Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CR-16-4000004 Date: 2017-06-22 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
Re: R v Ammaan Charley
Before: E.M. Morgan J.
Counsel: Tracey Vogel and Andrew Weafer, for the Crown David Midanik, for the Defendant
Heard: May 18 and June 8, 2017
Application Under Section 752.1
[1] The threshold test for remanding a person for a psychiatric assessment as the first stage in a dangerous offender application is a low one. This application asks how low it can go.
[2] On January 27, 2017, after a two-week trial before me as judge alone, I convicted Ammaan Charley of the offences of robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm without being the holder of an authorization. Flowing from those convictions, Mr. Charley was also found guilty of possession of a firearm while prohibited from doing so. All of these convictions were in relation to an incident that took place on January 15th, 2015, in which Mr. Charley and a young person robbed a store brandishing a handgun and beat the store clerk.
[3] The Crown seeks an order under section 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code remanding Mr. Charley for the purposes of having a psychiatric assessment for use as evidence in its proposed application to have him declared a dangerous or long-term offender under s. 753 or s. 753.1. The Crown proposes that the assessment be conducted by Dr. Scott Woodside at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto. Further, the Crown requests that Mr. Charley’s sealed youth files, which have been requisitioned under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”), be unsealed and delivered to the psychiatrist performing the assessment. The defense opposes all of these requests; in the event that a psychiatric assessment is ordered it opposes the appointment of Dr. Woodside and proposes Dr. Julian Gojer.
[4] The relevant test for an assessment order is not a particularly high one. It was best articulated by LaForme J. in R v McArthur, [1997] O.J. No. 5146, at para. 20:
It is my opinion that on an application brought pursuant to s. 752.1 the only onus and burden of persuasion on the Crown is to satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender might be a dangerous offender. In other words, the question the court must answer is based on the circumstances and evidence, is it a logical conclusion that there is a possibility that the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender? Moreover, as the test for an assessment does not involve any finding of fact that the offender is, at this stage, a dangerous offender, the onus on the Crown is not that which is expressed in either the criminal or civil standards of proof. Rather, in my view, it is simply this: is the court satisfied, after weighing and balancing all the relevant considerations, including the evidence, that the offender should be remanded for observation?
[5] I note that not only is the test a relatively low one, but once it is met the section is phrased in mandatory language: “… the court shall, by order in writing, before sentence is imposed, remand the offender, for a period not exceeding 60 days, to the custody of a person designated by the court who can perform an assessment ”.
[6] As a preliminary matter, s. 752.1 requires that a dangerous offender must be found to have committed a “serious personal injury offence”. In Mr. Charley’s case, this first step is not a controversial one. The armed robbery on January 15, 2015, with its attendant beating of the store clerk, qualifies as a serious personal injury offence. That statutory criterion is therefore met.
[7] The question then becomes whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there “are reasonable grounds to believe that [Mr. Charley]…might be found to be a dangerous offender under section 753 or a long-term offender under section 753.1.” Again, the threshold is a low one. “The word ‘might’ speaks to possibilities: is the prospect of the offender being found to be a dangerous or long-term offender within the realm of possibility or beyond it?”: R v Fulton, [2006] SJ No 669 at para. 20-22 (Sask CA).
[8] That said, Hill J. pointed out in R v Naess, [2005] OJ No 936, at para 77, that “[a]s minimal as this standard is, it is something more than…a remote prospect only.” Accordingly, the onus is on the Crown to demonstrate that, given the evidence at hand, there is at least a possibility that Mr. Charley could be found to be a dangerous offender.
[9] Section 753 of the Criminal Code sets out the grounds on which a person may be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender. Where the person has, like Mr. Charley, engaged in a violence-based serious personal injury offence, it is for the Crown to demonstrate that he shows:
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour,
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or,
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint…
[10] The Crown relies primarily on subsections (i) and (ii). Counsel for the Crown submits that the predicate offense, combined with Mr. Charley’s criminal antecedents, demonstrate a pattern of behaviour that is both violent and that exhibits an indifference to the consequences of this behaviour.
