David Midanik

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising multiple grounds including errors in evidence assessment, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, failure to address honest but mistaken belief in consent, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings and rejecting arguments based on stereotypical victim behaviour.

The court found no air of reality for the honest but mistaken belief defence and no evidence of judicial bias, concluding that the verdict was reasonable.

Devonte Blair pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted handgun, possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the combination of drugs and a loaded weapon, the involvement of fentanyl, and the offender's repeat weapons history.

Mitigating factors included his youth, disadvantaged background, guilty plea (which saved court resources and waived arguable Charter issues), and the increased risk of infection due to the COVID-19 pandemic during his incarceration.

The court applied sentencing principles, including proportionality and similarity to comparable cases.

A notional sentence of 75 months (65 months concurrent for drug and weapon offences, 10 months consecutive for breach of prohibition) was imposed.

After applying 1.5:1 "Summers" credit for 838 days of presentence custody (42 months) and "Duncan" credit for harsh conditions (18 months), the net sentence remaining to be served was 15 months.

A 12-month probation, DNA order, and lifetime section 109 order were also imposed.

The offender was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years.

He spent over three and a half years in pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre, enduring exceptionally harsh conditions including 491 days of lockdowns.

The court dismissed a request for a Charter stay of proceedings but granted significant enhanced credit for the oppressive pre-sentence custody conditions under the Duncan framework.

The offender was sentenced to 7.5 years plus one day, with 7.5 years of pre-sentence credit applied, leaving one day to serve followed by two years of probation.

Following a jury verdict finding the applicant guilty of manslaughter, the applicant brought a motion seeking the trial judge's recusal from the sentencing hearing, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant cited several incidents, including the judge's post-verdict comments to the deceased's family, accepting doughnuts brought by the family, and various procedural rulings and expressions of frustration.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias from any of the isolated incidents or their cumulative effect, noting that the presumption of judicial impartiality had not been displaced.

The applicant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

Following conviction, the Crown brought an unsuccessful application for a psychiatric assessment for a dangerous offender application, and the defence brought a Charter application regarding pre-trial custody conditions.

The sentencing was delayed for 17 months post-conviction.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework to the post-conviction sentencing delay, finding a net delay of 32 months (24 months pre-trial and 8 months post-trial attributable to the system/Crown).

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the court found a s. 11(b) violation and permanently stayed the proceedings.

The applicant, awaiting sentencing for armed robbery and other offences, brought multiple applications challenging his incarceration conditions and seeking production from government entities.

The court ruled that the prosecuting Crown is the only proper and necessary party, with other government entities acting as interveners or third parties.

The court established a sequence for the upcoming applications, beginning with an O'Connor application for third-party production from the federal government, followed by habeas corpus and Charter applications, and concluding with the sentencing hearing.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence.

The applicant argued that the affiant failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe he was engaged in drug trafficking, that material misrepresentations and omissions marred the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that he was assaulted during execution.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, determining that the redacted ITO was insufficient to establish statutory preconditions for issuance.

The court excluded the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the deficiencies in the affiant's approach, combined with the serious impact on the applicant's Charter-protected rights, outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The Crown sought an order under section 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code to remand the defendant, Ammaan Charley, for a psychiatric assessment as the first stage in a dangerous or long-term offender application.

This followed Charley's conviction for robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and related firearm offenses.

The defense opposed the assessment and the unsealing of Charley's youth records.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that while the threshold for such an assessment is low, the defendant's criminal record, particularly when considering the diminished moral culpability of a youth offense, did not establish a sufficient "pattern of repetitive behaviour" or "persistent aggressive behaviour" to meet the statutory criteria.

The application to unseal youth records for sentencing was also dismissed.

The accused was charged with armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a convenience store.

The Crown alleged the accused pistol-whipped the store clerk and struggled with him over a handgun, resulting in two shots being fired.

The accused testified that he was merely a bystander and that his young companion committed the robbery.

Applying the W(D) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory evidence as contrived and accepted the store clerk's testimony, which was corroborated by an independent witness and forensic evidence including gunshot residue.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The Crown sought to admit an audio recording and transcript of a 911 call as *res gestae* evidence in a criminal trial for armed robbery.

The defence argued the call was not truly contemporaneous with the events and contained significant inconsistencies compared to other witness accounts and the caller's later police statement, thus lacking reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding the 911 call necessary for a complete picture of the alleged armed robbery and reliable due to its contemporaneous and urgent nature, which negated the risk of concoction or fabrication.

The court admitted the 911 call for the truth of its contents, noting that any inconsistencies could be addressed through cross-examination of the caller at trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol concentration greater than 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought regarding alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused had unequivocally requested to speak to duty counsel after being arrested, but the investigating officer failed to implement or facilitate this request.

The officer did not contact duty counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so during a 20-minute delay at the scene.

