Maureen Bellmore

The offender, Andrew Medford, brought a motion for recusal of the trial judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias during his conviction for assault, sexual assault, and related offences, and during a subsequent dangerous offender application.

The allegations included the judge's facial expression while viewing video evidence, the short deliberation time before conviction, the judge's statement about convicting on 'pretty much everything,' and the revocation of bail.

Further allegations during the dangerous offender application concerned the judge's handling of a publication ban, an alleged excusal of the complainant's inappropriate gesture, and signs of frustration with defence counsel during cross-examination of an expert witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, either individually or cumulatively, and affirmed the presumption of judicial impartiality.

Andre Callaghan was found guilty of 15 counts, including discharging a prohibited firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a high-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a removed serial number, careless storage, possession of firearms/devices while prohibited, dangerous driving, and failing to stop for police.

Counts 2, 5, and 7 were stayed.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his extensive criminal record (including prior gun and drug offenses, and breaches of prohibition orders), lack of remorse, and high-risk lifestyle.

Mitigating factors included family support, educational achievements in custody, and employment history.

The court declined enhanced credit for pre-trial custody conditions due to insufficient evidence of impact.

A global sentence of ten years was imposed, reduced to six years after credit for pre-trial custody, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition and a two-year driving prohibition.

V.J. was convicted of eight offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement, against his wife, A.J., over a two-year period.

The court considered aggravating factors such as domestic violence in the home, escalation of violence, and the victim's vulnerability, alongside mitigating factors like the offender's lack of criminal record and strong work ethic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and following the approach of assigning fit sentences for each offence before considering totality, the court imposed a total penitentiary sentence of 35 months, along with a mandatory weapons prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Registry order, and a no-contact order.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court determined whether three accused should be committed to stand trial on charges of human trafficking, prostitution-related offences, assault, and uttering threats.

The complainant testified that she engaged in sex work from December 2014 to April 2015 under the control of the three accused.

The court analyzed the essential elements of trafficking in persons under section 279.01 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1 to 286.3.

The court committed all three accused to stand trial on various counts, finding sufficient evidence of control, direction, and influence over the complainant's movements and earnings for exploitative purposes.

The court discharged certain counts where insufficient evidence existed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit three defendants to stand trial on charges of human trafficking and prostitution-related offences.

The court examined the essential elements of trafficking in persons under sections 279.01-279.04 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1-286.5.

The decision provides comprehensive analysis of the statutory framework, including the definition of exploitation, the requirement for exploitative purpose, and the distinction between trafficking and prostitution offences.

The court applied the legal test for committal at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused, Phillip Joseph (P.J.), was convicted of second-degree murder and faced a sentencing hearing to determine whether an adult or youth sentence was appropriate.

P.J. was 17 at the time of the offence.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the accused's role, age, maturity, mental disorders (Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Cannabis Use Disorder), and progress in custody.

Despite some positive developments in custody, the court found that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the young person accountable or ensure public protection and rehabilitation, given the severity of the crime and the uncertainty of treatment success.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault after pouring hot oil on a teenager who was fighting her son.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 to 3 years, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court found that the offender's actions were a spontaneous overreaction to protect her son, rather than a premeditated attack.

Considering the offender's status as a first-time offender and the sole caregiver for four children, the court applied the principle of restraint and sentenced her to 90 days in jail to be served intermittently, followed by 24 months of probation.

In a murder trial involving a young person, the defence brought a Scopelliti motion seeking to introduce images recovered from the deceased’s cellphone memory card to suggest a violent disposition and support a claim of self‑defence.

The proposed evidence consisted of photographs of firearms, knives, cash, marijuana, and aggressive slogans whose origin and authorship were unknown.

The court applied the governing principles from Scopelliti and subsequent authorities and concluded that the images had minimal probative value and did not demonstrate prior acts of violence or a disposition to carry weapons.

Any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect, risk of improper reasoning about the deceased’s character, and the potential to distract the jury with collateral issues.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The accused, a young person charged with first degree murder, challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police statement on a voir dire.

The court considered whether the police were required to comply with s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and whether the statement was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The court held that s. 146 was not triggered because the accused was neither arrested nor detained and the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe he had committed the offence at the time of the interview.

The interview circumstances did not involve inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or improper trickery, and the rudimentary cautions given were sufficient in the circumstances.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused was convicted by a jury of possession of a weapon for the purpose of committing an offence contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code after returning to a public baseball field with a machete following an earlier altercation.

The court rejected the accused’s claim that he obtained the machete by disarming an unknown attacker and found the conduct represented a deliberate escalation of a public dispute that created significant danger to bystanders and resulted in injuries.

Aggravating factors included planning, the use of a dangerous weapon in a crowded public setting, retaliatory motive, and the foreseeable injuries resulting from the confrontation.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and personal injuries sustained during the incident.

The court imposed a custodial sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender’s rehabilitative prospects.

A young person charged with first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a 20-year-old victim sought release pending trial.

The Crown opposed release on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the Crown established a substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released, based on the extreme and unexplained brutality of the murder.

The court also found exceptional circumstances warranting detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The young person's parents, though willing to act as sureties, demonstrated insufficient knowledge of and control over their son.

The court ordered detention pending trial.