[11] In R v Neve, 1999 ABCA 206, [1999] AJ No 753 at para. 107 (Alta CA), the elements entailed in finding a person to be a dangerous offender under x. 753(1)(a)(i) were outlined as: 1) a pattern of repetitive behaviour; 2) the predicate offence must form part of that pattern; 3) that pattern must show a failure by the offender to restrain his or her behaviour in the past; and 4) that pattern must show a likelihood of death, injury or severe psychological damage to other persons through failure to restrain his or her behaviour in the future.
[12] The pattern of repetitive behaviour must include a number of significant similarities between each example of the behaviour under consideration. Of course, the offences need not be identical and there may be differences in the behaviour, “so long as the differences leave the key significant relevant elements of the pattern in place”: R v Newton, [2006] OJ No 1108 at para 91 (SCJ). The scrutiny of the elements of each offense is not to be made in excessive detail, as microscopic examination of the factual components of the offenses could obscure the pattern of conduct: R v Langevin (1984), , 45 OR (2d) 705, at paras. 20-21 (Ont CA).
[13] However, it is clear that not all criminal behaviour forms the kind of pattern referenced under section 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii). To be relevant to the dangerous offender analysis, the past behaviour must involve some degree of violence or attempted violence or endangerment. If the violence or endangerment elements are present, the past behaviour may be more or less serious than the predicate offence and still comprise part of the pattern: R v Neve, at paras 106-113.
[14] To reiterate, the pattern need not be identical, but must contain “enough of the same elements of unrestrained dangerous conduct to be able to predict that the offender will likely offend in the same way in the future”: R v Hogg, 2011 ONCA 840, [2011] OJ No 5963, at para 40 (Ont CA). Under s. 753(1)(a)(ii), the context of each past offense can be used to determine whether the pattern has shown a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender: R v Neve, at para 118.
[15] The Crown submits that “repetitive behaviour” under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and “persistent aggressive behaviour” under s.753(1)(a)(ii) can be established in two different ways: a) where there are similarities in terms of the kind of offences; and b) where the offences themselves are not similar in kind, but in terms of the degree of violence or aggression inflicted on the victims.
[16] Counsel for the Crown has compiled a chart which details Mr. Charley’s criminal record insofar as it is relevant to this Application:
| Offence
Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CR-16-4000004 Date: 2017-06-22 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
Re: R v Ammaan Charley
Before: E.M. Morgan J.
Counsel: Tracey Vogel and Andrew Weafer, for the Crown David Midanik, for the Defendant
Heard: May 18 and June 8, 2017
Application Under Section 752.1
[1] The threshold test for remanding a person for a psychiatric assessment as the first stage in a dangerous offender application is a low one. This application asks how low it can go.
[2] On January 27, 2017, after a two-week trial before me as judge alone, I convicted Ammaan Charley of the offences of robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm without being the holder of an authorization. Flowing from those convictions, Mr. Charley was also found guilty of possession of a firearm while prohibited from doing so. All of these convictions were in relation to an incident that took place on January 15th, 2015, in which Mr. Charley and a young person robbed a store brandishing a handgun and beat the store clerk.
[3] The Crown seeks an order under section 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code remanding Mr. Charley for the purposes of having a psychiatric assessment for use as evidence in its proposed application to have him declared a dangerous or long-term offender under s. 753 or s. 753.1. The Crown proposes that the assessment be conducted by Dr. Scott Woodside at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto. Further, the Crown requests that Mr. Charley’s sealed youth files, which have been requisitioned under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”), be unsealed and delivered to the psychiatrist performing the assessment. The defense opposes all of these requests; in the event that a psychiatric assessment is ordered it opposes the appointment of Dr. Woodside and proposes Dr. Julian Gojer.
