S. Chung

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit three defendants to stand trial on charges of human trafficking and prostitution-related offences.

The court examined the essential elements of trafficking in persons under sections 279.01-279.04 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1-286.5.

The decision provides comprehensive analysis of the statutory framework, including the definition of exploitation, the requirement for exploitative purpose, and the distinction between trafficking and prostitution offences.

The court applied the legal test for committal at a preliminary inquiry.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court determined whether three accused should be committed to stand trial on charges of human trafficking, prostitution-related offences, assault, and uttering threats.

The complainant testified that she engaged in sex work from December 2014 to April 2015 under the control of the three accused.

The court analyzed the essential elements of trafficking in persons under section 279.01 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1 to 286.3.

The court committed all three accused to stand trial on various counts, finding sufficient evidence of control, direction, and influence over the complainant's movements and earnings for exploitative purposes.

The court discharged certain counts where insufficient evidence existed.

The Crown applied for a review of a justice of the peace's order granting judicial interim release to the respondent.

The respondent's original surety had applied to be relieved of his obligations, resulting in a committal order under s. 766(1) of the Criminal Code.

A justice of the peace subsequently substituted a new surety without holding a new bail hearing, relying on R. v. Alexander.

The Superior Court held that a committal order vacates the underlying release order, necessitating a new bail hearing.

Furthermore, because the original surety was specifically named in the release order, the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to amend the order to substitute a new surety.

The release order was quashed and a new bail hearing was ordered.