Bradley Jordan Juriansz

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and a mid-trial ruling allowing cross-examination on text messages.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to take a holistic view of evidence, ignored an alleged motive to fabricate, and applied uneven scrutiny.

He also contended the text messages were undisclosed, subject to a Crown undertaking not to use them, and their use constituted case-splitting.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and finding no error in the admission of the text messages for impeachment and reply evidence, or in the handling of the "recent fabrication" argument.

This decision addresses a question of law that arose during a jury trial concerning the interpretation of causation under s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to impaired driving causing death.

The Crown argued for a temporal link between the impairment/illegal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and the accident resulting in death, asserting that no causal link between the impairment itself and the accident was required.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that the offence requires a causal link, meaning the impairment or illegal BAC must be a significant contributing cause of the accident that resulted in death.

The court emphasized the need for moral blameworthiness to be connected to the serious consequences of the offence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

She argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting her defence that she did not understand the officer's instructions due to a language barrier.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the appellant understood the instructions and feigned her inability to provide a sample—were supported by the evidence, including the in-car video recording.

The trial judge's reasons were found to be adequate and her credibility assessments were entitled to deference.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a conveyance with a high blood-alcohol concentration (160 mg in 100 ml of blood) after a rear-end collision, with her 12-year-old daughter as a passenger.

She had no prior criminal record but a previous "warn" for alcohol.

The Crown sought 120 days custody, an 18-month license suspension, and 18 months probation.

The defence sought a 1-year driving prohibition and a 30-day conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-day conditional sentence, an 18-month driving prohibition, and 18 months probation with alcohol counselling, emphasizing the need to elevate penalties for impaired driving cases, especially with aggravating factors like an accident and a child passenger.

The applicant, Zosia Ruchlewicz, charged with impaired driving and "80 plus" sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was approximately 26 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the R. v. Jordan framework, deducting defence delay and delay attributable to the COVID-19 public health crisis as a discrete event.

The net delay, after deductions, was found to be below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also found that the case did not take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have, despite some defence inaction regarding disclosure.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance with excess alcohol after a rear-end collision.

She brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing her right to counsel (s.10(a) and 10(b)) was infringed because it was not provided earlier during the motor vehicle collision investigation.

The court found that the police officer was credible and was not conducting a drinking and driving investigation until a later point when a stronger odour of alcohol was detected.

The court determined that no detention for Charter purposes occurred until the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was made, and rights were provided timely thereafter.

Even if a detention occurred earlier, the right to counsel would have been suspended during the preliminary investigation.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed her conviction for 'over 80' impaired driving.

She was pulled over and the officer smelled alcohol, but delayed making an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for 13 minutes until confirming a device was available, resulting in a total 22-minute delay before the test was administered.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred in concluding the test was administered 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The delay resulted in breaches of the appellant's rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police's failure to preserve in-car camera footage breached her s. 7 right to disclosure.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal judge excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

Alexandra Forrestall pleaded guilty to failing to stop after an accident resulting in death.

The primary issue at sentencing was whether the custodial portion of the sentence should be served in jail or conditionally in the community.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the profound loss of life and the accused's subsequent fabrication of events, and mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, youthful first offender status, positive character references, and significant mental health challenges exacerbated by the incident.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was legally available following the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Sharma* and was appropriate given the specific circumstances, including the accused's health vulnerabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Specifically, the defence argued that the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was not made immediately, the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the Approved Instrument demand due to uncertainty regarding mouth alcohol, and right to counsel advice was not provided immediately upon arrest.

The court found that a brief delay in the ASD demand for officer safety was reasonable and did not constitute a Charter breach.

It also found no issue with the officer's grounds for the Approved Instrument demand despite a misunderstanding about mouth alcohol detection.

While a section 10(b) breach was found due to a five-minute delay in providing right to counsel advice, the court determined that this breach was not serious and had no impact on the accused's Charter rights, thus declining to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.

The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.

The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 ml.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the roadside screening demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was not breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the six-minute delay for the roadside demand was justified, the 1 hour and 45-minute delay for the breath samples was reasonable, and the appellant had a fulsome opportunity to consult with duty counsel.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a RIDE check on April 21, 2016.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results showing blood alcohol levels of 168 and 145 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on multiple Charter grounds, including allegations that the officer failed to properly calibrate the ASD device, failed to make the demand forthwith, failed to administer the test as soon as practicable, and failed to document reasons for rejecting an intermediate sample.

The court rejected all Charter challenges and found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 140 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with sixteen Criminal Code and CDSA offences: four counts punishable by 14 years or more imprisonment (14+ offences) and twelve counts punishable by less than 14 years (less than 14 offences).

The accused elected trial by judge and jury and requested a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry should be limited to the 14+ offences only, while the defence argued it should encompass all counts on the information.

The court held that the preliminary inquiry is restricted to the 14+ offences only, based on the plain language of the amended Criminal Code provisions following Bill C-75.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to report under a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

At trial, the Crown relied on unauthenticated copies of the original Information and SOIRA order, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in admitting the documents, as they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were not the best evidence available.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden to the appellant to prove a reasonable excuse without first determining if the Crown had proven the mens rea of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on January 30, 2018.

A York Regional Police officer observed the defendant entering an intersection as the light turned red, conducted a traffic stop, and detected the smell of alcohol on her breath.

The defendant provided a failed Approved Screening Device (ASD) test and was arrested.

Two breath samples at the station showed readings of 110 milligrams.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the stop and the admissibility of the breath test results under the Charter.

The court found the officer credible, accepted that there was a valid reason for the traffic stop and reasonable suspicion of impairment, and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation while over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown withdrew the third count at trial and conceded that the Over 80 count should be dismissed due to Charter violations.

The sole remaining issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate his vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case rested on observations of an off-duty police officer and the arresting officer regarding the accused's driving pattern and physical observations.

The court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the impaired driving charge.

An appellant who was found not criminally responsible appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention in a forensic hospital.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge but the primary issue was whether the Board should exercise its inquisitorial powers to investigate alternative community residential arrangements.

The Court of Appeal found that while a conditional discharge was not available due to the appellant's significant risk to public safety, the Board had erred in failing to properly exercise its inquisitorial duties to break the residential impasse.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving after being stopped for speeding.

The Crown relied on blood alcohol test results showing readings of 96 and 95 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, taken approximately three hours after the defendant was stopped.

A toxicologist provided expert evidence that the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the toxicologist's assumptions regarding elimination rates, plateau periods, breath-to-blood conversion ratios, and other factors.

The court found that while the defence raised hypothetical scenarios that could theoretically affect the calculations, there was insufficient case-specific evidence to create a reasonable doubt about the Crown's case.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that the trial judge improperly shifted the burden by requiring defence evidence for innocent explanations and wrongly relied on inconsistent civilian testimony.

The appeal court held that innocent explanations may arise from the absence of evidence, but only where they are reasonable in light of logic, experience, and the record as a whole.

The court found no misapprehension of the evidence and no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s weighing of competing inferences or credibility findings.

The civilian evidence, though inconsistent in some respects, remained probative on central issues and was corroborated by the attending officer and surrounding circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.