[4] The relevant test for an assessment order is not a particularly high one. It was best articulated by LaForme J. in R v McArthur, [1997] O.J. No. 5146, at para. 20:
It is my opinion that on an application brought pursuant to s. 752.1 the only onus and burden of persuasion on the Crown is to satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender might be a dangerous offender. In other words, the question the court must answer is based on the circumstances and evidence, is it a logical conclusion that there is a possibility that the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender? Moreover, as the test for an assessment does not involve any finding of fact that the offender is, at this stage, a dangerous offender, the onus on the Crown is not that which is expressed in either the criminal or civil standards of proof. Rather, in my view, it is simply this: is the court satisfied, after weighing and balancing all the relevant considerations, including the evidence, that the offender should be remanded for observation?
[5] I note that not only is the test a relatively low one, but once it is met the section is phrased in mandatory language: “… the court shall, by order in writing, before sentence is imposed, remand the offender, for a period not exceeding 60 days, to the custody of a person designated by the court who can perform an assessment ”.
[6] As a preliminary matter, s. 752.1 requires that a dangerous offender must be found to have committed a “serious personal injury offence”. In Mr. Charley’s case, this first step is not a controversial one. The armed robbery on January 15, 2015, with its attendant beating of the store clerk, qualifies as a serious personal injury offence. That statutory criterion is therefore met.
[7] The question then becomes whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there “are reasonable grounds to believe that [Mr. Charley]…might be found to be a dangerous offender under section 753 or a long-term offender under section 753.1.” Again, the threshold is a low one. “The word ‘might’ speaks to possibilities: is the prospect of the offender being found to be a dangerous or long-term offender within the realm of possibility or beyond it?”: R v Fulton, [2006] SJ No 669 at para. 20-22 (Sask CA).
[8] That said, Hill J. pointed out in R v Naess, [2005] OJ No 936, at para 77, that “[a]s minimal as this standard is, it is something more than…a remote prospect only.” Accordingly, the onus is on the Crown to demonstrate that, given the evidence at hand, there is at least a possibility that Mr. Charley could be found to be a dangerous offender.
[9] Section 753 of the Criminal Code sets out the grounds on which a person may be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender. Where the person has, like Mr. Charley, engaged in a violence-based serious personal injury offence, it is for the Crown to demonstrate that he shows:
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour,
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or,
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint…
[10] The Crown relies primarily on subsections (i) and (ii). Counsel for the Crown submits that the predicate offense, combined with Mr. Charley’s criminal antecedents, demonstrate a pattern of behaviour that is both violent and that exhibits an indifference to the consequences of this behaviour.
[11] In R v Neve, 1999 ABCA 206, [1999] AJ No 753 at para. 107 (Alta CA), the elements entailed in finding a person to be a dangerous offender under x. 753(1)(a)(i) were outlined as: 1) a pattern of repetitive behaviour; 2) the predicate offence must form part of that pattern; 3) that pattern must show a failure by the offender to restrain his or her behaviour in the past; and 4) that pattern must show a likelihood of death, injury or severe psychological damage to other persons through failure to restrain his or her behaviour in the future.
[12] The pattern of repetitive behaviour must include a number of significant similarities between each example of the behaviour under consideration. Of course, the offences need not be identical and there may be differences in the behaviour, “so long as the differences leave the key significant relevant elements of the pattern in place”: R v Newton, [2006] OJ No 1108 at para 91 (SCJ). The scrutiny of the elements of each offense is not to be made in excessive detail, as microscopic examination of the factual components of the offenses could obscure the pattern of conduct: R v Langevin (1984), , 45 OR (2d) 705, at paras. 20-21 (Ont CA).
[13] However, it is clear that not all criminal behaviour forms the kind of pattern referenced under section 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii). To be relevant to the dangerous offender analysis, the past behaviour must involve some degree of violence or attempted violence or endangerment. If the violence or endangerment elements are present, the past behaviour may be more or less serious than the predicate offence and still comprise part of the pattern: R v Neve, at paras 106-113.
[14] To reiterate, the pattern need not be identical, but must contain “enough of the same elements of unrestrained dangerous conduct to be able to predict that the offender will likely offend in the same way in the future”: R v Hogg, 2011 ONCA 840, [2011] OJ No 5963, at para 40 (Ont CA). Under s. 753(1)(a)(ii), the context of each past offense can be used to determine whether the pattern has shown a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender: R v Neve, at para 118.
