David Locke

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on a citizen's report of an erratic driver and subsequent police investigation at a plaza.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the complainant's observations and circumstantial evidence.

Although the court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to delay during investigative detention, it held the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a single-vehicle collision on January 14, 2024.

At trial, the court examined two issues: whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found insufficient evidence of impairment and determined that police breached the defendant's right to counsel by imposing an arbitrary time limit on accessing a lawyer and failing to inform the defendant of alternative options.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy for the Charter breach, resulting in acquittals on both counts.

Inderdeep Singh Kandola pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing the death of Gita Jagpal.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3 to 4 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 18 months to 2 years less a day.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and strong community support.

The judge also took into account the conditions in provincial correctional facilities.

Ultimately, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by 30 months of probation, a five-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order, finding this sentence proportionate and effective in achieving sentencing objectives without immediate incarceration.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and the accused, who presented starkly different accounts of the sexual encounter.

The complainant testified to non-consensual acts, while the accused maintained all activity was consensual.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness on the central issue of non-consent, despite some memory issues.

However, the court determined that the accused's evidence, while not positively believed, could not be safely rejected and raised a reasonable doubt regarding the essential element of lack of consent.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted.

The accused was tried on charges of assault and sexual assault against his then spouse arising from two incidents in May 2019.

The case turned entirely on credibility and the application of the W.(D.) framework in a two-witness trial.

The court found both the complainant and the accused not credible on important points, including admitted falsehoods in an overseas complaint process and the accused's implausible lack of memory about whether intercourse occurred on the relevant dates.

Viewing the evidence as a whole, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted on all charges.

Sentencing following conviction after trial for historical sexual abuse of two very young child relatives by a trusted caregiver.

Applying the Supreme Court's framework for child sexual abuse sentencing, the court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, profound long-term harm, breach of trust, repetition of abuse, the victims' vulnerability, and the aggravating effect of a family cover-up.

Although the offences were approximately 35 years old, the passage of time did not diminish their seriousness or impact.

The court reduced the otherwise fit 10-year global sentence to 9 years to reflect the offender's poor health, limited English, and the harsher custodial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, then credited pre-trial custody for an effective sentence of 8 years and 4 months concurrent.

Ancillary DNA, SOIRA, firearms prohibition, and non-communication orders were also imposed.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and four counts of sexual assault against his former wife.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant's testimony.

The court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility, noting her demeanour during cross-examination regarding a marriage fraud investigation she initiated against the accused in India.

The court concluded the complainant had an ulterior motive to force reconciliation and gave false evidence.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused was arrested for impaired care and control after police responded to a call about individuals drinking and smashing bottles in a parking lot.

A search incident to arrest revealed a loaded firearm.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), seeking to exclude the firearm and his refusal to provide a breath sample under s. 24(2).

The court found minor breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but concluded the evidence was either not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter or should not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The Crown's application to admit the accused's statements regarding his identity was granted.

Sentencing decision for possession of child pornography involving an exceptionally large and highly depraved collection of images, videos, and written materials accumulated over years.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount objectives under the Criminal Code and recent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal authority, particularly given the young ages of the children depicted, the graphic abuse shown, and the victim impact evidence of ongoing trauma.

Although the offender was elderly, medically frail, remorseful, and a first offender with strong community support, the court found a conditional sentence would impermissibly diminish the seriousness of the offence.

COVID-19 incarceration conditions and health risks were treated as collateral consequences but could not justify a sentence disproportionate to the gravity of the crime.

An 18-month custodial sentence was imposed together with DNA, SOIRA, and forfeiture orders.

The defendant, Nhat Nguyen, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol ("80 plus").

He conceded the elements of the offence but brought a Charter motion arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The court found that police failed to facilitate contact with his chosen lawyer, Kim Schofield, despite her number being in his seized phone, and instead directed him to Duty Counsel.

The court noted inconsistencies in police testimony and identified a systemic issue in police training regarding counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence, leading to an acquittal.

