Mihael Ami Cole

The court sentenced Neng Jia Jin for the first degree murder of Vanessa Kurpiewska and the attempted murder of Sulakshana Srijeyarah, both committed on December 8, 2022, on Toronto public transit.

Jin pleaded guilty, avoiding a lengthy trial.

The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years was imposed for murder, and 20 years’ imprisonment (concurrent) for attempted murder.

The court reviewed the facts, victim impact, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles, emphasizing the gravity of the offences, the profound impact on victims and the community, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court acquitted A.B. of all charges of sexual assault and sexual touching against Y.Z., finding that the complainant's evidence was not sufficiently reliable or credible to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision turned on significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, implausibility in the mechanics of the alleged assaults, and contradictions with other evidence, including the timing and circumstances of the alleged events.

The court also found the accused's evidence to be generally credible and reliable.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit the complainant's videotaped statement in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statement, recorded two years and two months after the last alleged incident, was not made within a "reasonable time." The court, applying a holistic interpretation of "reasonable time," considered the complainant's age at the time of delay, the relationship with the accused, and the common reasons for delayed disclosure in sexual abuse cases.

The court found the delay reasonable and allowed the application, concluding that admitting the video recording would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.

The accused, Malcom Bryce-Brown, faced ten criminal counts, including sexual assault, assault bodily harm, assault, possession of child pornography, and probation breaches.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of child pornography, two counts of assault (one causing bodily harm), and three related probation breaches based on concessions.

For the remaining counts, including sexual assault and assault bodily harm related to a choking incident, the court found reasonable doubt regarding consent, particularly concerning the agreed-upon "safe word" and the complainant's impaired memory due to marijuana use.

The court also addressed the legal principles of vitiation of consent in sexual activity involving bodily harm, concluding that the Crown did not prove the subjective intent to cause bodily harm required to vitiate consent in the choking incident, nor was sufficient evidence of bodily harm presented.

This decision concerns the dangerous offender sentencing of Mr. Francis, who was convicted of criminal harassment and breaches of probation and a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The court determined that an indeterminate sentence was necessary due to the offender's extensive history of violent and harassing behaviour, particularly against women, his consistent refusal to engage in treatment, and the high risk of recidivism.

The court found no reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence, even with a new LTSO, would adequately protect the public, especially given his immediate re-offending after a previous LTSO.

The judgment emphasizes the severe and life-altering psychological harm inflicted on victims and the offender's profound lack of insight or remorse.

The Crown applied under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit a video statement of a child complainant (K.B.) in a sexual assault trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statement was not made "within a reasonable time" (5.5 years after alleged offences).

The court considered the circumstances, including the complainants' young age at the time of disclosure, their mother's initial disbelief, and prior abuse by a sibling.

The court found the delay reasonable given the context of child sexual abuse and that the admission would not interfere with the proper administration of justice or the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The application was allowed.

Jack Himel pleaded guilty to possession and making child pornography.

The Crown sought 18 months custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 12-15 months.

The court found that despite significant mitigating circumstances and low risk of re-offence, a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the severity of the offences, particularly the making of child pornography, and the Supreme Court's directives on sentencing for child sexual offences.

A sentence of 12 months custody followed by 12 months probation was imposed.

The defendant, designated a dangerous offender, faced charges including criminal harassment and breach of orders.

The Crown brought three pre-trial applications: (i) similar fact/prior discreditable conduct evidence regarding two former domestic partners, (ii) video link testimony for two witnesses residing in the United States, and (iii) admission of a deceased witness's videotaped statement under the hearsay exception.

The court granted the similar fact application regarding one partner (Ms. Landrio) but dismissed it for the other (Ms. MacLean), granted the video link testimony application for both witnesses, and granted the hearsay application for the deceased witness's statement.

The accused, Matthew Moreira and Patrick Smith, brought an application to stay charges of second-degree murder, manslaughter, assault, and robbery, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the end of the second trial was 32 months and 16 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the complexity of the case and a mistrial declared during the first trial, which was deemed a discrete event.

The court found the case to be complex due to multiple accused, voluminous evidence, and challenging legal issues.

It also determined that the mistrial was an unforeseeable discrete event, and the Crown acted expeditiously to mitigate its impact.

Additionally, the court considered the transitional exception under *Jordan*, acknowledging that the system needed time to adapt to the new framework.

Consequently, the application to stay the charges was dismissed.

The applicants, William Cummins and Matthew Moreira, charged with first-degree murder and robbery alongside Patrick Smith, sought severance from Mr. Smith for their joint trial.

The motion was based on the potential impact of Mr. Smith's statement to undercover officers, which they argued was exculpatory for them and necessary for their full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the legal presumption in favour of joint trials for co-accused acting in concert, the risk of inconsistent verdicts, and the truth-seeking function of a single trial.

The court found that antagonistic defences were likely to arise, and that carefully crafted jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice.

The accused was charged with assault, unlawful confinement, and failing to comply with a recognizance following an attack on a complainant.