[15] The Crown submits that “repetitive behaviour” under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and “persistent aggressive behaviour” under s.753(1)(a)(ii) can be established in two different ways: a) where there are similarities in terms of the kind of offences; and b) where the offences themselves are not similar in kind, but in terms of the degree of violence or aggression inflicted on the victims.
[16] Counsel for the Crown has compiled a chart which details Mr. Charley’s criminal record insofar as it is relevant to this Application:
| Offence --- SYSTEM INSTRUCTIONS:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROCESSING CASELAW FILES
You will receive a caselaw file in markdown (MD or MDX) format. Your task is to output the entire file in full, including:
- The complete YAML frontmatter.
- The complete caselaw text exactly as given.
Do not remove or modify any content except where explicitly instructed. Formatting, capitalization, and all other text must remain exactly as in the original.
1) Correct and Complete the YAML Frontmatter
- Ensure all frontmatter fields are accurate, complete, and in the correct format.
- If a field is missing or incorrect, fix it using details found in the caselaw text.
- The following fields must be checked, corrected and/or added:
Required fields to fill in and/or add:
case_type(see Section 2 for rules)date_judgement(format:YYYY-MM-DD)date_heard(format:YYYY-MM-DD). Can be an array of dates if multiple hearings occurred. For example,date_heard: ["2022-01-01", "2022-02-01"]applicant(list of applicant names)applicant_counsel(list of counsel names, or"Self-represented")respondent(list of respondent names)respondent_counsel(list of counsel names, or"Self-represented")judge(full name, without title). Can be an array of judges if multiple judges presided over the case. For example, `judge: ["John Doe", "Jane Smith"]summary(A incisive summary of the case written in legalese for lawyers to read, as they seek case law to match their fact pattern. Do not include individual names or initials here.)interesting_citations_summary(An incisive summary focusing on case law matching of their fact pattern, judicial reasoning, and legal principles. Do not include individual names or initials here.)final_judgement(The final judgement of the case stated if short or summerized if long.winning_degree_applicant: A number from 1 (won 100%) to 5 (won 0%) to the degree to which the applicant won.winning_degree_respondent: A number from 1 (won 100%) to 5 (won 0%) to the degree to which the respondent won.judge_bias_applicant: A number from 0 (biased 0%) to 5 (biased 100%) to the degree to which the judge seemed biased towards the applicant.judge_bias_respondent: A number from 0 (biased 0%) to 5 (biased 100%) to the degree to which the judge seemed biased towards the respondent.
--
Cited Cases and Legislation
- Review the
cited_casessection: - Remove duplicates or obvious errors.
- Separate into two sections:
legislation:→ laws and statutes.case_law:→ previous judicial decisions.
- Keep all valid citations from the original.
2) Fix the `case_type`
- If
case_typeis missing, empty, or incorrect, determine it from the caselaw content. - Valid case types (must be exactly one of these):
motion
motion to change
costs
trial
sentencing
appeal
Guidelines for determining case type:
motion→ Involves a motion (e.g., summary judgment, motion to dismiss).costs→ Concerns a costs decision or costs award.trial→ Decision after a full trial on the merits.sentencing→ Criminal sentencing decisions.appeal→ Appeals from a lower court decision.
Use court level, context, content and jurisdiction to assist in determining the correct type.
5) Markdown and Formatting
- Fix any markdown formatting issues.
- Ensure all headings use proper markdown (
#,##, etc.) for logical sections. - Preserve exact wording and structure from the caselaw except where fixing formatting or frontmatter.
- CRITICAL: Format the markdown with nice spacing between each section. Make it NICE.
6) Links
- Reproduce all links exactly as in the original HTML version:
- Link the same words or phrases to the same URLs.
- Remove all references to unless they are part of the official caselaw text.
7) Output Requirements
- Output the full corrected markdown with the correct
yamlfrontmatter followed by the full correctedmddocument. - Everything else must remain 100% verbatim — only the
yamlfrontmatter and formatting/links may be changed according to these instructions. - Make sure the markdown is nicely spaced, and has correct Headings (
#,##, etc.)
