Glenn Henderson

The defendant was charged with sexual assault.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and the accused, who presented starkly different accounts of the sexual encounter.

The complainant testified to non-consensual acts, while the accused maintained all activity was consensual.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness on the central issue of non-consent, despite some memory issues.

However, the court determined that the accused's evidence, while not positively believed, could not be safely rejected and raised a reasonable doubt regarding the essential element of lack of consent.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample and the imposition of a victim fine surcharge.

He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand and that a police officer's forcible attempt to remove his wedding ring constituted a Charter breach, rendered the demand unlawful, and provided a reasonable excuse for his refusal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions that reasonable grounds existed, no section 7 Charter breach occurred, and the ring incident did not cause the refusal.

The sentence appeal was granted on consent, setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The applicant, Ethan Miazad, sought certiorari to challenge his committal to stand trial on charges of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that Miazad and a co-accused defrauded Dr. Rhuel Maano by using him as a "straw man" to secure a $350,000 business loan for a medical clinic, personally guaranteed by Maano, while diverting funds to companies associated with the accused and failing to repay the loan, leaving Maano with the debt.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision and the law of fraud and certiorari, finding sufficient evidence for committal based on the overall "straw man" fraud theory and non-disclosure of related-party transactions.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol on December 11, 2012.

The first trial date was set for October 3, 2013, but the case was not reached that day due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 3, 2014.

The total delay was 12¾ months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was some prejudice to the accused, the overall delay was reasonable in the circumstances, with the institutional delay falling within acceptable ranges for the region.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the evidence of the refusal under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by providing an inadequate summary of the right to counsel while waiting 8 to 9 minutes for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) to arrive.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to determine the threshold issue of whether the ASD demand was valid, specifically whether the 'forthwith' requirement was met and if there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the wait.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, as the essential factual findings regarding the validity of the demand had not been made.