The court found serious breaches of the right to counsel and excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The defendant was charged with mischief, escape from lawful custody, assault causing bodily harm, obstructing a peace officer, and two counts of assaulting a peace officer with intent to resist lawful arrest, arising from an incident at Union Station where he attempted to board a departing GO Transit train.

The Crown abandoned the mischief charge mid-trial.

The court found that the defendant's arrest was unlawful because the transit officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe he had committed mischief.

The court rejected key aspects of the officers' testimony as unreliable and contradicted by video evidence.

Finding the arrest unlawful, the defendant's physical resistance was justified, and he was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was found guilty of operation impaired following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including violations of ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and critically, s. 7 security rights.

The accused was left in a urine-soaked state for approximately 10 hours in custody without being offered a change of clothing, blanket, or early release.

Police officers made demeaning remarks about his condition.

The court determined that the accused's dignity and composure during the breathalyzer process were fundamentally compromised by the wilful indifference of persons in authority.

Applying the test from R. v. Babos, the court found that the egregious Charter violation reflected an endemic institutional attitude toward detainees that could not be adequately remedied by alternative sanctions, particularly given mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was warranted to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The plaintiffs initiated steps to bring a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer for alleged conflict of interest and fraud, including requesting a case conference and setting a timetable.

On the deadline to serve their motion record, the plaintiffs indicated they were not proceeding.

The defendants sought costs for the abandoned motion.

The Master held that although no formal notice of motion or abandonment was served, the plaintiffs had 'made' a motion under Rule 37.09(1) by taking positive steps.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity scale due to the plaintiffs' unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and unprofessional communications.

Sentencing decision following convictions for multiple firearms offences involving possession of two loaded handguns, possession of firearms without a licence, possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, concealing a weapon, possession of an overcapacity magazine, and firearm transfer offences under the Criminal Code.

The accused argued he possessed the firearms under duress while temporarily holding them for another individual, but the defence had been rejected at trial.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in firearms offences and considered aggravating factors including possession of two loaded firearms in a public parking lot and failure to comply with police commands.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record and strong employment history.

Applying the Kienapple principle and the totality principle, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of 4.5 years with credit for pre-sentence restrictions.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms offences including possession of prohibited and restricted firearms, possession of an overcapacity magazine, and possession for the purpose of transferring firearms.

The accused admitted possessing the firearms but asserted the common law defence of duress, claiming he held the guns under threats from an associate with a reputation for violence.

The court held that the accused had voluntarily associated with the individual and had reasonable avenues of escape during the week he possessed the firearms.

The court further found that handing the firearms to another individual constituted a transfer within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The defence of duress lacked an air of reality and, in any event, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence failed.

The accused, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police records relating to a third party whom he alleged had coerced him to possess the firearms.

The defence argued the records were relevant to a defence of duress because they would demonstrate the third party’s reputation for violence, firearms, and drug activity.

Applying the two‑stage test for third‑party record disclosure from R. v. McNeil and R. v. O’Connor, the court first found the requested materials were likely relevant.

After reviewing the records, the court held that police occurrence reports involving allegations of violence, firearms, drugs, and confirmation of the third party’s nickname were necessary to permit full answer and defence.

Disclosure of those records was ordered, with identifying information of complainants redacted to protect privacy.

The accused applied for disclosure of unvetted information used to obtain a search warrant, arguing that confidential informant communications could raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and support a defence of duress.

The Crown opposed disclosure on the basis of confidential informant privilege and argued the innocence-at-stake exception was not met.

Applying the two-stage test from Supreme Court authority, the court held the accused failed to establish that the information sought was unavailable from other sources or that it could likely raise a reasonable doubt.

Potential witnesses connected to the alleged duress, including individuals involved in the transfer of the firearms, were available to testify.

The application to disclose confidential informant information was therefore denied.

The accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case on several firearms trafficking-related counts.

The motion argued that the Crown had failed to adduce evidence establishing the essential elements of transferring or offering to transfer a firearm and possession for the purpose of trafficking under ss. 99 and 100 of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the legal test for directed verdicts, including the requirement that the Crown present some evidence of culpability on each essential element and the limited weighing permitted when relying on circumstantial evidence.

Considering police observations of the accused displaying an object later identified as a prohibited firearm to two individuals, along with the seizure of firearms and money at the scene, the court held that a reasonable jury properly instructed could infer an offer to transfer.

The application for a directed verdict on the impugned counts was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that a 30‑month delay from arrest to trial infringed their right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, reasons for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the societal interest in adjudicating the charges.

The court attributed portions of the delay to inherent requirements, defence delay, Crown delay related to a certiorari application, and institutional delay.

The combined Crown and institutional delay totaled approximately 17½ months, within the Morin guideline range for cases proceeding through both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice.

Balancing the modest prejudice experienced by the accused against the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearms and drug charges, the court concluded the delay did not exceed what is constitutionally tolerable.