Example of HTML and Markdown so you can see how to prepare our markdown file from the html:
<div class="solexHlZone lbh-document" id="originalDocument">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p>COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00009461-0000</p>
<p>DATE: 20250603</p>
<p>SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO</p>
<p>RE: SAMUEL MIDDLETON, Plaintiff</p>
<p>AND:</p>
<p>MATTHEW SHAWN KEY and Michelene catherine key, Defendants</p>
<p>BEFORE: Firestone RSJ.</p>
<p>COUNSEL: Thomas L. W. Orendorff , for the Plaintiff</p>
<p>Ryan D. Truax and Marcus Rozsa, for the Defendants</p>
<p>HEARD: In Writing</p>
<p>ENDORSEMENT</p>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=1"><p data-viibes-parag="1" data-viibes-start="0">[ 1 ] The Defendants bring this motion for an order transferring this proceeding from Sudbury (Northeast Region) to the Toronto Region.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=2"><p data-viibes-end="0" data-viibes-parag="2" data-viibes-start="1">[ 2 ] The Plaintiff opposes the transfer motion. He also brings a cross-motion requesting that should a transfer be necessary, it should be to Gore Bay in the Northeast Judicial Region.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=3"><p data-viibes-end="1" data-viibes-parag="3" data-viibes-start="2">[ 3 ] The motion is brought pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure , R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) and the procedures set forth in the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction amended February 1, 2024 (the “Practice Direction”). In accordance with the Practice Direction, I am to determine the Defendants’ request to transfer this proceeding from another judicial region to the Toronto Region.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=4"><p data-viibes-end="2" data-viibes-parag="4" data-viibes-start="3">[ 4 ] In determining whether a transfer is desirable in the interests of justice, the court is to consider the factors enumerated in subrule 13.01.02(b)</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=5"><p data-viibes-end="3" data-viibes-parag="5" data-viibes-start="4">[ 5 ] The factors set forth in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) are to be applied holistically. No one of the enumerated factors is more important than the other. These factors are to be examined together and balanced in order to determine whether a requested transfer is desirable in the interests of justice: Chatterson et al. v. M&M Meat Shops , 2014 ONSC 1897 , 68 C.P.C. (7 th ) 135 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 22 , 34, and 35.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=6"><p data-viibes-end="4" data-viibes-parag="6" data-viibes-start="5">[ 6 ] Balancing the factors in Rule 13.1.02 (2)(b) is not a purely numerical or mathematical counting exercise : Bruce Power L.P. v. BNT Canada, L.P. , 2018 ONSC 5968 , at para. 16 .</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=7"><p data-viibes-end="5" data-viibes-parag="7" data-viibes-start="6">[ 7 ] If the Plaintiff’s choice of venue is reasonable and the Defendant challenges that venue, then a comparison of the two venues is required. The Defendant must establish that its proposed choice of venue is “significantly better” than the one chosen by the Plaintiff: Chatterson, at paras. 28-29.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=8"><p data-viibes-end="6" data-viibes-parag="8" data-viibes-start="7">[ 8 ] The subject collision took place in the City of Toronto. At that time the Plaintiff was a student at Tyndale University in Toronto and was employed at Starbucks. He attends university between September and April of each year. The Plaintiff is ordinarily resident in the Northeast Judicial Region.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=9"><p data-viibes-end="7" data-viibes-parag="9" data-viibes-start="8">[ 9 ] Following the collision, he was transported to the North York General Hospital and then St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto where he remained for a number of days. Upon discharge he sought treatment at the Manitoulin Health Centre.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=10"><p data-viibes-end="8" data-viibes-parag="10" data-viibes-start="9">[ 10 ] The Defendants reside in Aurora which is located the Central York Region and is part of the greater Toronto area. Neither the Defendants nor the Plaintiff reside in the City of Toronto.