Angela MacArthur

The defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting police officers engaged in the lawful execution of their duties and one count of breaching a recognizance of bail.

The defendant was initially stopped for speeding and found to be in possession of two cellular telephones.

A computer check revealed the defendant was on bail for drug trafficking with a condition prohibiting possession of more than one cell phone.

The defendant argued the officer's arrest was unlawful due to misinterpretation of the bail condition, and therefore his assault on the officers was justified.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on objectively reasonable grounds, the defendant's assault was unjustified, and the defendant breached his bail condition by possessing two cell phones.

Two youth applicants charged with sexual assault sought to adduce other sexual activity (OSA) evidence of the complainant pursuant to section 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application for failure to comply with the statutory requirements of section 276(2)(b), which mandates that OSA evidence must be relevant to an issue at trial and that detailed particulars must be provided.

The court found the application incomplete and lacking in specificity regarding both the particulars of the alleged prior consensual sexual activity and the articulation of its relevance to the issues at trial.

The application was dismissed.

A young person charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Charter based on an alleged infringement of the right to a speedy trial under section 11(b).

The applicant argued that the total delay of 18 months and 7 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that while the net delay fell slightly below the 18-month ceiling when defence delay was deducted, the case warranted a stay because: (1) a reduced presumptive ceiling of 12 months should apply to youth cases; (2) even applying the 18-month ceiling, the delay was unreasonable as a clear case falling below the ceiling; and (3) the defence demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings while the Crown and trial coordination system failed to provide timely disclosure and trial dates.

The court emphasized that young persons should be tried within a markedly shorter timeframe than adults.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after being pulled over on Highway 410 early in the morning.

The Crown admitted its case on the merits, and the sole issue at trial was whether the accused's right to counsel of choice had been breached.

The court found that police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel and failed to facilitate her access to counsel of choice.

Instead, police funneled the accused toward duty counsel through a binary choice presentation, despite her clear indication that she wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain private counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault arising from an incident in which he allegedly spat at a vehicle and struck a passenger through a partially opened window.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, and unreasonably rejected his denial based on assumptions about driver behaviour in traffic disputes.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s reasons as a whole and concluded the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework were properly applied.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence, rely on corroborating photographs, and apply common sense in assessing credibility.

The conviction was upheld.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were properly informed and whether the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied.

The Crown conducted an approved screening device (ASD) demand approximately 13 minutes after the initial traffic stop.

The defence argued that the accused was not provided with his rights to counsel at the roadside and that the delay in administering the ASD violated the forthwith requirement.

The court found that the accused had been informed of his rights to counsel and declined them, rendering the evidence admissible.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 13 months.

The court found that while a reasonable intake period of 6 weeks was appropriate, the Crown's delay in providing disclosure was unjustified, taking over three months to provide 14 pages of police notes.

The court also found that the defendant suffered actual prejudice in the form of emotional and physical symptoms, including depression, anxiety, and stress-related health issues.

Balancing the factors under the Morin test, the court found the delay unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) based on police videotaping of her using the toilet in a holding cell.

The Crown conceded the section 8 violation.

The court found a section 8 breach but declined to grant a stay of proceedings or prevent reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c).

The court found the breach was not egregious given the low privacy expectations in custody, the valid public policy objective of the videotaping policy, the limited intrusiveness of the actual footage, the evolving state of the law, and the absence of bad faith.

The court imposed a conviction with consideration for sentencing leniency as a remedy for the Charter violation.