Terry Hawtin

This criminal trial addressed charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol.

The defendant was involved in an accident after driving the wrong way on a one-way street.

The court found insufficient evidence to prove impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the lack of clear indicia of impairment beyond the driving error itself.

Regarding the defendant's Charter Section 10(b) right to counsel, the court found no breach, determining that the defendant's waiver of her right to counsel at the police station was clear and unequivocal, even after being reminded of her initial assertion of the right.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of impaired operation but convicted of operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol.

The accused was charged with impaired operation contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation while over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown withdrew the third count at trial and conceded that the Over 80 count should be dismissed due to Charter violations.

The sole remaining issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate his vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case rested on observations of an off-duty police officer and the arresting officer regarding the accused's driving pattern and physical observations.

The court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the impaired driving charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL of blood after presenting his vehicle for service at a dealership.

The Crown and defence agreed that two issues remained: (1) whether the Crown proved identification of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) whether the Crown proved that the Standard Field Sobriety Test demand was based upon reasonable suspicion, particularly regarding the time of driving.

The court found that identification was established through the combined evidence of the Guest Services Manager's in-court identification linked to the arresting officer's confirmation of identity.

The court also found that the SFST demand was objectively reasonable based on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences regarding the timing of the driving.

The "Over 80" count was stayed under the rule in R v. Kienapple.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after being pulled over on Highway 410 early in the morning.

The Crown admitted its case on the merits, and the sole issue at trial was whether the accused's right to counsel of choice had been breached.

The court found that police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel and failed to facilitate her access to counsel of choice.

Instead, police funneled the accused toward duty counsel through a binary choice presentation, despite her clear indication that she wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain private counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

Two young persons charged with street racing causing death, street racing causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm brought applications under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The charges arose from a fatal motor vehicle collision on April 14, 2014.

The information was sworn on May 13, 2014, with trial anticipated to conclude on October 5, 2016, representing a total delay of 28.75 months.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which created presumptive ceilings of 18 months for provincial courts.

The court found that while the delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling, it was justified by exceptional circumstances, including an unforeseen adjournment request by co-accused's counsel and the transitional nature of the case.

The court also considered the case under the pre-Jordan Morin framework and found the delay was not unreasonable in that context either.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control and over 80 care and control following a report of a potential impaired driver at an LCBO.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment by three police officers and breath test readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first breath test was completed within the two-hour statutory requirement due to uncertainty regarding the precise time of the offence.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, including inconsistencies in officer observations and the defendant's cooperative demeanor.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

During trial, the accused revealed he had made notes of events the day following his involvement with the officer and had reviewed them prior to testifying.

The Crown sought production of the notes.

The defence objected on the basis of litigation privilege.

The court held that while the notes were initially protected by litigation privilege as they were made in anticipation of litigation, the accused waived that privilege by using the notes to refresh his memory prior to testifying.

The court ordered production of the notes to the Crown.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proved the accused had consumed seven beers and had a projected BAC of 160 mgs/100ml or higher.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control when police found him parked in a lot by a baseball field with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and music playing.

The court found the accused occupied the driver's seat, the engine was running, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he intended to walk home, finding his continued occupation of the driver's seat inconsistent with that claim.

Both counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.