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=11"><p data-viibes-end="9" data-viibes-parag="11" data-viibes-start="10">[ 11 ] A number of the medical and other witness to be called at trial reside in or near the greater Toronto area. However, the record discloses that the majority of the witnesses to be called by the Plaintiff at trial are resident in the Northeast Region. This is where the post-acute care and treatment was received and is where the Plaintiff’s family doctor, treating orthopedic surgeon and psychological expert reside. It is also where the Plaintiff has worked in his chosen profession.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=12"><p data-viibes-end="10" data-viibes-parag="12" data-viibes-start="11">[ 12 ] On a holistic consideration of the factors enumerated in subrule 13.1.02(2) and the circumstances of the case, I find that the Plaintiff’s choice of venue was a reasonable one. I am not satisfied that the record establishes that the venue proposed by the Defendants is “significantly better” than the one chosen by the Plaintiff. It cannot be said that the Plaintiff’s choice is unreasonable. I therefore dismiss the Defendants motion for a transfer.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=13"><p data-viibes-end="11" data-viibes-parag="13" data-viibes-start="12">[ 13 ] Given this result, the cross motion is also dismissed. For clarification, a request to transfer or move a proceeding within a particular judicial region from one location to another is not a determination to be made by an RSJ in a different region.</p></div>
<div link="/en/#search/origin1=/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html&linkedNoteup=&section1=14"><p data-viibes-end="12" data-viibes-parag="14" data-viibes-start="13">[ 14 ] I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs. If they cannot agree, the Plaintiff is to provide his costs submissions of no more than 2 pages by June 11, 2025. The Defendants are to provide their costs submission of the same length by June 18, 2025. Any reply is to be delivered by June 23, 2025. These submissions are to be uploaded to Case Center and provided to my judicial assistant.</p></div>
<p>_______________________________</p>
<p>Released: June 3, 2025 Firestone RSJ.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
---
citation: "Samuel Middleton v. Key et al., 2025 ONSC 3292"
parties: "Samuel Middleton v. Matthew Shawn Key and Michelene Catherine Key"
party_moving: "Matthew Shawn Key and Michelene Catherine Key"
party_responding: "Samuel Middleton"
court: "Superior Court of Justice"
court_abbreviation: "ONSC"
jurisdiction: "Ontario"
case_type: "motion"
date_judgement: "2025-06-03"
date_heard: "2025-06-03"
applicant:
- "Matthew Shawn Key"
- "Michelene Catherine Key"
applicant_counsel:
- "Ryan D. Truax"
- "Marcus Rozsa"
respondent:
- "Samuel Middleton"
respondent_counsel:
- "Thomas L. W. Orendorff"
judge: "Firestone"
winning_degree_applicant: 5
winning_degree_respondent: 1
judge_bias_applicant: 0
judge_bias_respondent: 0
year: 2025
decision_number: 3292
file_number: "CV-20-00009461-0000"
source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3292/2025onsc3292.html"
cited_cases:
legislation:
- title: "Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194"
url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194"
case_law:
- title: "Chatterson et al. v. M&M Meat Shops, 2014 ONSC 1897, paras. 22, 34, 35"
url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2014/2014onsc1897/2014onsc1897.html"
- title: "Bruce Power L.P. v. BNT Canada, L.P., 2018 ONSC 5968, para. 16"
url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc5968/2018onsc5968.html"
summary: >
The defendants brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Sudbury (Northeast Region) to the Toronto Region. The plaintiff opposed the transfer and brought a cross-motion requesting that, if a transfer was necessary, it should be to Gore Bay in the Northeast Judicial Region. The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the plaintiff’s choice of venue was reasonable. The defendants did not establish that their proposed venue was significantly better. Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.
interesting_citations_summary: >
The decision provides a clear application of the holistic approach to venue transfer under Rule 13.1.02, emphasizing that no single factor is determinative and that the party seeking transfer must show their proposed venue is significantly better. The court also clarifies the limits of an RSJ’s authority regarding intra-regional transfers.