This is a sentencing decision for Charlston Lewis, who pleaded guilty to charges arising from a prolonged and multi-faceted incident of intimate partner violence against Ms. Marshall, his partner of 11 years, who suffered from a known brain disorder.

The assault, which included choking and striking her head, occurred in the presence of their children and was partially recorded on an in-house security camera.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, the presence of children, the history of abuse, and the controlling nature of the offender's actions.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, extensive counselling undertaken by the offender, and his remorse.

The Crown sought 12-24 months of 'real jail', while the defence proposed a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles, particularly in cases of intimate partner violence and abuse of vulnerable persons.

Considering the impact of COVID-19 on incarceration conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 180 days custody for assault and a concurrent 90 days custody for choking, followed by a 24-month probation term with strict conditions, a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA orders, and forfeiture of weapons.

P.R. was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and assault with a weapon following an incident where he mistakenly entered a residence while intoxicated.

The accused claimed mistaken entry and self-defence.

The court acquitted P.R. of break and enter and sexual assault, finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent due to intoxication and inconsistencies in witness testimony.

However, P.R. was convicted of assault with a weapon, as his use of a flashlight against the homeowner was deemed disproportionate and not a reasonable act of self-defence given the homeowner's right to remove an intruder.

The applicant brought a motion to stay criminal proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant was charged with two counts each of assault, overcoming resistance, and unlawful confinement on April 13, 2018, with an offence date of April 9, 2018.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 17 months and 21 days, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 10 days.

The court found no periods of defence delay attributable to the applicant and determined that the applicant had demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case had taken markedly longer than reasonable.

The motion was granted and the charges were stayed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit (Over 80) contrary to s. 253(1)(b) and impaired driving, arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial addressed four key issues: the voluntariness of utterances made to police, identification of the driver, whether breath tests were taken within the required two-hour window, and whether the defendant's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to section 254(3).

The accused admitted to operating his vehicle while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was transporting an injured friend to hospital and then returning home to protect his sister from imminent danger.

The court rejected the necessity defence, finding no clear and imminent peril to the sister and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

On the breath sample charge, the court found the accused wilfully failed to provide a sample through malingering rather than incapacity, and that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a reasonable excuse.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his system and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a motor vehicle collision at 2 a.m. on July 4, 2016.

The accused sought Charter relief on two grounds: first, that police lacked sufficient grounds for detention in violation of s. 9 Charter rights, and second, that police breached s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the initial arrest was lawful based on objective grounds including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, and the context of a severe collision.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after a second officer arrived on scene, but found the breath demand was lawful and the evidence admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating with excess blood alcohol following an erratic driving report.

A Charter application was brought to exclude evidence obtained following an alleged violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that police delayed providing the right to counsel for 26 minutes after arrest, constituting a breach.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the breach was serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights was significant.

However, the court found the accused guilty of the included offence of care or control while impaired, as the Crown established the accused was in the driver's seat with keys in possession and was heavily intoxicated, presenting a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a roadside stop and arrest.

The accused applied to exclude breath sample evidence on the grounds that the arresting officer failed to advise her of her right to counsel immediately upon arrest, in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach.

The court found the breach serious due to systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Suberu, which established that "without delay" means "immediately." Despite the reliability of the evidence and the accused's decision not to contact counsel, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the repute of the administration of justice.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after being pulled over on Highway 410 early in the morning.

The Crown admitted its case on the merits, and the sole issue at trial was whether the accused's right to counsel of choice had been breached.

The court found that police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel and failed to facilitate her access to counsel of choice.

Instead, police funneled the accused toward duty counsel through a binary choice presentation, despite her clear indication that she wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain private counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The defendant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on May 14, 2015, with the information sworn on May 27, 2015.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 18 months and 2 days.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was approximately 14.5 months.

The court applied the transitional provisions of the Jordan framework and found that the case had taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

A stay of proceedings was granted.