Norton [2014] O.J. 2845 (5 months); Oliveira (6 months); R. v. Gummer, [1983] O.J. 181 (C.A.) (6 months on the failure to remain consecutive to a 6 month sentence on a dangerous driving conviction); Ramdass (9 months); and Arruda (9 months).

(j) Sentences in the 12 to 15 months range for failure remain tend to involve a prior criminal record or a companion impaired driving offence having been committed immediately prior to the failure to remain incident. (See Fortin where a sentence of 90 days was varied to one year in a case where there were two prior convictions for impaired driving); R. v. Turnbull, [2009] O.J. No. 6432 affirmed [2011] O.J. no. 1504](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2011/2011onca1504/2011onca1504.html) (one year for the failure to remain consecutive to 3.5 years for an impaired conviction); Lapensee (one year on the failure to remain with a six month concurrent sentence for public mischief. The defendant had a record for impaired driving); R. v. Avery, [2011] O.J. No. 2678 (15 months sentence on the failure to remain-the defendant had a record for impaired driving and had six drinks on the day of the failure to remain).

(k) There are sentences in the 18 to 24 month range for a failure to remain but they are exceptional and somewhat unusual in my view. See R. v. Dhesi, [2001] O.J. No. 1343 (C.A.) (18 months sentence. The accused had twice the legal limit of alcohol in his system and a prior conviction for impaired driving); R. v. Murray, [1994] O.J. 2392 (C.A.) (a two year consecutive sentence for failure to remain was imposed to the companion conviction for criminal negligence causing death. There was also a prior criminal record; R. v. Porter, [2017] O.J. No. 5784 (24 months was imposed after trial on a failure to remain conviction. This appears to be outside the range for similar cases).”

Further Case-law

26Defence counsel provided further caselaw on this sentencing with a view to establishing that the low end of the range is actually a conditional sentence: see R. v. Forrestall, 2021 ONCJ 121 where a 12 month conditional sentence for a 320.16(1) and (3) offence). He also referred to a number of other cases in which 90 or 120 day imprisonment sentences were imposed: see R. v. Sivakumaran, 2021 ONCJ 307 (90 day sentence imposed); R. v. Lisi, 2001 BCCA 559 (90 day sentence imposed) and R. v. Alves, 2012 BCPC 403 (120 days). I stand by the conclusions I reached in Francis about the range of sentences in failure to remain cases. One such conclusion was that 90 days sentences are at the low end of the range and are unusual and are not in keeping with the weight of authority in failure to remain cases where death occurs. I would also note that the BC Court of Appeal decision in Lisi was actually an appeal by the defendant against the sentence of 90 days on the basis that he should have received a conditional sentence. The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal. I do not take that decision to be an endorsement by the BCCA of the 90 day sentence in that case. Further, in my view, a conditional sentence for failure to remain where death occurs is outside of the usual range that would apply in most cases. In any event, in my view a conditional sentence would certainly not be appropriate on the facts of this case as it would not be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code because it would not sufficiently denounce what happened in this case and would not meet the requirement for general deterrence. The same is true of a proposed 90 day sentence in this case in my view.

27It is important to understand why our courts view an offence under section 320.16 (and its predecessor provision section 252) so seriously. When a driver of a vehicle fails to remain at the scene of an accident with which they are involved and fails to give their name and address and offer assistance to an injured person, they are failing to meet their moral obligation to help someone injured in an accident where they were the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident. Further, they are deliberately preventing the police from investigating their actions in operating a motor vehicle involved in the accident. Indeed, this very point is noted in the Lisi case mentioned above at para. 7.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

28I will consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case before the court.

29The aggravating factors in this case are as follows:

(a) Mr. Sankar had an obligation to help Ms. Manan and he completely failed to do so. It is bad enough not to help a stranger involved in an accident with your vehicle but the failure to help Ms. Manan was even worse. She was a passenger in a vehicle which Mr. Sankar was driving, and she was his girlfriend. Further, Mr. Sankar was 20 years old (he would turn 21 under 4 months later) which made him significantly older than Ms. Manan who was only 16 years old. Further, he knew that she must have been compromised because of the alcohol in her body. About 17 minutes earlier he was picking her up off the sidewalk after they left the baby shower. In all of the circumstances, Mr. Sankar had an obligation to watch out for Ms. Manan and to care for her. I recognize that the specific provisions of s. 320.22 (c) of the Criminal Code are not triggered because Ms. Manan was not under 16 years old, but I nevertheless consider that in all the circumstances that Mr. Sankar’s failure to help Ms. Manan was particularly aggravating.

(b) It is further aggravating and shocking that Mr. Sankar would leave Ms. Manan in a live lane of traffic at night on a six lane road where the speed limit was 80 km an hour. The fact that she was not hit by another vehicle was pure luck. He did not leave her on the sidewalk when she lay down there outside the baby shower, but when she fell out of his moving car on a six lane road 17 minutes later, he leaves her and does not stop? Mr. Sankar could not have known whether Ms. Manan was dead or alive when he left her. As it happens, she was alive when he left her, but he essentially left her for dead. I recognize that in retrospect we now know from the medical evidence that she was not going to be able to survive the fall from the vehicle no matter what was done, but Mr. Sankar could not have known this at the time. Mr. Sankar left it for others to help her when it was he who had the obligation to help her. I repeat that his conduct was shocking.

(c) The death and loss of Ms. Manan has had a devastating impact on her family and friends. She was only 16 years old and she had her whole life ahead of her.