keywords:
- Venue transfer
- Rules of Civil Procedure
- Ontario Superior Court
- Chatterson v. M&M Meat Shops
- Bruce Power v. BNT Canada
- Judicial region
- Civil procedure
- Costs submissions
areas_of_law:
- Civil Procedure
- Civil Litigation
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# Court File and Parties
**Court File No.:** CV-20-00009461-0000
**Date:** 2025-06-03
**Superior Court of Justice – Ontario**
**Re:** Samuel Middleton, Plaintiff
**And:** Matthew Shawn Key and Michelene Catherine Key, Defendants
**Before:** Firestone RSJ.
**Counsel:**
Thomas L. W. Orendorff, for the Plaintiff
Ryan D. Truax and Marcus Rozsa, for the Defendants
**Heard:** In Writing
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# Endorsement
[1] The Defendants bring this motion for an order transferring this proceeding from Sudbury (Northeast Region) to the Toronto Region.
[2] The Plaintiff opposes the transfer motion. He also brings a cross-motion requesting that should a transfer be necessary, it should be to Gore Bay in the Northeast Judicial Region.
[3] The motion is brought pursuant to [Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194) (the “Rules”) and the procedures set forth in the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction amended February 1, 2024 (the “Practice Direction”). In accordance with the Practice Direction, I am to determine the Defendants’ request to transfer this proceeding from another judicial region to the Toronto Region.
[4] In determining whether a transfer is desirable in the interests of justice, the court is to consider the factors enumerated in subrule 13.01.02(b).
[5] The factors set forth in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) are to be applied holistically. No one of the enumerated factors is more important than the other. These factors are to be examined together and balanced in order to determine whether a requested transfer is desirable in the interests of justice: [Chatterson et al. v. M&M Meat Shops, 2014 ONSC 1897, 68 C.P.C. (7th) 135 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 22, 34, and 35](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2014/2014onsc1897/2014onsc1897.html).
[6] Balancing the factors in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) is not a purely numerical or mathematical counting exercise: [Bruce Power L.P. v. BNT Canada, L.P., 2018 ONSC 5968, at para. 16](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc5968/2018onsc5968.html).
[7] If the Plaintiff’s choice of venue is reasonable and the Defendant challenges that venue, then a comparison of the two venues is required. The Defendant must establish that its proposed choice of venue is “significantly better” than the one chosen by the Plaintiff: Chatterson, at paras. 28-29.
[8] The subject collision took place in the City of Toronto. At that time the Plaintiff was a student at Tyndale University in Toronto and was employed at Starbucks. He attends university between September and April of each year. The Plaintiff is ordinarily resident in the Northeast Judicial Region.
[9] Following the collision, he was transported to the North York General Hospital and then St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto where he remained for a number of days. Upon discharge he sought treatment at the Manitoulin Health Centre.
[10] The Defendants reside in Aurora which is located in the Central York Region and is part of the greater Toronto area. Neither the Defendants nor the Plaintiff reside in the City of Toronto.
[11] A number of the medical and other witnesses to be called at trial reside in or near the greater Toronto area. However, the record discloses that the majority of the witnesses to be called by the Plaintiff at trial are resident in the Northeast Region. This is where the post-acute care and treatment was received and is where the Plaintiff’s family doctor, treating orthopedic surgeon and psychological expert reside. It is also where the Plaintiff has worked in his chosen profession.
[12] On a holistic consideration of the factors enumerated in subrule 13.1.02(2) and the circumstances of the case, I find that the Plaintiff’s choice of venue was a reasonable one. I am not satisfied that the record establishes that the venue proposed by the Defendants is “significantly better” than the one chosen by the Plaintiff. It cannot be said that the Plaintiff’s choice is unreasonable. I therefore dismiss the Defendants' motion for a transfer.
[13] Given this result, the cross-motion is also dismissed. For clarification, a request to transfer or move a proceeding within a particular judicial region from one location to another is not a determination to be made by an RSJ in a different region.
[14] I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs. If they cannot agree, the Plaintiff is to provide his costs submissions of no more than 2 pages by June 11, 2025. The Defendants are to provide their costs submission of the same length by June 18, 2025. Any reply is to be delivered by June 23, 2025. These submissions are to be uploaded to Case Center and provided to my judicial assistant.
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Released: June 3, 2025
Firestone RSJ.
