B. Jurianz

The defendant, Nhat Nguyen, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol ("80 plus").

He conceded the elements of the offence but brought a Charter motion arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The court found that police failed to facilitate contact with his chosen lawyer, Kim Schofield, despite her number being in his seized phone, and instead directed him to Duty Counsel.

The court noted inconsistencies in police testimony and identified a systemic issue in police training regarding counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol concentration greater than 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought regarding alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused had unequivocally requested to speak to duty counsel after being arrested, but the investigating officer failed to implement or facilitate this request.

The officer did not contact duty counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so during a 20-minute delay at the scene.

The court found serious breaches of the right to counsel and excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused's detention for approximately eight hours after providing the second breath sample breached his section 9 Charter rights and whether the breath samples should be excluded.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in breach of section 9 of the Charter because the officer in charge focused too narrowly on the breath readings without conducting a comprehensive assessment of all relevant circumstances.

However, the court declined to exclude the breath samples or stay the proceedings, finding no nexus between the post-evidence breach and the collection of the evidence, and determining that a stay was not warranted as this was not one of the clearest of cases.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control following his arrest on August 25, 2014.

The Crown called evidence from two police constables and filed exhibits including photographs, toxicologist reports, in-car camera video, and breath sample results.

The defence challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, arguing a Charter breach occurred.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's condition, admissions of alcohol consumption, and vehicle damage.

The court also found the accused had care or control of the vehicle under the statutory presumption and that he failed to rebut it.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood on April 28, 2013.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 160 mg/100ml taken approximately 2.5 hours after the incident, supported by an expert report estimating the accused's BAC at the time of driving was between 160-205 mg/100ml.

The defence presented evidence of bolus drinking (rapid consumption of alcohol shortly before driving) and expert evidence suggesting the accused's BAC at the time of driving was between 49-73 mg/100ml.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused consumed large quantities of alcohol within 15 minutes prior to the incident, a critical assumption underlying the Crown's expert opinion.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an over‑80 impaired driving charge.

The trial judge had found breaches of s. 8 of the Charter on the basis that the officer failed to prove calibration of the roadside screening device and failed to articulate reasonable grounds for a breath demand, and excluded breath test evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal court held that proof of calibration is not required for reasonable grounds following a roadside fail and that the officer repeatedly articulated his belief that the offence had been committed.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to properly apply the three‑part analysis under R. v. Grant when excluding the breath evidence.

The breaches, if any, were minor and the societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving offences strongly favoured admission of the breath tests.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following an arrest on July 1, 2013.

The case proceeded to trial on September 15, 2014, at which point the defence brought a section 11(b) Charter application to stay the proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date exceeded 17 months, with approximately 11 months and 3 weeks attributable to Crown and institutional delay—well beyond the 8-10 month guideline established in R. v. Morin.

The delay was caused by Crown negligence in failing to notify a witness of the first trial date and late disclosure of a 911 call.

The accused demonstrated prejudice through additional work absences and increased legal costs from multiple missed trial dates.

Balancing the seriousness of impaired driving against the constitutional violation and prejudice, the court granted the stay.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol in his system on November 11, 2011.

He brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have the charges stayed due to delay in trial.

The total delay from the date the information was sworn to the end of trial was approximately 15.5 months.

The court found that while some delay was neutral time and a small portion was attributable to the defence, the Crown was responsible for 6.5 months of delay due to an inexcusable systemic failure regarding videotape disclosure.

The accused suffered significant prejudice to his right to security of the person and his right to a fair trial.

The court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The accused was arrested for driving with excess alcohol after failing an approved screening device.

Following arrest, he provided his lawyer's name and two phone numbers to the arresting officer.

The officer attempted to contact the lawyer but was unsuccessful, and subsequently called duty counsel instead.

The accused spoke to duty counsel for approximately four minutes.

The central issue was whether the accused's right to consult with counsel of choice under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The court found that the officer's evidence regarding her attempts to contact the accused's lawyer was unreliable and that the accused was effectively denied the right to consult with counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breathalyzer results and acquitted the accused.