3 total
Bolus drinking lacked an air of reality on the trial evidence.
In this impaired driving jury trial, the court determined whether the accused's bolus drinking theory had an air of reality sufficient to be left with the jury.
Both Crown and defence toxicologists agreed on the blood alcohol calculations and on the quantity and timing of alcohol that would have been required for the theory to operate.
Even taking the accused's and supporting witness's evidence at its highest, the factual record could not support the necessary recent consumption.
The court held that leaving bolus drinking with the jury would be confusing and unsupported by the evidence, and instructed the jury not to consider it if they accepted the toxicology evidence.
Custodial sentence imposed for returning to public park with machete after dispute.
The accused was convicted by a jury of possession of a weapon for the purpose of committing an offence contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code after returning to a public baseball field with a machete following an earlier altercation.
The court rejected the accused’s claim that he obtained the machete by disarming an unknown attacker and found the conduct represented a deliberate escalation of a public dispute that created significant danger to bystanders and resulted in injuries.
Aggravating factors included planning, the use of a dangerous weapon in a crowded public setting, retaliatory motive, and the foreseeable injuries resulting from the confrontation.
Mitigating factors included the accused’s lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and personal injuries sustained during the incident.
The court imposed a custodial sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender’s rehabilitative prospects.
30‑month delay did not breach s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within reasonable time.
The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that a 30‑month delay from arrest to trial infringed their right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, reasons for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the societal interest in adjudicating the charges.
The court attributed portions of the delay to inherent requirements, defence delay, Crown delay related to a certiorari application, and institutional delay.
The combined Crown and institutional delay totaled approximately 17½ months, within the Morin guideline range for cases proceeding through both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice.
Balancing the modest prejudice experienced by the accused against the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearms and drug charges, the court concluded the delay did not exceed what is constitutionally tolerable.