(d) It is obvious that Mr. Sankar put his own well-being ahead of Ms. Manan’s. It is further obvious and can be inferred from the agreed facts that he failed to meet his obligations under section 320.16 of the Criminal Code to stop his vehicle and give his name and address and offer assistance to Ms. Manan because he wanted to prevent the police from investigating him. While he appears to have circled around the site of the incident in the moments following Ms. Manan’s fall from the vehicle, it appears to me that his main concern was for himself. For example, within a short period of time, he went back to the house where the baby shower had been held and he and his friends examined Mr. Sankar’s car. It is obvious that Mr. Sankar must have been trying to see if his car could be linked to Ms. Manan being located in the middle of Queen Street.

Mitigating factors

30The mitigating factors in this case are as follows:

(a) It is mitigating that Mr. Sankar has pled guilty. A plea of guilt is always taken by the court as a sign of remorse. In addition, Mr. Sankar made a statement at the sentencing hearing wherein he apologized to Ms. Manan’s family. I take his apology to be genuine. He knows he made terrible mistakes in this case.

(b) Mr. Sankar has no criminal record and no provincial offences driving record.

(c) Mr. Sankar is currently 22 years old. At the time of the incident he was 20 years old. Accordingly, he is a youthful first offender. The court must show restraint in sentencing a youthful first offender.

(d) The PSR of Mr. Sankar is positive in the sense that he has good family supports. In addition, he has also done volunteer work and appears to have good supports in the community and good prospects for rehabilitation. It appears to me that the incident in which Ms. Manan lost her life has had a significant impact on Mr. Sankar in the sense that he is been unable to continue with his studies and unable to work. Of course, I understand the sentiment of Ms. Manan’s family that Mr. Sankar still has his life.

Further observations regarding the circumstances of the offence and the offender

31Let me make some further observations regarding the circumstances of the offence and the offender. While Mr. Sankar gets the benefit of the mitigating factor associated with his plea of guilt, he does not get the mitigating factor that might have been accorded to him had he cooperated with police. In the course of the investigation, he had the right to remain silent and the exercise of that right is not aggravating. However, in some failure to remain cases, the person will leave the scene of an accident and then turn themselves in within hours or days and then cooperate with police. This can be a mitigating factor, but it does not arise here. To this day, Ms. Manan’s family does not know how this tragedy came about.

32I also note the submissions of defence counsel that Mr. Sankar suffers from asthma and had a collapsed lung in 2018. The defence submits that this condition should be considered in arriving at a fair sentence particularly in light of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. No medical evidence was filed on this issue.

33Further, the defence submits that Mr. Sankar has been on a strict bail since the end of June 2000 which among other things made him subject to a curfew from 9 PM to 5 AM. The defence does not seek a specific allocation of a deduction from sentence for the asthma or the strict bail but simply says that these circumstances support the 90 day sentence sought by the defence.

34The defence does seek credit for the two days presentence custody Mr. Sankar served which at 1.5 to 1 would be 3 days credit.

The Appropriate Sentence in this case

35As I indicated at the outset, the Crown seeks a sentence of 15 to 18 months imprisonment and other companion orders. The defendant seeks a sentence of 90 days. Both the Crown and the defence seek 18 months’ probation and a 2 year driving prohibition.

36It must be remembered that when I sentence Mr. Sankar, I am not sentencing him for dangerous driving or for impaired driving causing death. He was not charged with those offences. He was charged with failure to remain at the scene of an accident when he was reckless as to whether the accident had resulted in the death of Ms. Manan. He is not charged with having caused her death. As I have already said, it is of course troublesome that by failing to meet his obligations under 320.16 (1) of the Criminal Code Mr. Sankar prevented the police from investigating him as concerns the possible commission of other offences. But I cannot and will not sentence him for what might have happened had he met his obligations under section 320.16 of the Criminal Code to stay at the scene of the accident and help Ms. Manan.

37I view this as a very serious failure to remain case. The fact that Mr. Sankar was driving and left his 16 year old girlfriend alive but completely incapacitated in a live lane of traffic on a major roadway in the middle of a winter night pulls me towards a more significant sentence. So does the loss of such a young life and the impact on the victims of this loss. The fact of his plea of guilt, his lack of a record and his youthfulness at the time of the offence and now, as well as his good prospects for rehabilitation pull in the other direction towards a more modest sentence. When I consider all the facts underlying the failure to remain, it is my view that a sentence of 8 months less three days pre-sentence custody is the appropriate sentence of imprisonment in this case. The 8 months sentence takes into account the bail conditions. Further, I have also considered Mr. Sankar’s medical condition namely that he appears to suffer from asthma, and he has had a collapsed lung in the past. I am not prepared to deduct anything based on this point based on the very limited information that I have been given on this issue. Mr. Sankar is young and there is no medical evidence to suggest he is not in good health. I understand it will be difficult to serve this sentence during Covid-19 but I consider that the sentence is a fair one nonetheless. I repeat that Mr. Sankar is young and there is no medical evidence to suggest he is not in good health. There will also be 18 months’ probation with counselling as directed and 75 hours of community service. There will be a two year driving prohibition recognizing that he has not been permitted to drive since the time of his arrest. Further, a DNA order will be made. In this regard, I am guided by the facts of the case before me and the principles laid down in R. v. Hendry, [2001] O.J. 5084 (C.A.) indicating that a DNA order will be appropriate in most cases.

Summary

38In my view, the sentence of 8 months less 3 days pre-sentence custody will send the appropriate message of denunciation and general deterrence while at the same time promoting rehabilitation.

39There will be 18 months’ probation with counselling as directed and 75 hours of community service. Reporting by telephone within 3 working days of his release from custody and thereafter as required. The phone number for probation is 905 457 6887.

40There will be a DNA order in custody and a two-year driving prohibition.