Diane Oleskiw

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit three defendants to stand trial on charges of human trafficking and prostitution-related offences.

The court examined the essential elements of trafficking in persons under sections 279.01-279.04 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1-286.5.

The decision provides comprehensive analysis of the statutory framework, including the definition of exploitation, the requirement for exploitative purpose, and the distinction between trafficking and prostitution offences.

The court applied the legal test for committal at a preliminary inquiry.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court determined whether three accused should be committed to stand trial on charges of human trafficking, prostitution-related offences, assault, and uttering threats.

The complainant testified that she engaged in sex work from December 2014 to April 2015 under the control of the three accused.

The court analyzed the essential elements of trafficking in persons under section 279.01 of the Criminal Code and prostitution-related offences under sections 286.1 to 286.3.

The court committed all three accused to stand trial on various counts, finding sufficient evidence of control, direction, and influence over the complainant's movements and earnings for exploitative purposes.

The court discharged certain counts where insufficient evidence existed.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a single-vehicle collision.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to exclude blood sample evidence obtained by search warrant, alleging that the Information to Obtain was legally deficient and violated Charter section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The applicant challenged three areas: the characterization of the odour of alcohol, the stated reasons for inability to provide a breath sample, and the adequacy of the police investigation into the collision circumstances.

The court found that while certain statements in the affidavit were erroneous or omitted, after excision and proper amplification, reasonable and probable grounds remained for the warrant's issuance.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while over 80 and impaired operation following a single-vehicle collision.

Police found the accused trapped in the driver's seat of a heavily damaged vehicle at 4:00 a.m.

Blood samples taken at 6:30 a.m. showed a BAC of 167 mgs per 100 mls, with expert evidence establishing the BAC at the time of collision would have been 172-222 mgs per 100 mls.

The Crown failed to establish the specific time of driving.

The court dismissed the operation charges but convicted on the included offence of care or control, finding the statutory presumption applied and was not rebutted.

The court also found a realistic risk of danger existed.

A young person charged with first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a 20-year-old victim sought release pending trial.

The Crown opposed release on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the Crown established a substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released, based on the extreme and unexplained brutality of the murder.

The court also found exceptional circumstances warranting detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The young person's parents, though willing to act as sureties, demonstrated insufficient knowledge of and control over their son.

The court ordered detention pending trial.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs on May 24, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for September 3, 2013.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay was approximately 15 months, with the Crown responsible for at least 2.5 months of delay due to delayed disclosure and institutional delay accounting for 11.5 months.

The court determined that the institutional and Crown delay was unreasonable and granted the application, imposing a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with attempt abduction, sexual assault, sexual invitation, and assault with intent to resist arrest following an incident on a Toronto street where he abruptly stopped his vehicle in oncoming traffic and aggressively approached a 2½-year-old child while screaming.

The child's father physically intervened and restrained the accused until police arrived.

The court found the accused guilty of attempt abduction, simple assault (as an included offence to sexual assault), and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The court acquitted the accused of sexual invitation and found him guilty of possession of cocaine and oxycodone on his own admission.

The court concluded that although the accused intended to sexually assault the child, the mens rea and actus reus of sexual assault did not coincide temporally at the roadside, as the sexual assault was intended to occur at a later time after abduction.

This is a ruling on committal for trial following a three-month preliminary inquiry into Project Marvel, a police investigation into drug and firearm trafficking by members of a criminal organization known as the Young Buck Killers (YBK).

Nine defendants faced sixty-four counts including trafficking and possession of cocaine and other drugs, trafficking and possession of firearms, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown alleged that most defendants committed these offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the YBK criminal organization.

The court applied the test for committal established in R. v. Arcuri, requiring that there be admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit most defendants to trial on the charges, though some counts were discharged where the evidence was insufficient or speculative.

The court's analysis focused on whether the predicate offences were sufficiently connected to the criminal organization and whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The accused was charged with carrying a concealed weapon (a ball bearing gun) following a police stop in a strip mall parking lot.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the detention was arbitrary, lacking reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was connected to a particular crime.

The court also found violations of the right to counsel and the right against unreasonable search.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the multiple Charter breaches and their significant impact on the accused's constitutional rights.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level was over 80 mgs on February 10, 2011.

The trial was scheduled for April 12 and 13, 2012, approximately 14 months after the charge.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that institutional delay of 11.5 months was unreasonable and unacceptable for a relatively simple 1.5 day trial, particularly where the defence and Crown were not responsible for the delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.