Jonathan M. Rosenthal

The Crown brought applications for the forfeiture of hundreds of forged paintings attributed to Norval Morrisseau.

The Estate of Norval Morrisseau brought a motion seeking standing as a party or leave to intervene, as well as leave to file expert evidence regarding the adverse effects of preserving the forgeries.

The court found that the Estate had a valid interest in the property and granted it leave to intervene.

The Estate's participation was limited to leading expert evidence on the harms caused by the forgeries and making submissions grounded in the evidentiary record.

The Crown brought applications for the return and forfeiture of hundreds of paintings and objects of art seized during the Voss, Lamont, Cowan, White, and Bremner investigations into forged art.

At a case conference, the court set out the evidentiary basis for the applications and directed that the parties must sign an undertaking restricting the use and dissemination of the disclosure material before the Crown provides it.

The court scheduled a further case conference to review the status of disclosure and set a schedule for the delivery of application records and responding materials.

The Crown applied to hold joint forfeiture hearings in multiple related prosecutions involving over 1,000 allegedly forged artworks seized from third parties.

The third parties and proposed intervenors either took no position or did not oppose the application.

The court granted the application, finding that a joint hearing involving common third parties, evidence, and legal issues would be the most efficient process and ensure a consistent application of the law.

The defendant applied under section 11(b) of the Charter to stay charges of impaired driving and exceed 80, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court assumed the total delay was 21 months and 2 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

The central issue was whether the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the pandemic directly impacted the case by preventing the Crown's proactive efforts to secure earlier trial dates and by burdening the court system with a massive backlog, thereby preventing rescheduling.

The period of delay attributable to the pandemic was sufficient to bring the case below the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the defendant on an "Over 80" charge.

The trial judge had acquitted the defendant due to defects in the certificate of a qualified technician (lack of signature, inverted digits) which diminished its probative value, and alternatively, excluded the certificate under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) right to counsel infringement.

The appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the certificate's evidentiary weight was not procedurally unfair to the Crown, as the judge assessed weight, not admissibility, at the end of the trial.

The court affirmed that errors in certificate preparation affect weight, not admissibility, and can constitute "evidence to the contrary" under the Interpretation Act.

The accused was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and impaired operation of a vessel causing death following the death of an eight-year-old child during a canoeing incident on the Muskoka River during spring run-off.

The accused had consumed alcohol and cannabis before taking the child canoeing toward a waterfall to retrieve a barrel, resulting in the canoe capsizing and the child drowning.

The court imposed a six-year penitentiary sentence and a ten-year prohibition on operating a vessel, finding the accused's conduct demonstrated wanton and reckless disregard for the child's life and safety.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop on Highway 400.

The trial proceeded on the merits with a blended Charter voir dire.

The court found that police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a Prosper warning when the accused indicated a change of mind regarding legal representation.

The Intoxilyzer readings were excluded as a result.

However, the court found the Crown proved impairment based on the accused's driving pattern and roadside observations, resulting in conviction on the impaired charge and acquittal on the over 80 charge.

Applications by Uber Canada Inc. and alleged Uber driver Ersan Zukic for stays of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on alleged violations of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The defendants were charged with bylaw offences under the City of Mississauga Public Vehicle Licensing By-law 420-04.

The court applied the new analytical framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which establishes presumptive ceilings of 18 months for provincial court proceedings.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 24-26 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling and that the prosecution failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance did not apply as the prosecution failed to prove reasonable reliance on the pre-existing law.

Stays of proceedings were granted for all three charges.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The applicant was charged with two drunk driving offences on May 18, 2015, with trial scheduled for October 24-26, 2016, resulting in a total delay of 17 months and 8 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets an 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice matters.

The court found that while the delay fell below the ceiling, the applicant failed to meet the onus of establishing that the case took markedly longer than reasonable.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, particularly by failing to pursue Crown pre-trials or judicial pre-trials, and that both parties had limited availability for trial dates.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mLs of blood.

He brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charge was laid on February 8, 2014, and the trial was scheduled for October 9, 2014, but could not proceed due to court overbooking.

A new trial date was set for March 26, 2015, resulting in a total delay of approximately 13 months and 16 days.

The court found that the institutional delay of 11 months and one week exceeded the Morin guidelines, that the accused suffered actual financial and emotional prejudice, and that the delay was unacceptable for a straightforward impaired driving case.

The charge was stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

A civilian witness observed the accused's truck swerving erratically across lanes and changing speed without apparent cause, prompting a 911 call.

Police officers observed similar driving patterns and stopped the vehicle.

The accused displayed signs consistent with impairment including red and watery eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the credible evidence of the civilian witness and police observations of the accused's inability to maintain a safe driving course.

The court rejected the accused's assertion that diabetes could account for the observed impairment and found a guilty verdict.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

Charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood, the accused faced a delay of approximately 15 months and 20 days from charge to trial conclusion.

The court found institutional delay of 12 months and 3 weeks to be unacceptable for a straightforward drinking and driving case.

The accused suffered actual financial and emotional prejudice from the delay, including unexpected adjournment after the first trial date commenced.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level was over 80 mgs on February 10, 2011.

The trial was scheduled for April 12 and 13, 2012, approximately 14 months after the charge.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that institutional delay of 11.5 months was unreasonable and unacceptable for a relatively simple 1.5 day trial, particularly where the defence and Crown were not responsible for the delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

At trial, the defence brought a motion to quash the information on the grounds that it was a nullity.

The defence argued that because the applicant had been arrested and released on a Promise to Appear, a summons could not be issued under section 507 of the Criminal Code.

The defence further contended that the proper procedure should have been section 507.1, which was not followed, rendering the information statutorily deemed never to have been laid.

The Crown argued that the phrase "has already been arrested" refers to someone held in custody, not merely arrested and released, and that any procedural defect was cured by the applicant's subsequent attornment to the court's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the motion to quash.

The appellant appealed multiple Criminal Code convictions arising from incidents involving criminal harassment, assault, threats, theft, mischief, and breaches of recognizance.

The sole issue pursued on appeal was whether the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for conviction following a lengthy multi-day trial involving numerous witnesses.

The appellate court held that although the trial judge’s oral reasons were brief in parts, they sufficiently explained the route to conviction and allowed meaningful appellate review.

The judge’s acceptance of the complainant’s evidence, corroborated by other witnesses and independent evidence, and rejection of the appellant’s testimony demonstrated application of the principles in R. v. W. (D.).

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Registrar issued a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence of LJBD Incorporated operating as LOLA.

The parties submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts admitting to rats in the premises, a snake in a liquor bottle, and missing receipts.

The Board accepted the joint submission and ordered a 10-day suspension of the liquor licence, along with a condition prohibiting a former partner from involvement in the business.