The Crown's case relied primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove dropped by the assailant, which matched the accused's DNA with a high statistical probability.

The Crown also presented evidence that the accused's appearance was consistent with the complainant's generic description and that similar clothing was found in the accused's residence.

The court, however, found that the DNA evidence alone was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, especially given the presence of DNA from other individuals on the glove and the generic nature of the physical description and clothing.

Citing principles from R. v. Villaroman and R. v. Wills, the court emphasized that alternative inferences need not be based on proven facts and that probable guilt is insufficient for conviction.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

Three accused were charged jointly with first degree murder in the beating death of Zaher Nourredine and robbery of Mitchell Conery.

The Crown relied on section 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code for murder and section 231(5)(e) for first degree murder based on forcible confinement.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for manslaughter and robbery but opposed committal on first degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit all three accused to trial on first degree murder and robbery, applying the Sheppard test and finding that the evidence supported inferences of the requisite mens rea for murder and that the confinement of one victim (Conery) was a separate and distinct act from the murder of the other victim (Nourredine), satisfying the requirements of constructive first degree murder under the multiple victim scenario established in R. v. Russell.

Joel France pleaded guilty to unlawful act manslaughter in the death of two-year-old Nicholas Cruz, stemming from a failure to provide necessities of life.

The court considered aggravating factors, including France's repeated physical abuse of Nicholas and domestic abuse of Nicholas's mother, Marleny Cruz, as well as his abuse of a position of trust.

Mitigating factors included his lack of a criminal record and difficult childhood, though his limited remorse was noted.

The Crown sought a ten-year sentence, while the defence sought four to six years.

The court imposed a nine-year sentence, with a six-year credit for pre-trial custody, and issued ancillary orders including a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items and his security guard uniform.

A two-year-old child died from blunt force trauma to the abdomen.

The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for failing to provide necessaries of life.

This decision addresses a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating factors for sentencing.

The Crown sought to prove that the defendant assaulted the child's mother, inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, and assaulted the child on other occasions.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically and emotionally abused the child's mother and repeatedly assaulted the child on various parts of the body, constituting despicable assaultive behavior.

However, the court could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, considering other possible explanations and witness credibility issues.

Joel France was charged with second-degree murder.

This decision concerns a voir dire ruling on the admissibility and scope of expert evidence from Dr. Michael Pollanen, a forensic pathologist, regarding the cause of death of Nicholas Cruz.

The court limited Dr. Pollanen's testimony, prohibiting opinions on whether the fatal injury was deliberately inflicted or accidental, the statistical probabilities of causes, or inferences based on other injuries.

The court also restricted the language used by the expert, disallowing terms like "significant blow" and "consistent with" to avoid misleading the jury.

The judge found Dr. Pollanen's preparation and impartiality lacking in certain aspects, highlighting the dangers of expert overreaching and bias.

The accused, a 31-year-old First Nations woman, pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term offender supervision order by testing positive for cocaine metabolites.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment.

The court imposed a sentence of 1 day, taking into account the accused's Gladue factors, including her status as a Residential School survivor, her history of trauma, her addiction issues rooted in systemic discrimination against Indigenous peoples, and her rehabilitation potential.

The court emphasized the importance of restraint in sentencing Indigenous offenders and the principle of rehabilitation.

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted possession of child pornography.

He was a 57-year-old single parent of a 12-year-old adopted son with special needs, employed as a chartered accountant in the Ontario Public Service for 24 years.

At his workplace in May 2014, cyber security detected attempts to access pornographic websites, including some with references to minors.

A search of his home revealed chat logs of online conversations with sexual content involving children.

The Crown sought six months custody; the defence sought 30 days served intermittently.

The court imposed 37 days intermittent custody followed by three years probation with extensive conditions, considering the offender's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, low risk assessment, and the impact on his dependent son.

The accused was charged with accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought to introduce purchase orders and invoices found on the defendant's account at AZOV Films (a website selling child pornography) as evidence of the offence.

The central issue was whether these electronic documents were admissible for the truth of their contents.

The Crown argued admissibility under section 31 of the Canada Evidence Act or as admissions against interest.

The defence argued that section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act applied and had not been complied with.

The court held that section 31 addresses only authentication and the best evidence rule, not hearsay exceptions.

Section 30 applies to business records and was not complied with.

The documents were also not admissible as admissions because the accused was not in possession of the computer housing the records and there was insufficient evidence he created them.

The Crown conceded it could not establish admissibility and requested a finding of not guilty, which was granted.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

At trial, the defence brought a motion to quash the information on the grounds that it was a nullity.

The defence argued that because the applicant had been arrested and released on a Promise to Appear, a summons could not be issued under section 507 of the Criminal Code.

The defence further contended that the proper procedure should have been section 507.1, which was not followed, rendering the information statutorily deemed never to have been laid.

The Crown argued that the phrase "has already been arrested" refers to someone held in custody, not merely arrested and released, and that any procedural defect was cured by the applicant's subsequent attornment to the court's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the motion to quash.